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CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA

4. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-785

Crisis in Central Africa, S. Hrg. 10...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 26, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1994

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Simon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Simon, Feingold, Kassebaum, Pressler, and Jeffords.

Senator SIMON. Our hearing will come to order.

We are holding a hearing on the Rwanda situation to find out what we are doing and is what we are doing enough? We have to do everything we can to help. I think it is also safe to say that we did not respond as adequately as we should have early on, and one of the things that the administration, as well as other countries has to work together to be able to respond much more rapidly when crises develop.

Shortly after the problem developed in Rwanda Senator Jeffords and I talked to General Dallaire, the Canadian general who was in charge of the small U.N. contingency there in the capital of Kigali. One of the marvels of today's technology, even in the midst of chaos you can reach someone in a capital like Kigali. General Dallaire said if I could get 5,000 to 8,000 troops quickly he could end this whole problem. Senator Jeffords and I communicated that to our administration and elsewhere, but there simply was not the sense of urgency that there should have been, and the U.N. did not have the ability. Some weeks after we sent that letter and after the U.N. Security Council authorized 5,500 troops, the New York Times, of June 22 had an article by Richard Lyons from the U.N.

The story discussed the French moving into Rwanda and it says this 2,000-man force—and incidentally, the French moved in in 72 hours from the time that they made the decision—this 2,000-man force would be in addition to the already approved U.N. force of 5,500 troops, composed primarily of African soldiers, requested by Mr. Boutros-Ghali, but which has not yet been assembled and is not expected to get to Rwanda for 3 months. Clearly, we have to establish mechanisms to move much more rapidly in this kind of a situation.

Not too long after that article appeared the Secretary General of the Organization for African Unity visited me, and he said the OAU had commitments for the 5,500 troops. However, they need a mechanism to get to Rwanda. Now, some of these are

oversimplifications of a very complex situation, but somehow we have to deal with Africa in more than crisis terms. We have to anticipate problems and then move on the problems as they come along.

I spoke this morning on the phone with Rev. Jesse Jackson, who called me regarding his opinions on the Rwanda situation. He suggested that we recognize the new government of Rwanda and that we make an appeal to pharmaceutical companies for assistance. On that last suggestion, I have been in touch with some pharmaceutical companies and there is a response on their part. We must get these medicines transported as quickly as possible to Africa.

In addition, I want to digress by saying that for those concerned about Jesse Jackson coming in and being on one side of the somewhat tense situation in Nigeria, I think, you misunderstand Jesse Jackson. I think he will, if given a chance, will do a good job.

I called Ambassador Bob Krueger in Burundi and asked if there is spillover from Rwanda into Burundi? He told me, among other things, that they have a problem with the 200,000 Rwanda refugees, which is understandable in a small country; but that while they have the same two ethnic groups that Rwanda has, there is very little of the kind of violence that Rwanda has experienced. The Ambassador made a few other suggestions, and after the hearing I will talk to Secretary Moose about those.

But clearly, again, the bottom line is we that have to be willing to move more quickly. Boutros-Ghali is interviewed in the current Time Magazine. He is quoted as saying: "It was evident from the beginning that the situation in Rwanda was going wrong. But we have not been accustomed to having preventive diplomacy. During the cold war, the United States was ready to have its bombers flying 24 hours a day, which cost you \$1 billion a day. But now, U.N. members will not agree to spend \$50 million to send troops on a mission to avoid conflict." I think that is a criticism not just of the United States but of many countries, and I think we have to be preparing ourselves to move to prevent crises, not just to react to crises.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SIMON

The purpose of today's hearing is to examine our response to the continuing humanitarian crisis and political conflict in Central Africa, highlighting the Rwanda situation and spillover into the neighboring countries of Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania.

Aid agencies are calling this the greatest humanitarian challenge in history, with needs far outweighing those at the height of the Somalia famine in late 1992. In mid-July alone, more than 1 million refugees poured over the Rwanda border into Goma, Zaire. This past week more than 14,000 Rwandans in the area have died of cholera, and that number is quickly rising.

I am pleased that President Clinton has elevated the priority level of U.S. response to this crisis. I am happy that he has named Brian Atwood, our AID administrator who is here with us today, as his Special Envoy to Rwanda and Coordinator for International Disaster Response. In addition, I am happy to see that the U.S. military has been called in and that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili—who coordinated our response to the Kurdish plight in Iraq—has taken charge of this effort.

We must do everything we can to meet the immediate needs. However, it seems we shouldn't have found ourselves in this crisis situation in the first place. The massacres in Rwanda began in early April—it's now the end of July. After much debate, we finally authorized a U.N. peacekeeping force of 5,500 troops, but even now only a few hundred of those are on the ground in Rwanda. In the meantime, an estimated one-third of Rwanda's prewar population of 8 million has been killed or has

left the country before our eyes. We ignored the many warnings—and the advice of those who were right there, such as UNAMIR Force Commander Romeo Dallaire—at an immeasurable cost to humanity.

The tragedy we see today could and should have been dramatically lessened, if the United States and the United Nations had moved more quickly at the beginning. We need to develop stronger unilateral and multilateral mechanisms for much more rapid decision-making, mobilization of peacekeeping troops and humanitarian resources on the ground.

We need to recognize that Africa DOES matter to our national security. The greatest threat to our security now is instability, as evidenced by the plethora of regional and ethnic conflicts. We have a responsibility to lead the international community in responding to these situations. It costs us far more to wait—in terms of lives, money, and security.

More importantly, we need to look at Africa in more than crisis terms. As Brian Atwood pointed out on Friday before my House colleagues, we have to do better at crisis prevention. We could easily see Rwanda repeat itself in Burundi if we don't respond now. And we have refugees going into Zaire, which itself is in political chaos.

I am, however, pleased to note the overwhelming private response to this crisis. Jesse Jackson's National Rainbow Coalition is leading an effort to mobilize the support of private companies in getting medicines and transportation. I received a call yesterday from Searle, a major pharmaceutical company based in Illinois, which would like to donate \$1 million worth of cholera medicine to aid the refugees. I also have learned that a number of celebrities including Janet Jackson, are rallying support for this crisis.

Today I hope we will learn just what's happening on the ground, what we're doing so far, what other steps we need to take now, and begin to look at how we can do better next time.

We will begin with Brian Atwood followed by a panel consisting of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa and the Middle East Molly Williamson; and Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni of the Marine Corps, who has evaluated our military's crisis response capacity.

They will be followed by a panel of private witnesses, including Ms. Alison DesForges, a Board Member with Human Rights Watch/Africa, and an esteemed expert on Rwanda and Burundi; Mr. Jeff Drumtra, testifying on behalf of Roger Winter, for the U.S. Committee for Refugees; and Mr. Alain Destexhe, Secretary-General of Doctors Without Borders, who has come here from Brussels—Doctors without Borders is one of only two agencies that has been in Rwanda throughout the crisis.

We welcome you all, and look forward to learning from you today.

Senator SIMON. Let me call on my colleagues for any opening statements they may have. Senator Jeffords.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is not a word of what you have spoken that I do not agree with. I wish to thank you for holding this hearing to focus attention on the ongoing crisis in central Africa and to examine ways the United States, in conjunction with the international community, can help restore some measure of stability to a region that has witnessed some of the most graphic examples of man's inhumanity to fellow man. While Rwanda is an example of what happens when the international community fails to respond in a timely manner, we could still save hundreds of thousands of lives.

The images of the dead and dying broadcast daily on our television and printed in our newspapers are numbing, and the magnitude of the unprecedented refugee exodus is somehow beyond our understanding. Imagine, for a moment, the entire populations of New Hampshire and Maine, some 2 million people, running, walking, crawling, and being carried across the borders into Vermont in the course of a week, overrunning the few towns in the north-eastern part of our State.

This gives you some idea of the sheer numbers of the Rwandans who have been displaced and are now huddled in a lava field in

Zaire, overwhelming the capacity of Goma and Bukavu. Add to that the image of wounds of war, severe hunger, and lack of water leading to raging diseases. The refugees leave behind them a land drenched in the blood of innocent civilians. The best estimates put the number of those killed by the genocide and related massacres at more than 500,000 people, about equal to the total population of my State of Vermont.

When we picture this tragedy in these terms, I think my colleagues would agree that we have a human obligation to respond in some manner to relieve this great suffering. Mr. Chairman, none of us wants to repeat the mistakes of Somalia, but let us not lose sight of the fact that tens of thousands of lives were saved from starvation there, thanks largely to the intervention of the United States and other partners in that humanitarian effort. We can be proud of that achievement.

The situation in Rwanda is even more serious, and there is a great need for humanitarian assistance that only the United States is capable of providing. We can play an important role there, while using the lessons of the past to guide us. Over the past several months, the chairman and I have been urging both the administration and the U.N. to mobilize a constructive response when a constructive response was still possible. While more could have been done earlier, I commend the administration for its recent decision to show its leadership and commit resources and personnel to that effort.

I look forward to hearing from our panel about the details of operations that are currently underway or under consideration. The failure of the international community to act decisively has contributed to the scope of this disaster. This is an axiom that is evident in Bosnia, it is hovering over our Haitian policy, and clearly applies to Rwanda. Words not backed up by deeds serve merely to embolden the aggressor. We all agree that gunboat diplomacy is not the way for the United States to conduct itself in the world, but I am concerned that by failing to act decisively in certain crises, we are sinking into a pattern of lifeboat diplomacy.

I hope our panel will also provide some clear guidance on long-term U.S. policy toward Rwanda, Burundi, and the central African region, so that we might be able to anticipate the next crisis and not just respond to the next disaster.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will offer my comments during questions.

Senator SIMON. All right.

Brian Atwood, we are pleased to welcome you here. You are no stranger to the Senate of the United States, and we are looking forward to hearing from you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN ATWOOD, ADMINISTRATOR,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Mr. ATWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You and Senator Jeffords have raised, some very serious issues, and I want, obviously, to bring you up to date on what is a very dynamic situa-

tion. I have submitted testimony, and I am sure it is already dated given the changes that are occurring by the hour on the ground. But I really feel on this question that you have raised about responding more rapidly to this that I should address that at the outset. I think that is a very serious question.

The President said, when we announced this massive response to the humanitarian crisis the other day, that our response to the situation has escalated over time since the crisis occurred on April 6. When General Dallaire made the appeal that you mentioned for augmentation of his force, we proceeded to encourage and equip the Ghanaian force. We made 50 armored personnel carriers available. We attempted, obviously, to respond.

I do think, however, that it is a serious question, one that is asked in democracies, and one that must be asked not only by our democracy but by the entire international community, as to whether this kind of crisis could have been prevented, were there steps that might have been taken along the way that would have prevented in particular the exodus that has now claimed so many lives, and indeed, whether or not it is possible for the international community to intervene in a civil war?

I did not hear any voices up here suggesting that the United States should insert its forces in the midst of a hot civil war, and I think that is a serious question. I have not heard that our efforts on the humanitarian side have been in any way questioned. Indeed, we have supported the Red Cross, the organization that normally has the ability, because of its neutrality and because of its great courage and bravery, to operate in a wartime situation. It was with U.S. funds, for the most part—not all, but for the most part U.S. funds—that supported that humanitarian effort.

We responded very well, it seems to me, to the flow of refugees initially into Uganda, then into Tanzania; we supported the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees efforts there with our own disaster relief and refugee assistance. I think the response of the United States since the exodus began, only a few days ago on the 13th of July, has been beyond reproach, and feel very proud of our Government and of the American people for having supported it.

On the 15th of July, only 2 days after this exodus began, the President contacted me when I was on a trip in Jerusalem and asked me, as the disaster relief coordinator for the Government, to go to Goma. I arrived there on the 16th. We were able to announce on that date an increase in aid of \$35 million to handle this problem. Three days later, I was back in Washington briefing the President. The cholera epidemic had already started, and we announced an additional \$41 million to respond in a variety of ways, including: Defense Department, USAID, refugee assistance from the State Department.

We then met with the foreign policy team last Friday, and you have now heard the massive response that we have underway using our military in conjunction with the UNHCR priority areas that we have taken responsibility for, including airfield services, the air head facility, and Entebbe. We have, I think, responded as quickly as anyone could to a not totally unanticipated refugee flow, but certainly in the quantities of refugees that fled the country, no one had any reason to expect that that would occur.

In any case, it is a very, very tragic situation. We now have a situation in Goma where some 13,000 or 14,000 people have died, and many of them from cholera. I was just called before coming down here by Peter Hansen, the U.N. Secretary General's representative, the head of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, from Kigali. There is a desperate situation, and I am afraid a very macabre one relating to the dead bodies that are piling up in Goma that are themselves going to be the source of additional problems. The cholera bacteria can spread even more rapidly if we do not do something about this.

It is always, it seems, the United States that is turned to when these kinds of urgent requests are made, and Peter Hansen said, "I do not know anyone else who can do this." We need to take care of this problem. If we do not, then we could see 100,000 people dying in the space of a few days. It is obviously a very, very serious situation. I feel that the reaction on the part of the American people, in terms of the donations that they have made to private organizations, and the reaction of our Government has been very characteristic of the humanitarian impulse of the American people and I feel very proud of that response.

Is it too little too late? People always ask me that question. I have only one answer for that. It is not too late for the living. Clearly, we would have loved to have saved those people, but we are responding as quickly and as rapidly as we can. And I must say it is very frustrating for me when we, in all good faith and with all of the good will in the world, attempt to get food into a situation where the road convoy has not yet been opened up, where there is a demand for 600 metric tons of food a day, when we have an air-drop, that there is such a controversy because a few of those packages dropped a few hundred yards away from the target area. What I understand is that the press was given bad information and went to the wrong location. But in any case, let us stop having these silly debates.

We are responding. There are risks. We will make mistakes, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, and I do think it is important for us to look back in retrospect, but I hope that we will understand that we were dealing here with irrational forces and that in the end we come to the conclusion, of a new consensus to support a foreign policy whose foundation is crisis prevention. It is one thing to question whether we should respond after the crisis has broken out. We are dealing with irrational forces. We are dealing with civil wars and hot conflicts and a lot of danger and a lot of risk.

Rwanda was a country that had the densest population in all of Africa, a very small country containing 8 million people. Over time, there was a serious food deficit in that country as a result. Farms kept getting smaller, people were crowding, environmental degradation was occurring. And obviously, we had a serious governmental crisis in the sense that we had these ethnic clashes, but we still were attempting to work that out under the Arusha accords.

It seems to me the real question we have to ask ourselves is whether the international machinery, and that means our Government's machinery but also the machinery of the international community, is really adequate for this post cold war threat that we all face, the threat of chaos. We no longer have the singular threat of

communism, we are dealing with the threat of chaos. The problem we have as a people and as a policy is in dealing with a threat that comes in so many different forms. And it seems to me you are right in one regard, and that is that we do not yet have the machinery to deal with this new threat, that we must develop it. We must look at long-term development as one aspect of it. We must look at preventive diplomacy. We are doing a number of things in this area, and I think it is essential that we keep working on it.

On my trip, I went to countries in the region, and I might say that our response to this situation is not just humanitarian. That is the most important aspect. That is what everyone will be focusing on. But this is also a containment strategy. We are desperately concerned that the refugee flow will destabilize in particular Burundi, and you have mentioned that, Senator, and also Zaire, and Uganda and Tanzania—two countries that have made fantastic progress in recent years.

These are two countries that because of in one case authoritarianism and in another case because of civil conflict were really on the ropes and whose per capita income had fallen to the point of desperation. Both of these countries have come back almost miraculously from this. We now have to make sure that this situation in Rwanda does not spread. Zaire obviously touches on southern Africa, central Africa, and east Africa. If that situation gets worse then we really have a problem. So we are practicing through our diplomacy and through our humanitarian response preventive diplomacy, crisis prevention.

I believe, Senator, that with respect to bringing you up to date on the crisis I can tell you that there is some positive news coming out of Kigali. We have had our representative there and Ambassador Moose will describe in more detail our initiatives on the diplomatic front. But I was just updated on the humanitarian situation, as I mentioned, by Peter Hansen. He indicates that the new government there, which we have not yet recognized for reasons that we can explain and believe are correct, has now agreed to the deployment of human rights monitors throughout the country. It is obviously crucial that we encourage people to come back and help create the conditions for this. They have agreed to an unlimited number of human rights monitors that would be deployed throughout the country by the U.N., a very, very encouraging sign.

We were concerned, because of earlier discussions, that they might wish to screen all of the refugees as they return. We have now learned that they are allowing, and indeed encouraging, refugees to return without a screening process. They have also agreed that anyone who is suspected or accused of war crimes will be tried through internationally acceptable judicial processes. These are very, very positive signs.

Obviously, we need quickly to augment the UNAMIR force. General Dallaire has made a decision to take five of our APC's—armored personnel carriers—and, with a joint U.N. RPF patrol, go to the Gisenyi area, 4 miles away from Goma, and demonstrate a U.N. presence. Obviously, that will need to be augmented over time, but that will also be a confidence-building factor.

It is quite clear that some of the refugees are being encouraged by some of the radicals and extremists who created this problem

in the first instance not to go home, but rather to stay in Zaire. That, in my personal opinion, is unconscionable, given the threat of cholera and other problems that they are experiencing in the camps. Nonetheless, we have been attempting to deal with this problem by sending more positive messages to these people.

It is difficult, to put a lot of effort right now, into encouraging people to go back home, given that the security situation is still a little uncertain, but it gets better by the day. And what I am suggesting is through these reports it is getting better. But about 30,000 to 40,000 people have returned in that northwest quadrant to their homes—it is difficult to count because people are going back through backroads and not just over the Goma-Zaire border.

Approximately 90,000 people who were in the French safe zone have returned outside that zone back into the rest of Rwanda to return to their homes. So the positive signals are being given. We have to continue to encourage that. We have to encourage the changing of conditions so that people will go home, and that is being undertaken by our Government, and by the U.N., and by others. I think that there is some positive news, but the humanitarian crisis continues to look very, very tragic, and we have to respond to it as best we can.

I think I will stop there, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Atwood follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. ATWOOD

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

On July 15, President Clinton sent me as special envoy to assess the refugee situation and recommend a response to the Rwandan emergency. There I witnessed first-hand the tremendous suffering this tragedy is inflicting. Last Thursday and Friday, I made my recommendations for action to President Clinton. The plan of action that the President announced on Friday is crucial to averting even more widespread suffering in the region.

The international community has never been faced with a refugee crisis of such proportions in such a short period of time. The United States government is responding in full force to meet this massive humanitarian challenge.

We are also acting in Rwanda to contain unrest that has the potential to destabilize the entire region. The massive movement of refugees and the continuing threat of renewed civil strife could trigger similar situations in Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, and could spill quickly across borders throughout the Horn and Central Africa.

There have been some very positive developments in the last several days. We have seen the first people from the refugee camps moving back toward their homes. These numbers have been small, but it is a hopeful sign that increasing numbers of people are accepting the fact that they can return home safely.

I want to make it clear that these people are returning home voluntarily. Within Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has begun to allow people to move out of camps where they had been detained. This offers an important signal to Hutus outside of Rwanda that they will not be persecuted if they return.

Radio broadcasts by extremist Hutus, which have fueled this tragedy at every stage, have been silenced. The new government has begun to broadcast conciliatory messages on the national radio encouraging Rwandans to return home. We now have reports that the RPF military units are cooperating with UNAMIR forces, and even participating in joint patrols with them. We also estimate that the crops in Rwanda's fields, which are ready to harvest and are the best crop in some years, will likely remain viable for at least three weeks. All of these developments offer real hope in the midst of profound suffering. Much obviously remains to be done.

In Zaire 1 million refugees have moved into Goma; 312,000 into Bukavu; and 230,000 into Kamanyola. In addition, 460,500 refugees fled to Tanzania; 210,000 into Burundi; and 10,500 to Uganda. The total number of refugees is approximately 2.2 million people. There are approximately 2.5 million people that are internally

displaced. Of Rwanda's pre-crisis population of 8 million, it is staggering to think that 500,000 have been massacred and today almost 5 million are refugees or internally displaced.

People are dying of dehydration, malnutrition, exhaustion and cholera. They lack the most basic of life's necessities—food, water, sanitary facilities and shelter. In addition, there exist considerable logistical challenges involved in moving supplies into the area.

When I was in Goma, we had received very serious warnings that cholera would pose a grave threat because of the limited and largely fouled water supply. By Thursday of last week, reports of a cholera epidemic began to come in. When the President met with me on that same day, in particular because of the cholera epidemic, we targeted what we could do to respond.

The U.S. government response so far has been massive, aggressive, and as immediate as possible. Friday, the President announced that the Defense Department and our military were going to be directly engaged in this effort, and we've taken a number of steps to improve the quality and quantity of water in Goma to counteract the threat of disease. We have already sent truckloads of food in to meet the daily requirement of about 600 metric tons of food for one million people.

The United States government will be providing airport services not only for Goma, but for all of the airports in the region. This effort will be based at a major staging facility in Entebbe.

We have people on the ground in Goma now from the Defense Department. The military has put people in place to run the Goma airport. Their arrival has been followed by security personnel, by experts in logistics and the like. We have committed 4,000 U.S. troops to respond to the situation in and around Rwanda. General George Joulwan has been placed in command of this operation.

There is a joint task force that has been set up with Brigadier General Jack Nix in command. An air flight cell has been established in Geneva to work with U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A liaison team is working with the French in Paris. A preliminary team is on the ground in Goma with military transportation and communications on the ground.

We will enable the Goma airport to operate on a 24-hour basis. We will provide radar and field lights, which all should be operational in a day or two. The airdrops of food we have undertaken are a stop-gap measure until we can increase the airfield capacity to handle round the clock flights in a much more expeditious fashion than is possible now. We'll also be operating in the same way in the Bukavu airport. The logistics base services at these airfields will include unloading equipment, distribution, trucks, logistical command and control, and we have the ground survey team determining exactly what quantities of supplies will be needed.

We will be taking the lead within the U.N. system for water management. The Germans and others will also be contributing to this effort. We will provide purification systems and chlorination distribution systems for water. This ordinarily takes months to put in place. However, we are moving so that it will be a matter of days. It will be a gradually expanding operation. Potable water from the lake is obviously the most important aspect of this effort, and this requires purification systems. A C-5 carrying U.S. water purification equipment arrived yesterday in Goma.

Two C-141 flights from Copenhagen have flown in much-needed medical supplies, water bladders, water purification tablets, and cholera kits. The medical supplies included oral rehydration packets which were developed to effectively combat death by dehydration. They will be administered immediately. They have a very, very positive effect in attacking the cholera problem. From Frankfurt, there have been six 10-ton forklifts and medical supplies delivered. On Sunday, 42 DC-8 equivalent flights begin carrying 1,480 tons of food to Goma. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has sent a team of cholera experts from the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research in Bangladesh to Goma.

There are already World Food Program trucks on their way from Kampala and from Nairobi carrying food. We think that we will be able to move from a situation where, as of Thursday, we were only providing about 10 percent of the food needs to a situation where we can provide all the food needs, about 600 tons a day. 100 relief flights have taken place since April 6th, and the U.S. government is stepping up the pace and volume of these flights. These flights are providing: water bladders; essential drugs; 35 tons of plastic sheeting for shelter; 120 tons of blankets; packets of oral rehydration salts needed to deal with dehydration and diarrheal diseases; tens of thousands of tons of food; storage facilities; trucks; and, large quantities of cholera kits, antibiotics and syringes.

The air drop of bundles of rice, flour and meat began on Sunday using C-130s. The technical difficulties which these flights encountered are being immediately ad-

dressed by General Nix, who heads the military joint task force on the ground in Goma.

President Clinton announced, as of last week, an additional \$141.4 million in humanitarian and the Department of Defense (DoD) assistance, \$75 million of which will be an emergency drawdown of the Defense Department's budget to fund this operation. And we, of course, will be consulting with members of Congress on that point.

Ours is the only response that could have handled this problem. We have not seen anything like this rapid exodus in recent history, as I mentioned at the outset. I realize that a great deal of frustration surrounds this latest chapter of the Rwandan crisis. The whole world is frustrated—the relief workers, the donor community and the displaced people. The relief organizations that are working there are as admirable as any group of people I've ever seen, and they're working against impossible odds.

The political dimension of this crisis is equally important. The UNHCR and the U.N. Secretary General's representative have had very good contacts with the new government in Kigali. Ambassador Rawson arrived in Kigali on Sunday. We will need to deploy a U.N. military force to create, in essence, a safe zone throughout the country. People are going to be following very closely in the coming weeks to see that conditions are changing so that they can go home safely.

We hope that we have seen the end of the war now that the cease-fire is in place. If the cease-fire holds, the UNAMIR troops coming in—and we are still operating on the basis that we need 5,500 U.N. troops in the region—will not have to have the heavy equipment that we had anticipated earlier. That means they can be deployed faster. We are working urgently with the Secretary General, and hope to see the deployment take place very soon. We are prepared at this point. General Dallaire is planning to take over for the French in the safe zone. The French have said that they would leave by August 21. We would hope that would be possible without disrupting the situation inside the country.

The formation of a new government, one that embraces the involvement of diverse parties and groups and is based on the rule of law, is essential to restoring order. There have been some encouraging first steps. The cease-fire must hold. The Rwandan Patriotic Front swore in an interim government headed by two moderate Hutus last Tuesday. These two Hutus, President Pasteur Bizimungu and Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, can play an important role in establishing credible examples that Hutus have a peaceful role in rebuilding their nation. Former Rwandan government forces in Goma and elsewhere must be disarmed and a tribunal to administer justice and try genocide crimes should be created the international community.

It is important to note that this is part of a much broader effort, in which President Clinton has shown leadership—mobilizing the international donor community and coordinating our relief efforts. Other donors have also announced food/in-kind or cash contributions, exceeding \$150 million.

The U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance (UNDHA) is planning to host a donors conference on August 2nd in Geneva to follow up on a \$434 million appeal for urgent humanitarian needs in Rwanda. The European Union (EU) has approved \$28 million and is planning to reprogram another \$172.5 million. The French have proposed that 2,000 of the 18,000 U.N. troop contingent in Somalia be shifted to Rwanda and have requested U.S. support in getting the U.N. to respond to French proposals for action. Other countries have begun to offer troops for the UNAMIR force.

Private voluntary organizations, the UNHCR, and the World Food Program (WFP) operating in the refugee camps all remain extremely shorthanded. The United Nations is being stretched to a breaking point from dealing with crisis after crisis. We now understand that the new strategic enemy is not a single nation or government. It is the tumult of chaos that failed states are leaving in their wake.

Beyond our immediate response, it is vital to understand how the situation in Rwanda came to pass, and what we as a nation can do to prevent such occurrences in the future: The combined effect of failed economic policies, exploding population pressures, declining per capita agricultural production, a failure to establish viable democratic institutions as a means to ensure power sharing, and a lack of economic opportunity combined to spawn the horrors in Rwanda that now confront us on the evening news. This is a story of development that failed to take hold. It should serve as a powerful reminder of just how important achieving sustainable development is for all nations—rich or poor.

Rwanda had become the most densely populated country in all of Africa. This placed major strains on a largely rural economy. Farms became smaller and smaller, robbing most farmers of the advantages of large-scale planting. Arable land was

being used to capacity, which triggered declines in soil fertility and speeded environmental degradation. This led to a declining ability to meet nutritional needs and forced people off farms in search of work. Non-farming jobs were simply not there, and declining incomes and food insecurity became more common. These trends kindled growing social tensions, tribal conflicts and a general sense of hopelessness.

Unfortunately, a democratic government that would have been able to help defuse these tensions was not in place. Power sharing, conciliation and debate were not welcomed, and the government demonstrated the worst tendency that is the natural proclivity of a closed government—to violently persecute a minority based on their status. Perhaps the crisis in Rwanda could have been averted by stronger efforts by the international community to foster real development in Rwanda, to help reduce population pressures, to help increase personal incomes by diversifying the economy, and by nurturing democracy and open governance.

The U.S. Agency for International Development had such programs in Rwanda before the country self-destructed, but these efforts proved inadequate. Not only must we be more proactive in our development efforts, we must also continue to design them better. We must encourage the full participation of all members of developing societies in the most vital way in their economies and governments. By making citizens the real stakeholders of their societies, we can increasingly ensure that they will resist the narrow voices of extremism.

Mr. Chairman, while our focus is rightly fixed on the urgent needs of Rwandans today, we must not lose sight of the challenges we face in that entire region. In the entire Greater Horn of Africa—Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Djibouti—USAID now estimates that 23 million people are at risk of starvation or displacement due to a combination of factors that include drought, ethnic strife and conflict, and chronic food shortages.

In response to the existing and impending crises in the Greater Horn of Africa, President Clinton asked me, on May 20, to lead a delegation to the Horn to discuss appropriate short-, medium- and long-term responses with affected countries and key donors and to call international attention to the situation. The report I submitted to the President concluded two things: (1) that immediate action is needed to prevent the current emergency in the Horn from escalating into a full-blown crisis; and (2) that a long-term regional strategy is needed to break the cycle of famine.

The U.S. government has taken several actions to respond to the immediate food emergency in the Greater Horn:

- Through reprogramming and commitment of available funding, the U.S. Government has already committed and programmed additional FY 1994 resources totalling \$143 million and projects adding an additional \$71 million. These amounts are in addition to previous FY 1994 expenditures totalling \$366 million.
- USAID has authorized early programming of up to 100,000 metric tons of FY 1995 food resources for emergency programs in the Greater Horn region.
- We have allocated 60,000 tons of grain for pre-positioning in the Greater Horn region and are now planning an additional 40,000. This effort—like the 1,100 tons of food aid pre-positioned for Rwanda—will help us meet emergency needs more quickly.
- A USAID team was sent to Europe in late June to work with the European Union to: ensure that assessments of relief needs in the Horn are shared widely; coordinate delivery dates of food shipments to avoid overtaxing ports and agree upon a plan for the division of labor for relief efforts, including port rehabilitation, leasing of aircraft and other urgently needed logistics; and, discuss establishing international donor food reserves and storage sites in the Horn.
- USAID met with the European Union in Brussels on June 30 to address food needs in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Out of a total food aid need of just over 1 million tons, pledges to date are around 934,000 metric tons and 603,649 metric tons are now scheduled for delivery between now and the end of the year.
- An extensive emergency logistical survey covering the Greater Horn countries has been prepared by USAID and disseminated to major relief organizations and donors. While there has also been concern over the port capacity and other logistical bottlenecks, the U.S. and the European Union with WFP are vigorously pursuing port repairs.

Recurrent crisis in the Horn is not the result of one failed crop or a single political conflict, but is the culmination of decades of thwarted development, failed policies, poor leadership and disempowered citizenries. Unless we address the root causes of crises, we will be caught in a vicious cycle: spending more and more to meet urgent humanitarian needs while spending less and less to build sustainable and less vulnerable societies. The evolution of the current crisis in the Horn reaches back generations.

We are now laying the groundwork for a new approach to long-term food security and sustainable development in the Greater Horn of Africa. For the first time, the approach will be regional in scope and provide a common framework for donors, recipients, nongovernmental organizations and other groups to work from. This is essential to develop programs to achieve our common goal of moving from perpetual relief to longer-term food security and development.

Mr. Chairman, the Horn initiative is being undertaken at a time when all of the diverse foreign policy challenges facing the Administration are extant in the Greater Horn. In Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan, we face the crises of failed or collapsed states. In Ethiopia we face the challenges of a post-war and famine-ridden economy. The region bears the constant pressures of war, famine, mass migration, population expansion, environmental degradation, economic deterioration and militarization. On the other hand, the Greater Horn also presents opportunities as evidenced by a growing struggle for democracy, efforts toward sustainable economic reform, new trends in regional cooperation, demobilization initiatives and the collective desire to end the cycle of famine.

We must move beyond simply responding to crises. By addressing their root causes and promoting lasting development, we will advance a foreign policy based on prevention. Development assistance must play a vital role in containing humanitarian and security threats before they burgeon into more serious problems. Globally, failed development is extracting an unprecedented price. Reducing the security risks, human suffering, and economic losses of the Rwandas of the world requires an emphasis on sustainable development today, so that seeds of hope can be planted for tomorrow.

By responding quickly in Rwanda, and in the greater Horn, President Clinton is ensuring that we avoid destabilization in the region, that fewer lives be lost, and that the ultimate costs of these operations will be significantly lower. The price for not achieving these goals will truly be tragic, and one that we must avoid. Much remains to be done in the days, weeks and months ahead. America is at the front lines of this battle. We are working closely with the United Nations, the European Union and other donors to avert further disaster. The international community must develop effective tools to not only respond to these kinds of crises, but ultimately to prevent them. Rwanda offers us just such an opportunity, and it poses a stern test for our collective resolve.

[Other material submitted by Mr. Atwood may be found in committee files.]

Senator SIMON. Thank you. We thank you not only for your testimony but also for your leadership, and we appreciate what you and the President are doing here in terms of this emergency. I might add, I was not aware of the human rights monitors until you just mentioned it, and that clearly is good news in terms of the situation. The new government also, while it is dominated by Tutsis, has as two of its key leaders Hutus, and that seems to me to send the right signal.

You brought up two things that I would like to just comment on, and then a question or two. You say the fundamental question is, is the international machinery adequate? And I think the answer has to be a resounding no. And I think the United States, as the principal player in the world today, has to lead in creating more adequate international machinery.

Then, you mentioned another point that I think we have to face up to, that we are reluctant to face up to, and I am speaking for myself only, here. You said we are reluctant to put American service personnel in hazardous situations. And none of us likes to do that. But Tony Lewis had a column in the New York Times recently that was right on target, that we cannot have risk-free operations, that if someone volunteers to be part of the Chicago Police Department, they understand that they are going to be taking risks. And if there is gang activity, and there is a casualty on the police force we do not pull out the Chicago Police Department. We continue to try to have stability.

In Somalia—and I agree with Senator Jeffords except I would make one minor correction. He said tens of thousands of lives were saved. Hundreds of thousands of lives were saved. Yes, we did have some American casualties, and a majority of them were caused by a mistake, an honest mistake but a mistake, that was made. But we lost few soldiers overall. We had fewer deaths in Somalia than New York cab drivers were killed last year. You know, to view Somalia as some kind of a disaster for the United States is just not accurate. And I think we have to recognize there are going to be risks.

For example, I was just in Angola a few weeks ago. If there is an agreement, and we are edging close to one, they are going to need 5,000–6,000 U.N. troops. I do not think the United States can endlessly say we are going to put up the money, you supply the troops.

I think we are going to have to be participants. We are going to have to risk not only our dollars, we are going to have to risk more than that. I am preparing legislation that will call for examination of the possibility of creating some kind of international peace force where among our U.S. service personnel, we would have 2,000 special volunteers, who might get added pay, but who would be available on 24 hours' notice if the Security Council said there is a need and the President of the United States OK'd it. And we would assume not only U.S. personnel, but personnel from France, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and other countries, as well as smaller countries who would put in smaller amounts. But I think we have to learn from this Rwanda situation.

Then, if I may return to the immediate emergency, for the pharmaceutical companies who donate things, drugs that are needed, do we have the ability to get those over there quickly? For example, one company, and I do not think they would mind me saying it, Searle, is one of the larger pharmaceutical companies, they are willing to donate \$1 million worth of drugs. They will get them to Paris, France, but they cannot get them to Kigali. That is where we have to take over. What is the option for a company like that?

Mr. ARWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that this is a reflection of what is happening all over this country right now. That particular offer that you just reported is happening everywhere. Our phones are ringing off the hooks with people who want to help in this situation. I think that is a reflection of American values at their best.

Yes, there is a way to handle this. We would like them to call AID and give us this information so that we can coordinate it. We are being a bit overwhelmed at this point, but that does not mean that we cannot facilitate this.

Now, there are a lot of other organizations that are also taking donations. These are the private voluntary organizations with whom we work as partners like Care, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and others. You will see on television broadcast nowadays all of the relief agency addresses that are providing humanitarian assistance. They desperately need help as well. They are doing wonderful work.

Peter Hansen told me that Phil Johnston of Care was there in Kigali, and one of the more encouraging suggestions, initially made

by General Dallaire, was that we should set up food distribution centers on the road from Goma or Gisenyi to Kigali. Care is prepared, along with DHA of the U.N., to facilitate that. So that will encourage people to go home. People are getting increasingly weaker in Goma, so if every few kilometers there is a food distribution center and medicine, that will facilitate their return, as well.

So the answer to your question is please have them call and we will see what we can do to help them.

Senator SIMON. Let me call on Senator Jeffords.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like to echo the suggestions of the chairman that we look toward a volunteer force of volunteers who would be able to be available for these operations. I know some time ago when that suggestion was made to Ambassador Albright, she concurred that that would be something which would seem to be useful.

And I also would like to add I think that we could serve a very incredibly important service by providing training for forces that might be working with our forces so that we can make sure that any coordinated efforts will be coordinated with the kinds of command and responsibilities that we expect to work. So I would hope that the administration would pursue that aspect to give us all confidence that we have, one, effective units to go in working together, and second, to ensure that the individuals that are willing to put their lives on the line are those that are volunteers, and certainly we have a lot of nongovernmental organizations around this world that have many Americans in it that do daily put their lives on the line. So I would just echo that suggestion.

I would like ask and inquire a little bit about the new government. You gave some reassuring comments upon what they are doing now, but I wonder how much we know about the individuals that are nominated to serve in the new transition government. What does it truly represent? Does it represent a cross-section of Rwandan political thought, or are the Hutus named to the government merely figureheads who have no real political clout or influence?

Mr. ATWOOD. One of the reasons that we have not yet recognized the government, Senator, is that we do not have all the answers to these questions. We know the individuals who were names as President and Prime Minister, and indeed, they are upstanding individuals who were moderates that believed in the Arusha accords. However, there is a question as to how much influence they will have. So far, they have been very active, and we are very encouraged by it. But the entire government has not been formed.

We believe it ought to be representative not only in ethnic terms but in political terms in the country. That is what the Arusha accords call for. So far, they are saying that they will fulfill their obligations under those accords, which means a rule of law society at one point in time, elections along the way. I would defer to Ambassador Moose, who may be able to elaborate somewhat on Ambassador Rawson's discussions with them. But at this point, I would simply answer that we still want to hold back our judgment as to exactly what kind of a government this will be until we see them taking very specific actions that will, I think, contribute to the res-

olution of this crisis if they take those actions. As I indicated, all indications are positive at this point.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. We are pleased to be joined by the chairman of the full committee Senator Claiborne Pell, and when I mentioned about having a U.N. force, he helped to write the words in the U.N. Charter which would authorize the use of such a force.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. It is articles 43, 44, and 45.

Senator SIMON. And you just happen to have it with you, too, do you not, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Today, actually, I forgot it.

Senator SIMON. You forgot it today. This is literally true. Ordinarily, he carries that U.N. Charter in his pocket. The first time I have ever known you not to have it in your pocket.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to be a cosponsor of the bill that you are developing for a volunteer force, as long as it is volunteer.

Senator SIMON. Great. We will be pleased to have you as a cosponsor.

The CHAIRMAN. I just have one broad question, and that is if the Tutsis are only 15 percent of the total population there, how is it that they come to dominate the government?

Mr. ATWOOD. Well, as I indicated, Senator, there have been two Tutsis who have been named President and Prime Minister. General Kagame, I believe, is the Vice President of this government. I do not think it is any secret, given the proportions that you mentioned—maybe 15 percent is an exaggeration, I am not sure—that this is going to be an issue. Can they govern? Obviously, they have been the victors in a civil war, but I think they have to establish that point.

I think in the conversations we have had with them they understand they need to reach out, and I also think it is important to remember the origins of this war on April 6 when this plane went down carrying the President of Rwanda, this was a coup. This was a planned effort that was perpetrated by extremists whose early targets in this were Hutu moderates, even before the Tutsis were targeted. I think that is an indication that the origins of this crisis were not ethnic, and that we need not have a situation wherein these two groups cannot live with one another in Rwanda.

Obviously, it requires the establishment of democratic institutions that will help these people manage conflict. That is what democratic institutions are for. They are not designed to resolve conflict. Conflict always exists in every society.

They also have to deal, I think, with the reconstruction of their society now and with the development of their economy, so that this highly populous country can live in peace in the future, and I think the international community has an obligation to try to help them in that respect.

The CHAIRMAN. I think for the 33 years I have been in the Senate, this must be the most horrible tragedy that I have seen come across history's screen. I am just curious what efforts are being made from the viewpoint of an international donor community, from the voluntary agencies around the world, not just the United States.

Mr. ATWOOD. It has been very positive. As you may know, on August 2 a conference will be held by the U.N. to continue to follow up on an appeal that was made by the Secretary General last Friday. He appealed for \$434 million. To date, we have raised about \$400 million of that, the United States contributing \$250 million or about 47 percent of the total. There is a \$172 million contribution from the European Union that is pending clearance within their system. Please do not ask me to describe their system. Nonetheless, we hope that that will be made available very shortly.

Obviously, the problem we are having here is that the private voluntary organizations, the U.N. system, the World Food Program, the UNHCR, are all just stretched terribly thin in handling other crises that are going on around the world. So they need people and resources in addition to cash. They need the services that our military is providing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I congratulate the chairman—Senator Paul Simon, on holding this hearing, and I think we are very lucky as a Nation to have a man of your caliber and ability in that part of the world with the responsibility.

Thank you very much.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator KASSEBAUM?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Atwood, I first would like to commend the administration for the leadership that it has shown in meeting the humanitarian crisis that really overwhelmed everybody. I think it is thoughtful to try and analyze what we could do better in other times, but sometimes things just seem to have happened so rapidly in this case that it was truly overwhelming. And I think the steps that have been taken have been extraordinary.

One of the things that really is difficult, though, as events happen so quickly, is coordination. I would like to ask just a little bit so that I can understand. Who is the coordinator between all the different agencies, and many are represented here—State Department, Defense Department, AID, NSC—are you the coordinator?

Mr. ATWOOD. I am one of them, yes, Senator. Actually, the President directed the National Security Adviser to direct this effort. Obviously, the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Deutch is key there on the civilian side, and General Shalikashvili on the military side is a person who has had a great deal of experience in these matters in northern Iraq, as you may know. And I am coordinating others through the disaster relief response, the humanitarian response on the part of AID and as the President's disaster relief coordinator.

I think it is a more complicated question internationally. The UNHCR, the High Commissioner for Refugees, has responsibility for refugee situations. But here, we are also dealing with displaced persons inside the country of Rwanda. That is why the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the U.N., Mr. Peter Hansen, is in Kigali now. And his office was created by the Secretary General to coordinate all of the U.N. agencies that will eventually be responding to this. UNICEF is responding with medicine, and world rehydration therapy for people suffering from cholera. Obviously, UNHCR, a

number of—the World Food Program—they are all under the umbrella of Peter Hansen and the DHA.

We would like to see that coordinating mechanism work more smoothly as a general proposition. I am not criticizing it for what it has done now. UNHCR is very short of people. And so we have seconded two of our AID very talented disaster relief people to UNHCR so they can help them with this effort.

A number of other things are happening, but coordination is always a problem. And you, of course, have a number of nongovernmental organizations on the ground. I do not know what we would do without them. I know there are people in this audience from *Medicins Sans Frontieres*, there are people from *Care* and *Catholic Relief*, and all of these organizations on the ground, *Doctors Without Borders*, they are just operating under the most difficult circumstances. Our worry, of course, at this point is that they are working around the clock. We need to augment them. We need to get more people in to spell them as they deal with this tragic disease problem.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I certainly agree, and I think we would all agree that there are just extraordinary efforts on the part of the nongovernmental agency personnel who have been there, and who have been there for some time. I do not know how they do it, really. And it is extraordinary. But again, they are sort of here, other efforts are here [indicating], other efforts are here, the international efforts are here [indicating], as you say, through UNHCR. It has to be confusing a bit to everybody, is it not? And I do not know if there is a better way to help streamline the coordination.

Mr. ATWOOD. The approach that the UNHCR has taken on this, I think, is a very wise one. They have put together what they call eight packages, airfield services, for example, site preparation, water management, et cetera, through eight of these. The United States has taken on four, airfield management, the air head staging facility at Entebbe, and, of course, Bukavu Airport, we have taken on the logistics of these airports, as well, we have brought in forklifts, et cetera, and we have taken on water management. Those are the most significant, the most urgent, at this point. That, UNHCR can say I do not have to worry about that, the U.S. military is taking over those things.

We have an air cell, we call it, in Geneva to coordinate with UNHCR so that we can determine what the priorities are, because there are an awful lot of air flights that are going in. We understand that the airport is now open 24 hours a day. There are still parts of that that need to be improved because it does not have much of a capacity in that airport. But nonetheless, UNHCR obviously welcomed the contribution that we were making.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just to touch on something else which I suppose seems almost trivial in light of the dimension of the tragedy, but it is important to help stabilize in a relatively short period of time the country and getting people back in who want to go back home. When is the planting season in Rwanda, and are we thinking ahead a bit about how to facilitate it? It is relatively soon, is it not, in the next month or so?

Mr. ATWOOD. We have, in some parts of the country, the crops are now to be harvested. We, of course, have worried a great deal

about that. We have urged the new government to allow people to leave camps that they created inside the country to go out and harvest the crops before they die on the fine. Some have already died, some of these crops. The need to harvest that crop so that this will obviously lessen the task of exogenous support for the country.

The other aspect of that that is so crucial is the need to collect the seed so they can make the next planting cycle. That is something that we are urgently concerned about, and I believe in the last few days we have been getting a positive response on that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. Senator Feingold?

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all say that I had the opportunity to be with the chairman in Angola a few weeks ago, and I find it hard to imagine anything worse than that, but of course, you found it. And I recognize that. But I want to congratulate you on what you have done so far. I had a chance to watch on television some of the tribute that has been paid to you and the Agency for being, if not the first, then one of the first ones in this situation, which is a tremendous credit to the administration, and I appreciate it.

I also want to say something about the chairman here, who I believe is one of the only people here who, really for no political gain, is thinking very seriously and consistently about what are we going to do as a country in these crisis, emergency situations. And we do not completely agree on all aspects of this, but the main thing is that somebody is trying to show leadership on it and trying to develop a policy.

When we were in Angola and in Liberia I had the chance to ask the government officials, for example, would you want American troops to be involved in peacekeeping? Now, it happens in those situations that the ECOMOG force in Liberia said that they wanted trucks. They did not want American troops. It is an all-African force, which is, I think, very desirable if it works out otherwise. I also had the chance to ask President Dos Santos in Angola, which countries do you want troops from, if we ever have peace achieved here? And he did not want to give me the whole list, but he did say he did not want American troops because he thought we should not do it because of what happened in Somalia.

So with all due respect to the chairman, who is the driving force behind all this, I am not sure that telling the American people that we will send troops because we need to is the best way to get their support. I think it might be just the reverse. We come at it from different angles, but what he is talking about is a solution. Even though we may come at it from different angles, it may well be the way to get the American people to be supportive of those who wish to volunteer to participate. I think it is very important how we craft that. Otherwise, I think, it sends a signal that somehow the Somalia thing will happen over and over again.

I do want to work with you, Mr. Chairman, because I think what you are doing here could not be more important.

Senator SIMON. Absolutely, and how we craft it is very critical. No question about it.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In terms of a question, and tying in the Angola situation with Rwanda, last week the Washington Post reported that food from the World Food Program was being diverted from Angola and Sudan to help meet the urgent needs in Rwanda. I am wondering if you could confirm or deny whether that is the case. We have been trying hard to find out if that is true.

Mr. ATWOOD. I cannot confirm that. I know that we have been putting a great deal of pressure on the World Food Program and that they have put out a special appeal for additional funding. What they were looking for in particular was cash as opposed to food in terms of a contribution because then they could buy it in Africa, which obviously helps African economies as well as being closer to the problem so that they could move it more quickly.

I will have to give you an answer for the record as to whether anything is diverted, but if it is, it is only a temporary problem because, as I indicated earlier, the U.N. appeal has been relatively successful. In fact, we have exceeded the Secretary General's appeal, and part of that was for the World Food Program. So if they have diverted some small quantities of food for this crisis, it is a temporary problem, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me just follow up on that. It could not be a more painful discussion than trying to look at these two situations and deciding what should be done, but what we were told in Angola was that a thousand Angolans would die a day if this relatively successful operation is stopped—even when there was bombing there and the planes were not able to fly, that was the calculation that was made as to what happens for a day or two delay.

I am not, obviously, interested in playing God and trying to decide which situation is more important, but I would like to know what is happening there and how we balance a successful operation in saving lives now with the other type of situation that is obviously desperately in need of help. So anything you could provide me on that would be helpful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Mr. Atwood, if someone is watching this on television or reads an account by one of the reporters and they want to help an individual American or someone from any other country, should they send money to AID or should they send money to the Red Cross or Care or one of the nongovernmental agencies?

Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking that question, because I indicated earlier that people should call USAID. I think we would be swamped with telephone calls. I was then handed a note by my staff giving a telephone number of a group called VITA—V-I-T-A [Volunteers in Technical Assistance]. They are coordinating all contributions in kind. Not cash contributions. Cash contributions for the most part should go to private voluntary organizations. But their telephone number is area code 703-276-1914. So they will give you the information needed for in-kind contributions, including the one you mentioned.

Senator SIMON. Thank you. As I recall, this is the first time we have ever had a head of an agency suggest you ought to send money somewhere else rather than to the agency. [Laughter.]

If there are no further questions, I simply want to underscore what has been said. We are grateful for your leadership. Having known Brian Atwood for a long time, I have confidence in the kind of job that you are doing, and it makes a great difference. We want to be of help in any way we can. If there are further things that need to be done, let us know.

Mr. ATWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. Thank you.

Our next panel will be the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose; the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Middle East and Africa Division of the Department of Defense, Molly Williamson; and Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni, commanding general, Marine Expeditionary Force.

We will enter your full statements in the record. If you wish to comment orally and if you have no preference as to who goes first, we will start with George Moose. Secretary Moose, we will call on you.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador MOOSE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement which I would like to submit for the record.

Senator SIMON. It will be entered into the record.

Ambassador MOOSE. Thank you. Let me perhaps just excerpt from that testimony to say that clearly, as your questioning has focused, there is a critical political and diplomatic dimension to our efforts to resolve the crisis in Rwanda. May I say from the outset it goes to the heart of some of the issues you raised earlier, and in effect our engagement in Rwanda goes back almost 2 years.

There was a serious effort not only on the part of the United States but on the part of many other governments to try to anticipate and to prevent a crisis when the conflict originally broke out between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Government of Rwanda back in 1990.

It was a response that involved the OAU and the international community and U.S. Government support for the Arusha negotiations process—an attempt to resolve that conflict. Indeed, a year ago last August, after the end of almost a year of negotiation, an accord was reached. We had observers in that negotiation. We supported very much the outcome of that negotiation. We had pledged financial commitment as well as our support in the U.N. for the creation of UNAMIR. I think we need to bear that in mind as we are talking about Rwanda.

It is not as though there has not been a recognition of the inherent dangers in that situation, or an attempt by the international community—indeed, by the United States, to address them.

That said, Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with you we must, in the wake of the dimensions and the magnitude of this crisis, examine every aspect of our response, political and diplomatic as well as humanitarian and security, to see in what ways we do need to improve the machinery of the international community, so that hopefully we can strengthen our capacity to respond as needed and when needed to crises of this magnitude.

That said, I think we all recognize that the events that precipitated the immediate problem—there were a number of those events, starting with the plane crash on April 6, which were totally unpredicted and unpredictable, just as were the sudden movement and exodus of refugees out of the country about 10 days ago.

I do not think, frankly, that our response could have been more rapid. I spoke with Brian Atwood in Nairobi the day before he went into Goma. We had somebody on the ground within 3 days after the start of that movement. I think this is an indication of the commitment at the very highest levels of the administration to try to respond to this disaster.

On the political front, we have been extremely active throughout the crisis. We have been extremely engaged with both parties in this conflict. In the initial stages of that conflict, we sought to get an agreement from the government authorities for their cooperation in an effort to end the violence.

I regret to say that notwithstanding repeated conversations, both directly and by telephone conversation, we were unsuccessful in securing their cooperation, and notwithstanding promises that were given to us. It was the failure of that cooperation, clear evidence that there was not a commitment on the part of the Government of Rwanda, that led the President to conclude that we must sever all relations with the former Government of Rwanda, to derecognize that government, and to make it clear that we could not accept participation of representatives of that government in any future political discussion, dialog, or political dispensation in Rwanda.

We have maintained our contacts throughout also with the RPF. I personally have had numerous telephone conversations with General Kagame and his deputies, and most recently have spoken with President Bizimungu on Saturday. Those conversations have all aimed at one purpose: how to end the violence in Rwanda, how to reach as rapidly as possible a cease-fire that would allow for the resumption of negotiations, how to end the mass killings of Rwandans, how to restore a process of political dialog and reconciliation, and last but not least, how to bring to justice those who have been responsible for the political violence.

I will not rehearse all of the efforts. Many of those are outlined in my testimony. Let me simply focus on the current situation. As you know, Secretary Christopher dispatched Ambassador Rawson, our former Ambassador to Rwanda who has been serving as our special envoy to Kigali. He arrived there on Sunday. He has since that time been engaged directly in discussions with the representatives of the new government as well as with representatives of the U.N. and the international relief agencies.

The purpose of his going was to engage in a more sustained dialog with the leaders of the new government, to make clear to them what our hopes and expectations are with regard to their behavior; to give us some greater assurance that the pledges that they have given, both in terms of creating a broadly based government, as well as in terms of creating a climate in Rwanda that will allow the earliest possible return of refugees, will be honored.

I have to say that up until this point our contacts with them, as Brian Atwood indicated, have been extremely encouraging. They

have been responsive to the concerns that we have raised, and there have been a number of concerns. We have expressed our concern about reports or allegations that summary executions are continuing. We have been assured that they intend to exercise maximum restraint and control over their own troops.

The announcement that Brian just alluded to, that they are prepared to allow for human rights monitors, is I think an extremely important one. It is something we have been urging them to do for some time, because it gives the international community a capacity to monitor the behavior, and also gives assurances to other Rwandans that in fact there is some meaningful constraint and control over the actions of the government.

We were concerned about reports that the new government intended to screen the return of refugees and what that might imply. Our conversations with the new government and the government's public announcement have led us to the conclusion that they do not intend to inhibit the return to Rwanda of those people who wish to return, nor do they intend to inhibit the continuing exodus of those people who are still concerned about their safety and security. I think we have to be clear on both points.

We have wished to satisfy ourselves that their intent with regard to the formation of a broad-based government is in fact serious, and I will say at this point that the government that has been formed does include a number of prominent Hutu officials—the Prime Minister, Mr. Twagiramungu, who was designated by the Arusha accords process to become the new Prime Minister. He has now been put into that position.

The President, Mr. Bizimungu, is a prominent Hutu politician who up until 3 years ago was a member of President Habyarimana's party. Those appointments are indeed encouraging.

At the same time, it is also clear that at this point in time the predominant influence in the new government is that of the RPF, and I think we would wish to be further assured that there will be an ongoing effort to broaden the base of that government so as to provide not only the immediate assurance for people's return, but also to lay the basis for a longer term process of political reconciliation.

I think, to be fair, one must say that part of the problem the new government faces is that many of the participants in the former government are at this point not willing to participate either because they do not trust the new leadership, or because they still harbor the prospect of their return to power, so the problems that are being encountered here are not strictly problems that the new RPF-led government is capable of resolving immediately and on its own.

We believe that the focus must quickly shift now to creating the conditions which will allow for the earliest possible return of refugees. That means responding to the needs inside the country for support and relief, but also, as we were talking about, the creation of political conditions that will allow such a return. One of the most encouraging things that has happened in recent days has been the agreement by the new government to enter into joint military patrols with UNAMIR in western regions of Rwanda. Our hope is that that kind of cooperation will expand, because it is, indeed, an-

other concrete manifestation of the willingness of the government to create those conditions.

Related to that, Mr. Chairman, I think is the importance which we all attach to the most rapid possible deployment of UNAMIR and because we wish to be assured that the refugees can safely and securely return. We believe that UNAMIR's deployment is a key to creating that assurance of safety and security.

So one of the focuses that we have in the immediate term is indeed to work with the U.N. to accelerate that deployment. We believe that progress is being made on that front. I should simply say that we had a meeting on Sunday at which we convened key representatives of the Diplomatic Corps. The purpose of that meeting was to follow up on a letter which the President addressed to his counterparts in 24 countries. Part of that appeal was for their support of efforts to deploy UNAMIR as rapidly as possible.

Last, and I do not want to dominate this too much, Mr. Chairman, let me just say a word about Burundi, because it remains a source of great concern for us. We believe that the leadership in Burundi should be highly commended for the efforts it has made to date to try to maintain relative calm despite the tremendous negative impact of the situation in Rwanda.

There is currently underway an effort to resolve a Presidential succession issue. Our Ambassador to Burundi, Ambassador Krueger, who you mentioned earlier, has been active in urging flexibility and restraint on the part of all parties in an effort to resolve that succession issue as rapidly as possible so that the process of political reconciliation and democratization can continue.

We also believe it is critical, in that context, to deal with the issue of responsibility and accountability for the killings that took place last October following the assassination of President Ndadaye, and that it will be important, if that effort is to be mounted, for the U.N. and for the international community to provide strong support for an effort to establish the responsibility and accountability.

Last, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me simply say that the Secretary has asked me to leave this weekend for Kigali and for the region to continue our diplomatic efforts. I hope to be departing on Friday, and will certainly be spending time in Kigali to continue our discussions with government authorities.

As Mr. Atwood mentioned earlier, we have not really addressed the issue of recognition because frankly I think at this point it is not the issue on the table. We have established a practical dialog and working relations with the government, and I think as we see their response to the situation on the ground, and to the requirements of creating stability and a return to security, that will enable us to make the judgment I think we will have to make that we are obliged to make about the more formal questions of our relationship.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Moose follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MOOSE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa: Although the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) declared a military victory and a unilateral cease-fire last week, the conflict in Rwanda is not over. The majority of the

population is now displaced, with over two million Rwandans having fled to neighboring countries. Despite public assurances by the RPF that innocent civilians have nothing to fear, the refugees have shown little sign of returning. Armed contingents of the routed former government forces are present in Zaire alongside the refugees, and the leadership of the discredited rump government is believed to be in Zaire, as well.

A new government is taking shape in Kigali, with both the President and Vice President from the RPF. The MRND, the former ruling party of the late President Habyarimana, is not part of the new government. Other parties are represented, but the RPF holds a clear plurality of the cabinet positions. The Prime Minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, is a Hutu from the MDR party who was accorded that position under the terms of last year's Arusha peace accord. The RPF has reiterated its assurances that it intends to create a broadly based government. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this new government is sufficiently broad in its representation to gain general acceptance among the various sectors of the Rwandan population, including the hundreds of thousands who fled to neighboring countries ahead of the RPF's military advance.

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

With a fragile cease-fire and a new government in place, our principal goals for Rwanda are as follows:

- Save lives through an urgent humanitarian response;
- Protect innocent civilians from further violence;
- Maintain the cease-fire;
- Foster a truly broad-based government;
- Encourage return of refugees and reintegration of all of the uprooted; and
- Ensure that those responsible for genocide are brought to justice.

We have taken several measures designed to achieve these goals. Mr. Atwood has already discussed the humanitarian response. I will focus my comments on diplomatic and peace-keeping initiatives.

From the start of the crisis, we have put diplomatic pressure on the parties to stop the killings and agree to a cease-fire. We enlisted the Organization of African Unity, other regional states, and our European allies to join us in this diplomatic effort. When the mass exodus into Zaire began, we redoubled our efforts to put a halt to the fighting, with high-level demarches in Washington, via diplomatic channels in other locations, and by telephone to Rwanda. We reinforced these private contacts with public statements from the White House and State Department and supported several UN Security Council resolutions and statements calling for a halt in the fighting.

Through the UN, the United States has taken a leading role in efforts to protect the Rwandan people. We strongly supported the UN arms embargo and the expansion of UNAMIR, with a revised mandate to help protect threatened populations and relief efforts. We have been working with the UN to accelerate deployment of these forces and have airlifted 50 armored personnel carriers into the region for use by UNAMIR forces. We are providing equipment for the UN's Ghanaian battalion and have encouraged other countries to offer equipment for the remaining contingents.

Recognizing that deployment of additional UNAMIR contingents could take time, the UN Security Council authorized France and other member states to establish a temporary humanitarian operation to help protect threatened populations in Rwanda, pending deployment of expanded UNAMIR. We supported this operation to help stop the killings in the territory held by the rump government. Operation Turquoise, as the deployment is known, has succeeded in saving many lives.

Following delivery of the U.S. armored personnel carriers to the UN, UNAMIR expansion began, with the arrival of 206 new Ghanaian troops, bringing total UNAMIR personnel to about 800. We are making every effort to press for deployment of the balance of the force as quickly as possible, in anticipation of the eventual withdrawal of Operation Turquoise. We believe that, in contributing to security and protection of threatened populations, UNAMIR can serve an important role in deterring further violence and encouraging the return of the hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees in Zaire and elsewhere in the subregion.

We are following internal political developments closely as the new government coalesces in Kigali. We continue to believe that Rwanda's best chance for lasting peace is through establishment of a broadly based government and administration that can foster a genuine national reconciliation, consistent with the principles of power-sharing embodied in the Arusha peace accord. For this reason, we have encouraged the RPF to follow a principle of inclusiveness. We are not asking

Rwandans to accept into their government those responsible for genocidal acts or other atrocities; we believe only that the government should be sufficiently broad in scope to allow for representation of a range of regional, ethnic, and political currents. A government of this type would help reassure the general population and encourage a more rapid return of refugees.

The prospect of incursions into Rwanda by troops of the former rump government based in Zaire remains a concern. We note that Zairian authorities disarmed many of these troops upon entry into Zaire. This effort is commendable; more must be done in this area, both to reduce the security threat to other refugees, Zairian locals, and relief workers and to reduce the likelihood of renewed fighting in Rwanda.

Finally, the United States is working with the international community to ensure that the perpetrators of genocide and other crimes against humanitarian law are brought to justice. We strongly supported convening a special session of the UN Human Rights Commission, which resulted in the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to investigate human rights atrocities in Rwanda. His report, issued June 28, confirmed the widespread reports of genocidal massacres and called for an international tribunal to judge those responsible. Following this report, the United States co-sponsored a UN Security Council resolution which establishes a Commission of Experts to evaluate evidence of atrocities and recommend appropriate next steps. As the White House has said, we hope that the UN would act swiftly—consistent with the resolution establishing the Commission—to then move to create an international tribunal for Rwanda. Establishing accountability will help Rwandans to break the cycle of violence, close out this tragic chapter in their history and move to true reconciliation.

In closing, I would like to say a few words about Burundi. The horrific events in Rwanda inevitably affect its neighbor to the south, which shares a similar ethnic make-up and has known great tragedy of its own. Burundi authorities and the Burundi people deserve great credit for maintaining relative calm despite the catastrophic events next door. The Burundi leadership is engaged once again in the delicate process of designating a President to replace the late Ntaryamira who was killed in the plane crash with Rwanda's President on April 6. Our Ambassador in Bujumbura, Robert Krueger, has urged all sides in the multi-party political discussions to show flexibility and move to a prompt conclusion so that the country can proceed with its democratic transition.

We will continue to assist Burundi on its path to democracy and national reconciliation. We have sent high-level visitors to the country, most recently Mr. Atwood, to show our support for Burundi's fragile nascent democracy and are continuing our relief efforts there. We have also provided support to the 47-member monitoring force that the OAU is in the process of deploying in Burundi. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has developed a comprehensive plan for technical human rights advisory services to Burundi, and we are providing voluntary contributions to support that worthy effort. The plan is fully consistent with our own democracy in governance program, in which U.S. development funds are used to help build democratic institutions as well as promote civil education and the development of a pluralistic society.

We welcome the strong interest in Burundi by international human rights organizations, which can work with local human rights groups to promote tolerance and help improve civil/military relations. We continue to support accountability for those responsible for the attempted coup and murder of President Ndadaye last October, and the ethnic killings that followed. We recognize that Burundi may need help in that effort, and we stand ready to assist.

Senator SIMON. We thank you for your testimony and for your close monitoring of the situation.

I regret to say we have a rollcall vote on right now. We will take a 5-minute recess.

Senator PRESSLER. May I just get in one question before we break?

Senator SIMON. All right. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. How are the French performing in your judgment, or have you covered that already?

Ambassador MOOSE. I think the French presence has been extremely critical in helping to arrest the erosion of the situation. Without their presence, I think we would be facing a much greater disaster.

Senator PRESSLER. There have been a lot of cynics like the New Yorker and others who say the French are just there because they are making money in the future as they were in the past, and that Mitterand has blood on his hands, and this kind of stuff, with all of the arms. Is that true?

Ambassador MOOSE. I think there are a lot of questions. I think the issue—and the French themselves would admit it—that they have had past Hutu relationships. This means that they may have a little bit of baggage they brought to this experience. But I think their performance over the last several weeks has clearly demonstrated that they are serious about trying to bring about an end to this problem.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

Senator SIMON. If I could just add a comment, I had some real mixed feelings when I heard the French were going in, but I think they really have conducted themselves well, from everything I have heard, and they moved swiftly; 72 hours after the decision was made, they had troops on the ground.

We will have a 5-minute recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator FEINGOLD [presiding]. OK, we will begin again.

As I understand it, we will now hear from Molly Williamson.

STATEMENT OF MOLLY WILLIAMSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY VINCENT KERN, OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN MATTERS, AND CAPTAIN BILL SULLIVAN, JCS-J3

Ms. WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Senator. I am delighted to be here today. I am very honored to have this chance to address the committee. I have had the opportunity to meet some of its members in different capacities, and I am most flattered to have been remembered. Thank you very much, Senator Jeffords.

I would like to point out that when the Deputy Assistant Secretaryship of Defense for the Middle East expanded to include all of African Affairs, that expansion took place on the morning of the seventh.

Senator JEFFORDS. Excuse me, would you pull the microphone a little bit closer?

Ms. WILLIAMSON. I am sorry. Is that better?

Senator JEFFORDS. Much better.

Ms. WILLIAMSON. Thank you. The expansion of my responsibilities from Middle East Affairs to Middle East and African Affairs occurred on the morning of April 7, 1994. That gave me the very special and unique opportunity to meet in rather a hurry all of the key players in African matters, African crises, African policies, and problems.

I have the great benefit of resources of an extensive nature at the Department of Defense. I am accompanied today by Mr. Vincent Kern, who is the office director for African matters, and he is our task force director on Rwanda, and I am also accompanied by Captain Bill Sullivan, who was given special permission to be released from chief of the watch team of our current CINC room for the Joint Staff. He has the latest information on the military front,

and I am very pleased that Captain Sullivan could be released to join us for this meeting.

I would like to point out that in the course of events subsequent to the morning of April 7, when I officially assumed responsibility for Middle East and African Affairs, I have had opportunity to see some of the finest professionals dedicated to meeting the needs of crises on a day-in-day-out basis, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. They are very devoted people, dedicated professional people of expertise, people of professional integrity and honor.

It is the case, as Senator Kassebaum pointed out earlier, that we are dealing with a universe in which there are not a series of well-defined, single points of contact, and that has put a premium on our ability, interagency and internationally, to develop very key networking skills on the interagency basis.

My colleagues at State, my colleagues at Joint Staff, my colleagues at the NSC and I, and my own colleagues on the policy side at OSD, are in daily contact. We do so by conference calls, by conference meetings, several times a day. We are available for each other 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. No one is safe from intrusion from one of the fellows.

It is complex, it is more characteristic of a close family, where everybody pulls in to try to meet the need, rather than the image of a well-oiled machine. I would not want to mislead you on how these things are structured. It is not as neat as we would all like it to be. The circumstance and the crisis is not neat, either.

We are working on a three-pronged approach to the crisis. The most immediate one commanding our attention for the sake of this meeting, of course, is the humanitarian prong, which has for us immediately three top priorities: water, medicine, food.

The second prong, but not second either by priority or by sequence, but the second prong is regional stability. We are looking to see that this chaos does not threaten the region, that it does not threaten to overflow, and that means we are working assiduously and in an internationally cooperative manner, seeing that conditions can be established so that people—the affected populations can return home, that they perceive that their lives can be conducted in safety and security, that they can see that there is an opportunity harvest their crops, to prepare for the next season, to see their families are fed, and have an opportunity to see the next day in a certain degree of security.

The third prong is the political process, where we look to see institutions established to create national reconciliation, political powersharing. There was a process suspended on the day of April 6, the Arusha process, that had opportunity. We hope that that process can be restored.

For us at the Department of Defense, our energies are on the first and second prongs, and that first prong again is humanitarian, where the coordination of logistics—we are looking at options to deal with an enormous magnitude of crisis.

No one had expected that there would be this degree of a refugee population, a displaced population. When I first assumed responsibility on April 7, no one predicted that we would be looking at a flow sometimes of 14,000 people an hour. No one could imagine rivers completely clogged with floating dead. No one could imagine

these horrible pictures, much less the needs, and it is entirely possible, in contemplating how to meet some of these needs, needs which are shifting by the minute, to become paralyzed. How do you attack such a problem?

I cannot tell you how impressed I am with our colleagues in the military services, as they approach the problem-solving of this order of magnitude. Looking at how you provide humanitarian assistance overland, when you may be looking at a 2,000-mile road, some last several hundred kilometers of which are gravel or dirt, looking at access by air, how do you do that?

How do you secure landing facilities? How do you coordinate the landing of planes and the taking off of planes, the offloading of planes? What do you use for material? What do you use for sources? How do you clear these things through? With what authorities can you work?

How do you establish your own basis of operations? How do you support the people that you are bringing in and the people that you are trying to help, and move the material along? How do you work with the U.N., which itself does not always have one voice? You have U.N. humanitarian concerns and organizations, and instruments of international peacekeeping, PVO's and NGO's, who all have very important needs to be met, and who need to be heard as well. These are very difficult questions.

Our colleagues are very much people of a can-do attitude who want to make things happen. We work very hard not to have the good sacrificed for the perfect. There are problems when you do not have a single point of contact, and this does call on everyone to polish all networking skills and making sure that you have contacted as many of these known points of contacts as possible.

When it comes to the political process, the third prong, we would defer to the very fine and able efforts undertaken in the diplomatic and political initiative area. I would not want to mislead any of our colleagues. If we get to a point where we can say that there is clean water available, there is medicine available, there is fresh food available, and move into the direction of being able to say that people can have the confidence of going home, we still have some very serious and very fundamental differences, longstanding struggles. Some of them are power struggles, some of them are ethnic, some of them are family and clan struggles which the first two prongs are not able to address.

I just do not want to leave anybody with a misunderstanding of how this mission is seen, and how we can proceed. It is not easy. It is not cheap. There is the cost not only of the lives of those who need the assistance, not only the risks undertaken by the various mechanisms for being conduits for assistance, the hard-working NGO community and PVO community, the international, humanitarian services community, all of these also involve risks, and they all have very serious concerns which we are trying to juggle and meet constantly.

With that, sir, I have left a statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Williamson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF Ms. WILLIAMSON

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa: I appreciate this opportunity to address you this afternoon on the Rwanda crisis.

DOD has been working hand in glove with our colleagues at the State Department to coordinate and implement policies and practices designed to address the civil war and human tragedy in Rwanda. Second, we have been working with the United Nations to get the UMAMIR peacekeeping operation up and running. Let me discuss each in turn.

DOD's role has been to implement the President's response to the humanitarian side of this crisis. Thousands of refugees have flooded into neighboring Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania; initially Tutsis fleeing government forces, and then Hutus attempting to escape what they perceive to be imminent retribution by victorious Tutsi forces. Over two million refugees are now in serious danger of starvation and death due to disease, especially cholera. It is a daunting task.

In the last week of April our Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs Office set aside \$15M for assistance to Rwanda. Almost half of that money had already been spent by last Friday. With this money, DOD carried out over 100 flights moving almost 3,000 tons of material into the region to help refugees. In addition, OFDA recently provided DOD with \$2M for an additional 10 DOD contracted flights, most of which occurred last week. U.S. Air Force C-141s have flown from Turkey and Dubai to deliver UNHCR trucks and supplies. We have contracted for civilian carriers, to include flights from Kenya to Burundi carrying International Red Cross supplies. A USC sponsored airlift of 1,650 tons of grain and cooking oil from Tanzania and Burundi commenced on 1 June. We have run contract flights of almost 1,500 MT of oil and rice from Nairobi to Tanzania, trucks and medical supplies from Sweden to Nairobi, landcruisers and medical supplies from the Netherlands to Nairobi, and plastic sheeting from Nairobi to Goma.

This is a large scale effort that has been underway for quite some time. We should have no illusions: These needs will continue unless and until the affected population believes it is safe to return to Rwanda.

At the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, we are expanding U.S. military humanitarian relief efforts in Rwanda. Our intent is to quickly establish a comprehensive command and control architecture in Zaire which ties together existing agencies to provide water, food, shelter, and health care. Forces from the U.S. European Command have arrived in Goma and will proceed to Bukavu to lay the groundwork for the U.S. military to take on airfield operational responsibilities at both locations. Another U.S. team from Europe has already delivered cargo handling equipment and water purification systems. These groups have linked up with French military forces, the UNHCR and international relief agencies. We are also in the process of establishing an air operations/logistics center in Entebbe. Immediately following the President's announcement, on July 22, our European Command established a joint task force operations cell and developed a plan of action to support the massive international relief operation. We are coordinating with the UNHCR, France, Germany, and others. There is a DOD flight cell team now in Geneva to help coordinate and increase the throughput of flights to Zaire and Uganda and we have a liaison team in Paris to coordinate our activities.

Our initial assessment is that there are some very specific requirements which must be met quickly in these airfields in Zaire and Uganda. We must develop 24 hour operational capabilities; onload/offload capabilities, including equipment, to permit quicker turnaround for aircraft; equipment to improve and expand runways and parking areas to permit more aircraft on the ground at any one time; security; and warehousing.

Water management and sanitation are also critical to prevent further loss of life. We will immediately be taking steps to purify water through chlorination, but intend to bring reverse osmosis purification equipment and distribution equipment to Rwanda. Working in conjunction with the Germans and the UNHCR, EUCOM is expediting this program. We have 5 ships moving toward Mombasa Kenya right now from Diego Garcia, Fiji, and California to provide an eventual capacity to purify 2M gallons of water per day within the next month or so.

We have also airdropped bulk food packages from C-130s out of Entebbe. This past Sunday we dropped 17 tons of bulk food such as rice, flour and meat north of Goma. The UNHCR is reviewing whether it would like us to conduct future drops of this nature.

This is a major activity which requires immediate resources. Other than the food transportation effort, DOD costs are being covered from the service operations and maintenance appropriations.

Before leaving the humanitarian side of the equation, let me underscore Dr. Lake's comment in Friday's White House Press Conference that U.S. military personnel are not part of a UN peacekeeping operation. Our participation is strictly in the context of the humanitarian effort at the urgent request of the UNHCR. The U.S. military offers unique capabilities at this particularly difficult moment. We are able to move quickly and bring sufficient resources to bear in stemming the worst of this crisis. That is why the international community has asked for our help and why we have responded to this and previous pleas quickly, professionally and honorably.

That is not to say that the USG in general and the Department of Defense in particular have not been involved in the international peacekeeping response to the horrors that have occurred in Rwanda. DOD has been actively involved in support of the UN, offering operational planning advice and counsel, and offering equipment and airlift support. We moved quickly to provide 50 M113 armored personnel carriers for the use by the Ghanaian contingent in UNAMIR. The last of these vehicles arrived in Entebbe, Uganda, on 2 July. Except for the French, we are the only country that has provided any equipment whatsoever to UNAMIR since its mandate was expanded on 16 May.

When other donors did not step forward, the USG went further—we "adopted" the Ghanaian battalion and are in the process of providing additional un-requested gear. We also urged other donor nations to follow our lead, here in Washington, at the UN and in foreign capitals. Most recently, the U.S. Government reiterated the need to move quickly on the equipment issue to representatives of 25 diplomatic missions at a Sunday afternoon meeting at the Department of State. Up to this point, only a handful of nations have offered support, most notably the French, whose establishment of a safe haven undoubtedly saved numerous lives.

Even as we help refugees survive in Zaire, we must look for ways for them to return home. This is the crucial end state we seek. We are presently engaged with the UN to determine what changes should be made in UNAMIR's mission statement to allow it to be more responsive to the current situation on the ground. In that regard, we believe that UNAMIR, by providing a secure environment, can play a critical role in allowing refugees to feel safe about returning home and reconstituting their lives and their country.

A U.S. military officer is with Ambassador David Rawson in Kigali for discussions with UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire right now, discussing the path UNAMIR will take. We will follow up these discussions by sending a DOD team to the UN later this week.

The situation in Rwanda is of enormous magnitude. As much as our humanitarian efforts to bring clean water, food, medicine, and other emergency assistance may help the immediate crisis of disease and starvation, the causes of the massive flight of refugees and displaced resulted from long-standing tribal and power struggles. This violence occurred when the Rwandan people were relatively well-fed, housed, and clothed. Beyond the humanitarian efforts, we do hope to contribute to the construction of a situation which engenders sufficient confidence of the affected populations to return home and—most importantly—allows for a process of political healing and the development of genuine and transparent power sharing arrangements. This political process and its subsequent outcomes are the ultimate requirements to promote regional stability.

Senator SIMON [presiding]. Your statement will be entered into the record. General Zinni.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ANTHONY C. ZINNI, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP PENDLETON, CA

General ZINNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me begin by saying I do not represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I believe the captain on the other end of the table is fulfilling that role.

Senator SIMON. All right, but you are not in opposition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General ZINNI. No, sir. In fact, I have no direct involvement in Rwanda, and before you think I have wandered into the wrong room, I believe I am here to testify based on my experience in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

Over the last 3 years, that has involved four operations: to begin with, Provide Promise in Bosnia, Provide Comfort in the hills with the Kurds, Provide Hope, the relief effort for the former Soviet Union, and Restore Hope in Somalia, on two occasions.

Subsequent to that, I have worked on service doctrine on training education, on organization and equipment, and on other things, to better prepare the U.S. military, my own service, and the joint effort to better handle these operations. From that perspective, I look forward to the questions of the committee, and that is all I have, sir.

Senator SIMON. From your perspective, if I may ask you to speak candidly, are we doing everything we can or should be doing right now to help Rwanda?

General ZINNI. If I could, sir, in resettling refugees in this situation, my experience has been that there are really five parts to this from the military perspective.

The first is that we have to put in place the distribution system, and that is not an easy task in remote places like this, with very poor infrastructure.

Then we have to stabilize the population in the camps. Now, that is very difficult. It is a large population. It came about very quickly. It is not only traumatizing. It is a situation that will get worse each day because of problems like sanitation. We begin treating the symptoms like the water, but the source of the problem, the poor sanitary conditions that exist, the spread of other diseases, will compound the problems.

After they are stabilized—and the longer this takes, the bigger this next phase becomes—we have the problem of transiting them back to their points of origin. If the population is really weakened, as we saw with the Kurds, we had to build a system, another system to get them back—transit camps, in effect.

We had to deal with them through psychological operations to mentally prepare them to get back to their villages. We had to tape record their villages and the few people that returned, to show they were safe and that it was habitable.

The next phase involves the villages or the towns or the points of origin themselves, when they get back. I think we heard earlier that the crops are near to harvesting. Some of them may already have passed that point. Is there a viable existence there for them? Are their crops and their livestock still there? If they are not, there is a phase that needs to go about taking place to allow them to re-establish themselves.

Then the fifth and the most critical stage is the recovery. So that this thing does not repeat itself, we have to cure the problems that led to that, and that becomes political, humanitarian, and military to a point, if peacekeeping is involved, or security in some fashion.

We have only started at the front end, building the distribution system, and beginning to stabilize the population where it exists. How much of those other three phases have to go on I think we will find out as we get into this, but it may require, if our military is involved in all of those phases, significant amounts of resources indeed.

Senator SIMON. It strikes me, general, as you comment, that you are precisely the kind of person the U.N. ought to be getting a hold of as we try to establish machinery for more rapid response.

Ms. Williamson, how—in the UNAMIR situation, we have committed assistance to some troops, and we have committed, as I understand it, armored personnel carriers for either Mali or Ghana. How rapidly will these troops be deployed? I mentioned before, the French got there in 72 hours. Obviously, this is more complicated when you have many nations involved, but how rapidly are we going to be able to get people there to stabilize the situation?

Ms. WILLIAMSON. Senator, the UNAMIR operation has a goal of achieving a force size of 5,500. The U.N. would hope to have something in the vicinity of 2,000, 2,500 on the ground in a matter of weeks, we would hope by mid-August. Am I answering the question?

Senator SIMON. Yes, you are answering it, but you are not telling me how rapidly we are going to get people there. In this kind of situation, it seems to me speed is really important.

General, you know this better than I do, but things are starting to move in a better direction there, and we want to make sure they continue to move in a better direction. In very specific terms—and Captain Sullivan, maybe you have more precise information, but how rapidly are we going to get troops on the ground? We have made troop commitments, we have made commitments in terms of personnel carriers.

Ms. WILLIAMSON. I will ask Captain Sullivan to comment. Let me just mention, first, to remember that as Ambassador Moose recalled from the weekend's activity with followup to 24 different potential donor troop contributing countries, that we have had some positive response from a number of countries. Even yesterday, you heard Israel announce that it would be giving a mobile hospital unit.

Senator SIMON. Well, with all due respect, weeks ago the Secretary General of the OAU said they had 5,000-plus African troops who were ready to go, and nothing happened.

What I am interested in is how rapidly we are going to have something taking place. Captain, can you enlighten us at all?

Captain SULLIVAN. No, sir, I am afraid I cannot. I am here to provide information based on the current situation of the humanitarian effort. I have not been privy to the plans to move troops into the area.

Ms. WILLIAMSON. The United States has informed the U.N. that we are prepared to provide airlift for any of the nations.

Senator SIMON. But my information is Ethiopia, Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe have all volunteered personnel. Do we have any idea, are they going to be there 3 days, 3 weeks, 3 months?

Ambassador MOOSE. I think, Mr. Chairman, I have some information to offer in that regard.

As you know, what we had suggested to the U.N. in general, and to other U.N. member states also, is that one of the major obstacles has been to find the equipment to enable those troops to deploy.

We undertook to supply the Ghanaian battalion. We have the 50 APC's that you referred to, which are precisely to enable the Gha-

nians to deploy. We got those APC's into theater. We would wish that we could have done it more quickly, but we do have constraints on our equipment availability, and we also had to train the Ghanians in order to use that equipment. That equipment is in theater. It is being delivered to Kigali.

We have also finalized, I think by today, the list of the other equipment the Ghanians will need, and I am told that we could have that equipment in Kigali within a week. This will facilitate the remaining deployment of the Ghanians.

There are already some 560 Ghanians on the ground awaiting the further deployment of another 260. There are problems of a similar nature with other units that have offered to deploy. Every one of the African units requires some additional equipment and some additional support before they are at a level where they can effectively carry out the requested mission.

We had urged that other nations do as we have done, that is adopt a battalion. That unfortunately has not been done. We are therefore working on another approach with the U.N., that is, to ask the U.N. to identify very specifically the equipment that is needed.

The purpose of our meeting on Sunday was again to urge donors to respond expeditiously to those needs. What has to be understood is that we are not in a position to provide all of the equipment that is required in order to deploy, so it has to be a cooperative, international effort.

The only other bit of information I have is that, based on the U.N. conversations with the Ethiopians this week, the Ethiopians probably will be able to deploy to Kigali within the next 10 days to 2 weeks, to have an initial element on the ground of somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000.

If that is the case, then what that means is the U.N. will be able to expand significantly these new, joint patrols that have been launched between the RPF and UNAMIR with a view to trying to create a sense of security and a reality of security in areas so that refugees will be encouraged to return.

Senator SIMON. I think if we can get the 1,500 or 2,000 as quickly as possible, it seems to me that is desirable.

I am also a great believer, whether it is for me personally or for the Defense Department or anyone else, that you have to set deadlines.

If someone asks me to write an introduction to a book, and they say, you know, whenever you get around to it, I just do not get around to it. I need a deadline, and I think if we are not setting deadlines, or at least goals, we ought to be doing that.

I recognize this is a U.N. operation, and that we cannot just call the shots, but clearly, we are a leader in this whole situation.

The Italians have offered, volunteered aircraft. Are they on the scene? Are they working with us on this?

Ambassador MOOSE. I am not aware of that particular offer. They had offered to have some transport in connection with the relief operation, but the point of coordination here remains the U.N.

We have sent teams of military people to New York to work with the U.N. Secretariat precisely to assist them with the planning and

coordination of this operation, and I think we will be looking at what we can do more than that along those lines.

Senator SIMON. I hear that the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire in charge is a really fine person. Those are the reports I have.

Ambassador MOOSE. No question.

Senator SIMON. I see that you are all nodding your heads for the record. Now, the record cannot get that nod of the head in the record, but you are in agreement. It does seem to me that we ought to be doing everything we can.

The Netherlands also has offered aircraft. Now, that may be transportation or something. The United Kingdom is offering trucks, I understand.

I would be interested in all of these. I have a whole list of things here—an Australian medical company, France funding for a Senegalese force, Canada communication company, Italy also trucks, Romania a surgical team, Russia helicopters.

I would be interested in getting from one of you, and I think probably the Defense Department is the place to do it, what the status of this is, and where we are, and how likely it is that we are going to have the 1,500 to 2,000 Secretary Moose talked about in a week, and where are we likely to be in 2 weeks, where are we likely to be in 3 weeks?

Ms. WILLIAMSON. We will be happy to provide that, Senator.

Concerning external support, there are currently over 1,900 UNAMIR troops deployed. As of August 15, 856 Ghanaians had deployed to Rwanda and DOD is working to provide water purification, mine detectors, binoculars, and transportation. Four hundred Ethiopians have self-deployed as of 16 August (and more coming); we will provide SATCOM (or equivalent) and the U.N. will provide flak jackets, tents, night vision devices, vehicles, and the like. The Dutch are preparing to lift equipment in support of a Zambian deployment. We believe the Tunisians will deploy in early September. France, of course, still plans to withdraw, but continues to redeploy personnel and equipment. We have requested that they equip and otherwise support the international forces of Operation Turquoise. Italy is awaiting a signed lease for APC's from the U.N. Over 200 British and over 500 Canadian troops are in the area.

Senator SIMON. OK. One other question. Incidentally, I talked about recognition of the government, and I was passing along the suggestion of Reverend Jackson. I am not sure when we should or should not recognize the government, but I am impressed with the fact that they have included Hutus in the top leadership, and apparently Hutus who have the possibility are providing real leadership.

There was a reluctance on the part of our Government to call genocide genocide. Is there any reason for that? Why was there that reluctance?

Ambassador MOOSE. No particular reason, other than I think, Mr. Chairman, we are a big Government that needs to be sure we are coordinated, and that sometimes takes more time than any of us would like. I do not think anybody denied or doubted that acts of genocide had taken place. There was a question of what would happen as a result of such a determination, and what kind of a response we and the international community would put in place.

I think we have made clear now that there is no question about the fact that genocide has occurred. We were among the first to urge the convening of a special meeting of the U.N. Human Rights

Commission in order to appoint a rapporteur to establish the facts of the situation.

That rapporteur acted quickly. His report included, as we all suspected, that in fact representatives of the government and the army, along with militias, were clearly responsible for organizing, ordering, and directing these actions.

We have also supported a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for the creation of a special commission, and the President himself has urged the earliest possible constitution of a tribunal that would, not unlike the tribunal that has been created in the Bosnian circumstance, have as its objective the actual trial of those who have been responsible for these acts of genocide.

Senator SIMON. I would just pass along and commend to the State Department also to take a look at Senator Specter's bill for an international criminal court. It strikes me that ad hoc criminal courts to deal with Bosnia or Rwanda or whatever else may arise are probably not a very good way of dealing with this problem, that we need some more permanent structure.

Senator Jeffords.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to broaden out the discussion a little bit. This is the third real large kind of operation that we have been witnessing, and there have been many others, from Bosnia, to Somalia, to here.

I get a little concerned when I hear people say that nobody interpreted or expected what would happen. When you had the sort of genocides we have just been referring to occur, and then the forces—the Hutus, when the genocide was largely against them, plus the Tutsis, come back and take control, move on down through, and you have largely Hutus there, it would seem to me there would be an expectation of panic and millions moving. It does not seem to surprise me in that regard.

But putting that aside, because I do not want to be a drugstore quarterback on these sorts of things, what I am concerned about is the larger question of what are we doing now? What is the U.N. doing to try to figure out how we can bring together coordination, and what are the distinctions between peacekeeping and peace-making? Do we want to wait until the genocide is over and then come in and establish peace, or do we have a force that is ready to go in ahead, and if so, what should that force be? What is the role of the United States?

We have talked earlier about the necessity, perhaps, for units in our own Government that have volunteered to be willing to place themselves in this kind of harm's way. Is there any discussion going on in that regard?

General Zinni, I know you have been in expeditionary forces. I know the Marines well enough, being a retired captain, to know that probably you go anywhere the President tells you to go.

Unfortunately, the public does not engage in such a desire to answer the President's call, so we in Congress have a terrible time trying to make decisions on these kinds of operations. It seems to me we need to have a clear line of when and who we can order in without having to go to Congress to get essentially a sanction to go, and we get in all sorts of debates.

Training is another thing that worries me. How in the world can we expect many governments in Africa to suddenly provide forces that have any idea how to coordinate or train with each other? Is there any thought to try joint coordination? How do we get an OAU force that can be formed rapidly that is trained together, that knows what to do?

It seems to me these are the kinds of things that I would like to see some effort in so that we do not have another hearing like this one trying to figure out what we should be doing and when we should do it, and who should do it, and what is the U.N. doing?

Ambassador, can you give me any hope in that regard?

Ambassador MOOSE. Senator, let me perhaps attempt an initial response. I would believe General Zinni has some observations, too, from his extensive experience here.

Frankly, the members of this panel are not in the best place to answer your question. The person in the State Department who has been most preoccupied with this, of course, is Doug Bennett, who is spending a substantial amount of his time worrying precisely about the issue of how we strengthen the capacity of the organization of the U.N. to respond effectively, not only after the fact of a peace and to restore a situation, but to employ preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping.

I think it is fair to say that at no point in the U.N.'s history has it been confronted with as many demands on the part of its member states for intervention in crisis situations around the world. We have asked a lot of the organization in recent years.

The simultaneous efforts in Cambodia, and the effort in Somalia, have put an extraordinary strain on the administrative and management capacities of the U.N. We have been working with them both in terms of civilian military personnel and issues to try to strengthen that capacity administratively so that, in fact, we would have a more rapid response.

At the same time, recognizing that the demands are going to be with us, we have, indeed, spent a fair amount of time trying to determine how we can strengthen the capacity of regional organizations to be the first line of defense in response in cases both of preventive diplomacy and of response to the crisis.

We have, over the last 2 years, committed almost \$5 million to the Organization of African Unity to strengthen its efforts to develop a conflict resolution capability and to support specific operations.

I would recall that we supported a monitoring group of the U.N. in Rwanda as part of the negotiating process of the Arusha accords. It was part of our effort to try to facilitate a resolution of the problem so that it would not explode.

I do think we have been attempting over the years to anticipate problems. In any event, it is obvious that our efforts of preventive diplomacy in Rwanda were not adequate. It did not prevent the explosion of the crisis that we are now witnessing. I do not think it is fair to say that we have not been seeking to find ways to anticipate and to avert these kinds of disasters.

But again, I would hope that you would have a chance to put that question specifically to people like IO Assistant Secretary

Doug Bennett and others who have been working directly with the U.N. Perhaps General Zinni has some observations to make.

General ZINNI. Sir, in my view, the U.N. does not have the capacity to handle operations that go beyond simple peacekeeping, chapter 6 level, or a tremendous humanitarian catastrophe such as this, that come quickly, are of such large scope, and are overwhelming, and they are layered with other problems in terms of security and other problems.

It is easy to get a lot of nations to sign up and provide forces, but what are those forces? They are hodgepodge forces of limited capability, requiring a lot of support and sustainment, of questionable quality, perhaps. There is a problem of interoperability of those forces if the operation is vast and you have to tie them together.

Political interoperability, some come with political constraints on what they are able to do or not able to do. Cultural interoperability, even the forces that are on the ground may have problems with other forces by their side. Military interoperability, which is important, equipment, procedures, all that has to meld together.

Only the United States provides the sinews for these operations if they are on a large scale. We provide the ability to command and control the operation, the physical ability to communicate, the ability to staff, plan, and to run and direct large-scale operations like this. We provide the strategic lift, the logistics to include the medical and engineering—sometimes people can contribute parts to these things, but the overall effort and the backbone, we provide.

If intelligence is required on the ground, if there is a threat, no one obviously has the capacity that we have to provide that.

There are other special capabilities that we bring that no one else can match: civil affairs; psychological operations; engineering capabilities; port and airfield management; all sorts of other things that cannot be matched elsewhere.

If we want someone else to do it in these large-scale operations like the U.N., then as member nations, we have to decide to provide the resources for them to do this and commit the people.

My concern about a volunteer organization is, they have plenty of volunteers now, some great people, some not-so-great people. It is quality they need, and a commitment of resources. They need the training, the structure—all that has to be revamped to handle things of this size.

They need deployable headquarters with the communications, they need to be able to tap into logistics support, they need an intelligence system, they need the special capabilities that we come with to handle displaced persons like civil affairs and psychological operations. None of that is resident within the U.N. now.

I think they are fine for the chapter 6 level peacekeeping, slow-developing disasters or catastrophes where they can energize the NGO and PVO community and contribute some minor military forces, too. When it gets this big, where it gets complex politically in a humanitarian sense, and militarily in terms of security, pulling all of that together is extremely difficult.

Senator JEFFORDS. Would anyone else like to comment? [No response.]

I realize it is a difficult one for you, but actually it is you who can give us a better idea of what is needed, because you have been out there facing these problems. It just concerns me that we are just going to do these same things over and over again, with the same message over and over again, and you are going to be on the firing line trying to explain why we did not react better.

Let me ask you, Ambassador, is it conceivable that in the OAU we can develop the kind of structures and coordinations and forces, or is that something which is beyond the realm of likelihood?

Ambassador MOOSE. I think it is possible over the next several years to develop within the Organization of African Unity a meaningful capacity both for preventive diplomacy and to respond in modest ways in situations of peace keeping or peace monitoring.

I think it would be unrealistic in the extreme—I think the organization itself would admit that—to expect the OAU to take on operations of the magnitude that we are talking about in Rwanda, Somalia, or wherever.

As the general has pointed out, these are situations where even the U.N. is perhaps beyond its capabilities to respond. I think it would therefore be unreasonable to expect that the Africans on their own would develop such a capability.

This is not to say, however, that it would not be a significant contribution to expand and enhance the Africans' ability to deal with this. There is a variety of situations in which some preventive diplomacy capability is needed, and some modest peace-monitoring, or peace-keeping capability is required, and precisely those situations where, if that is inserted quickly, it can avert, avoid a further escalation of the situation.

I think it is important, also, that African nations and organizations be empowered to deal with their own problems. I think that is what they are seeking to do in the resolutions the organization has passed over recent years to try to assume greater responsibility.

There are things that we are all seeking to do. We have a request in the budget which I hope will survive—it seems likely to survive—a request for \$10 million, which would enable us to provide assistance, training, and equipment to those African units which have developed a record and a reputation and a capacity for peacekeeping, so that when a situation arises, they will be prepared to move in, that there will be available to the OAU and to the international community troop contingents which can perform ably in a situation.

So I do think it is important that we work on that, but I do not think we should assume that that can, in any way, replace the much greater need and capacity that is required through the U.N. and through other mechanisms that we have put in place.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you.

Senator SIMON. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are a number of questions that my constituents ask me concerning relief operations like this and potential military involvement. The first question is, they want to know why one place and not another.

They see on CNN Bosnia and Rwanda, and then add to the mix when I tell them that there are places like Angola and Liberia that they do not even see, they do not understand, necessarily, why we act in one place or another, and I think we have to be able to articulate that.

I think it would be meaningless for us to work with the U.N. and create all these structures and participate unless we figure out some mechanism by which to do that. I do not think that is happening now.

It is very difficult. Obviously, the American people are more focused on domestic problems. That is the first problem.

The second is, once we do make a commitment, either financially or, more importantly, if it is a troop commitment, people want to know what the limits are.

I would suggest that one of the reasons we did not act quickly in Rwanda is because of what happened in Somalia, that the people of this country feel that somehow they were burned by showing compassion.

Now, I do not want to disparage the compassion of the American people. I think it is tremendous. But it is at these moments, now, when we start with military force in the area in any form, that we have to get some sense of what the boundaries are, and I think that has been missing from the process.

Apparently, over the weekend, Secretary of Defense Perry predicted that U.S. troops could be in Zaire for several months. What exactly is their mission and what will determine when they leave Zaire?

Ambassador MOOSE. Well, let me start with an answer, but I think Ms. Williamson could certainly contribute to that.

The President has made it clear from the outset, that our mission in Zaire is a limited one. It is to support the UNHCR, the U.N., and other agencies, in responding to the humanitarian crisis.

That is the limited mandate which has been given to our military. That is a massive effort, in and of itself. It is going to require time to put in place the structures that General Zinni has referred to, that will allow us to distribute water, food, medicine, and other things to those who need it.

I do not think, at this stage, anybody can accurately predict exactly how long that is going to require, and when we can be able to say that the elements of that mission have been accepted and are carried out satisfactorily.

Senator FEINGOLD. Is there an exit strategy?

Ambassador MOOSE. I do think it is fair to say that this is different, if you will, from being put into a situation of a peacekeeping, where we have absolutely no control.

We have control over this in the sense that we know what the mission is. We know what we have undertaken to do, and we can determine when it is finished.

So I do think we are all clear in our minds as to what the President has charged us to do, and what the limits of that mission are.

Senator FEINGOLD. What would be the exit strategy? Is there one? How do you measure success, so we can know when we can get out or when we must get out, so that we do not get into the situation that we did last time with talking about democracy-build-

ing and chasing a certain individual? I feel that we needed some answers.

Ms. WILLIAMSON. Senator, as I mentioned earlier, of the three-pronged approach to this crisis, the DOD role is the first two prongs: The humanitarian, first and foremost.

We are not looking at a U.S. military involvement as peacekeepers. We are not looking at a U.S. military presence and a military role.

The military, because of its logistical expertise, the capability, the ability to mobilize and to bring to bear assets and resources not otherwise available, means that we are serving as a conduit for the delivery of that humanitarian assistance.

The three top priorities in that sphere of humanitarian assistance are: First, water; second, medicine; third, food.

The second prong is the condition under which people will be able to see that it is safe to return home.

As I mentioned earlier to the chairman, we are hoping to see an increase of UNAMIR presence on the ground, perhaps as early as mid-August. If that is the case, if in fact there are joint patrols so that people have a sense of seeing blue helmets along key access routes, they have a sense that there is some safety, that they can harvest their crops, that they can have clean water and medicine and so on in their home areas; and, if we are very lucky, they will return home.

That is the end point we are looking for as a military presence, since what we are looking for is how to deliver that humanitarian assistance, and seek regional stability. We are not trying to be a peacekeeper, we are not trying to disengage parties otherwise hostile.

Senator FEINGOLD. So the notion is that the blue helmets, UNAMIR force, would come in and not only do what they are going to do, but even displace or eliminate the need for the limited functions that we are already performing; that the United States would literally not have to have a presence either in Zaire or in Rwanda?

Ms. WILLIAMSON. That is right. What we are hoping for is that people will see it is safe to go home.

Senator FEINGOLD. What is the policy now, on the use of these troops in Rwanda itself? I understand that some have entered Rwanda. Under what circumstances did they, if they did so?

Ms. WILLIAMSON. Do you mean U.S. personnel?

Senator FEINGOLD. U.S. personnel.

Ms. WILLIAMSON. We do not have U.S. personnel, as military personnel, in any sort of peacekeeping operation.

We do have representatives from EUCOM and from the military accompanying Ambassador Rawson, for example, in their discussions with General Dallaire and discussions with U.N. authorities, humanitarian assistance groups, to look at needs and to assess what on the ground is usable, would have to be enhanced or in some way amended; so that we can provide the most effective conduit for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Senator FEINGOLD. May I just interrupt? How many American troops or military personnel are there now in Rwanda itself?

Ms. WILLIAMSON. I thought we had three, with Ambassador Rawson.

Ambassador MOOSE. There are three, with Ambassador Rawson. There is a team that is supposed to arrive tomorrow. It may be a dozen.

Senator FEINGOLD. So, it is a very limited number, with a very narrowly defined role.

Ms. WILLIAMSON. Absolutely. Absolutely, in order to report back as to what would be most useful or most necessary, in terms of how people would provide assistance.

There is not a policy decision with respect to an introduction of U.S. troops into Rwanda. Prudent planners, however, would be remiss if they did not think about what it would take to create way stations, so that the food, medicine, and clean water were actually in Rwanda and not serving as a magnet outside of Rwanda.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate the answers. If I may say so, I think the more you can communicate these limitations, and how far we have gone, the more likely we are to have public support for what is obviously a very worthy effort.

But I think there has to be as much effort to do that as to talk about the other details of it, in order to ask the American people and the Congress to be supportive. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. General Zinni, you have had an unusual background in this kind of situation, and I have never heard you testify before; but I am impressed, I have to tell you.

Would you be willing to participate, subject to the approval of military hierarchy in a think-tank bull session some evening with representatives of this committee, the Armed Services Committee, of State Department, the Pentagon. And I think you are a very key person. Would you be willing to participate in something like that some evening?

General ZINNI. Yes, sir. Certainly.

Senator SIMON. I think that could be very helpful. Let me just thank Secretary Moose, Ms. Williamson, Captain Sullivan, all of you, very very much.

We are dealing with a situation where, obviously, mistakes are going to be made. But we have to make sure we are moving, and make as few as possible while moving rapidly to help people.

Thank you very, very much.

Ms. WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador MOOSE. Thank you.

Senator SIMON. Our final panel will be Alison DesForges from the Human Rights Watch/Africa; Dr. Alain Destexhe, Doctors Without Borders; and Mr. Jeff Drumtra, testifying on behalf of Mr. Roger Winter, from the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

First of all, I thank all three of you. Ms. DesForges, I would also like to thank you personally for what you are doing with Human Rights Watch; and, of course, we have met discussing this situation before. But your organization has performed invaluable service.

Doctors Without Borders in Somalia were just doing incredible things during my visits there. I have seen them in other situations. I have just been really impressed by what you are doing.

And Roger Winter, for the Committee on Refugees, he has been a witness on a number of occasions here; and we, again, appreciate what you are doing.

Unless there is some preference as to who testifies first, Ms. DesForges, I will call on your first.

**STATEMENT OF ALISON DESFORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/
AFRICA, WASHINGTON, DC**

Ms. DESFORGES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you very much for holding this hearing, and for inviting me to participate.

I represent Human Rights Watch here.

Senator SIMON. Do you want to pull the microphone a little closer to you?

Ms. DESFORGES. I have a written statement, which has been submitted.

Senator SIMON. We will enter written statements into the record.

Ms. DESFORGES. Right. Of course, I prefer to deal with more current information at this hearing.

Last week, I spoke with a high administration official who said to me, who gave me a very pessimistic analysis, but one that I have become increasingly convinced is accurate: He said the generosity of the American people exceeds its political grasp; and that is why we are paying a quarter of a billion dollars in Rwanda now, as opposed to \$10 million 6 weeks ago.

I find this analysis very compelling, because we have participated over these many weeks; as I know you know well and your staff, which has been very supportive, knows well, in trying to move our administration toward a more decisive and rapid response to this terrible tragedy.

There are several points which we can see were key in the response of our Government, and of the international community as a whole. And although it is obviously not the time for finger-pointing, it is the time to critical analysis, if that can save us from future mistakes.

One of these key points, obviously, was the decision to withdraw the UNAMIR presence, or to draw it down to an insignificant token force.

Another was the decision, or perhaps the nondecision, to comply with the new mandate for UNAMIR II. And I must testify that I am horrified, sitting in the audience here today, hearing from members of the administration that perhaps in mid-August we will have an effective UNAMIR presence in Rwanda.

At the time the mandate was restored and enlarged, on May 16, I remember being told by a member of the Security Council that 3 months was a realistic timespan to expect UNAMIR to actually be functional. And at that point I said, "Surely, surely, you are not serious? We already have UNAMIR I structure in place. It is simply a case of expanding it." He said, "Well, in that case, perhaps 1 month."

Here we are, looking at indeed more than 3 months before UNAMIR is fully functional; and this is in light of an enormous catastrophe in the last 10 days. Had we not had some 2 million refugees camped in Zaire and dying nightly on our television screens, would 3 months have been even a realistic time estimate?

We have engaged, along with the other member nations of the U.N. and its force, in an elaborate ballet, a choreography which is

incredibly gruesome, when you consider its consequences; and having shuttled myself back and forth between our administration, the U.N., and various troop-giving nations, I can assure you that this is the most unimaginable form of "apres vous, Gaston" kind of game that can be played in the world today.

It is true that our U.N. machinery does not function well. But it could surely have functioned much better.

It is true that the administration is caught up in redtape and bureaucracy. But surely, with a little leadership, we could have gotten those APC's to Rwanda in something short of 8-weeks time; and then, not tainted or with guns mounted.

I think we all have to agree with New York Times editorial comment: "Next time, we should try Avis." It surely is unconscionable, to think of that and then to hear the kind of testimony which we have heard this afternoon.

I have to say, I do not participate in all of the—what shall I say—the kind, courteous treatment that Members of the Senate are obliged to accord to members of the administration, and vice versa.

And I feel compelled by the urgency and the horror of the situation to say that, frankly, I am appalled to hear that this administration is not prepared to move faster.

And I must concur with you when you make your implied criticism, that the French were there in 72 hours; and why is it that we have no firm deadline about when this is going to happen?

There has also been, I think, a serious lack of leadership on the part of this administration, in terms of failing to stigmatize and isolate the genocidal regime in Rwanda; something which would have cost no dollars, and which was pressed on this administration very early, and which they failed to do over many weeks.

And, given that the United States plays a leadership role in the world community, had there been a decisive, clear public statement by the U.S. Government, condemning the genocide in Rwanda, perhaps that would have made a difference. We will never know.

The current situation is one that I think needs to inspire not just pity and hand-wringing, but a desire to get ourselves mobilized and to do something effective, beyond the humanitarian need. I do have to pay tribute, as everyone has, to the effectiveness of the humanitarian action being undertaken. But the tribute to the generosity of the American people does not, in any way, reduce the criticism of the political inaction on the part of this administration.

The current situation is one which is fraught with danger, not just in the short run because of the victims of epidemic and starvation and lack of water; but in the long term, because of the massing of large numbers of refugees within Zaire, many of whom have been permitted to cross the border with their weapons.

And here, I think, we need to look at the long-term potential of continuing unrest in this region. If these people are not successfully repatriated, we will have the kind of situation which led to the current crisis in Rwanda, but in spades.

Because instead of having a population of Tutsi, we will have a far larger population of Hutu, who will be hammering at the doors to come home; and hammering, much better armed and organized to fight at a much earlier stage. So I think we must pay serious

attention to the need for a stable and successful political solution to this conflict.

The first step is, obviously, to cut off the radios. No one has talked about the radios. Why have we not talked about the radios this afternoon, when they are still broadcasting?

The radio of the Radio des Milles Collines, which as recently as yesterday was continuing to send the same message. We may have 30,000 to 40,000 people returning home, and that is wonderful; but until we remove this continuing propaganda, which encourages people to flee the country, we will not be able to stabilize the situation.

The French position is that they would happily cut this radio off, if they could locate it. As I understand it, it is no longer operating from French territory; it is now operating from Zaire. I doubt that Zaire will be quite as cooperative and willing to cut off this transmitter.

So we may again be back to the situation we were at some 10 weeks before, in contemplating the possibility of jamming this radio. And I would suggest that is something we need to think about seriously; not just the radio broadcasting currently to Rwanda, but the radio which has begun similar broadcasts to Burundi.

A second thing which must be done, obviously, and we have referred to it here—many witnesses, as well as the Senators—is to have the UNAMIR II force in place quickly, and well prepared for its task. This is something that the United States needs to continue to play a leadership role in, in encouraging other countries and forces to get mobilized for this.

But again, a week ago today I was in Washington and I was assured by a member of the National Security Council that that very day we were going to finalize the arrangements for the equipment for the Ghanaian forces for Rwanda; and here this afternoon, 1 week later, I hear that today we are going to finalize the agreement for the Ghanaian forces. Clearly, it is 1 week later.

One week from today, will we still be hearing that it is going to be “today” that the agreement is going to be finalized? Why was it not, last week?

The role of the French, if I could touch briefly on that, I think in general it is appropriate to commend the French for their performance.

But I would like to note that, as recently as last week, the French continued to permit the Governors of Kabgayi and Cyangugu Province to exercise their authority. These men are clearly implicated in the genocide; and what is more, they were as recently as last week actively urging the populations of their zones to flee into Zaire.

So I think we need to pay careful attention to the French role here. They have presumably detained a certain number of minor leaders of the militia, but they have at the same time permitted former so-called President Sindikubwabo, to transit through their zone, along with various Ministers, into Zaire. Why were they not arrested then and there?

This is something that the United States as well needs to pay some attention to, in terms of eventual arrests or refusal of political asylum to people seeking U.S. shelter.

I see, Mr. Chairman, that you would like me to hurry up?

Senator SIMON. We are going to be having some more votes before very long; and we would like to get some questions in. So, if you could conclude your remarks?

Ms. DESFORGES. OK. Let me say a word about Burundi; because we have heard many times today and in many other contexts, we have heard no one could imagine, no one could imagine, a disaster of this dimension.

Let us imagine, let us imagine Burundi; because we need to put our imaginations to work, to avert disaster. Burundi, despite the optimistic report that you heard from our Ambassador, I cannot be so optimistic myself. Ayala Lasso, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, is not optimistic. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, the Secretary General's representative on the spot, is not optimistic.

We have had 50,000 dead there since last October; and we need to act. We need to act in encouraging prosecutions of the guilty, as Secretary Moose has indicated, both through the U.N. Security Council and through the donor communities.

We need to act by restricting military aid; in the future, by making it conditional upon prosecution of the guilty. And we need to encourage, and move strongly at the U.N., to have an arms embargo for Burundi; because, if not, the arms are going to continue to flow in there as they have been flowing in, rapidly, in the last few weeks. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. DesForges follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. DESFORGES

Introduction: Thank you for holding this important hearing, Chairman Simon, and for inviting me to testify. My name is Alison DesForges. I am a historian with a specialty in Central Africa, and am a founding board member of Human Rights Watch/Africa (formerly known as Africa Watch). I appear today on Human Rights Watch's behalf.

This hearing is an excellent opportunity to evaluate the events in Rwanda since April 6 and the United States's response to them, and to apply those lessons to neighboring Burundi. As you know, extremist Hutu mounted a political/military coup in Rwanda in early April launching genocide against the Tutsi and systematically and thoroughly exterminating Hutu political rivals. The genocide executed by elements of the army and civilian militia, resulted in the deaths of as many as 500,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, in three months.

The United States response to genocide in Rwanda was extremely disappointing. The disaster in Rwanda apparently failed to capture the attention of the President until millions fled the country within the past two weeks following the RPF victory. We would identify the following missed opportunities where the Clinton Administration failed to protect Rwandan victims, and to stigmatize and repudiate those responsible for genocide:

Weakening the UNAMIR Presence: One of the first lost opportunities to stem the killings and protect the victims was when the United Nations decided on April 21 to sharply reduce the United Nations (UNAMIR) force in Rwanda, which had been in place for some months to monitor the Arusha ceasefire. The United States took the lead in reducing the UNAMIR presence at the height of the massacres, sending a critically important signal to those doing the killings that there would be no international resistance to their crimes. The decision to reduce the UNAMIR presence was justified on the grounds that the troops could not play the role envisioned for them, as there was no peace to keep. Yet at the time, vast numbers of Rwandan civilians were being killed in areas where there was no conflict at all, and the U.S. failed to press for deploying UNAMIR forces in these areas to prevent genocide.

Foot-dragging on Equipment for the African Forces: By mid-May, when killings of civilians had risen to the hundreds of thousands, the United Nations reconsidered its decision to withdraw UNAMIR, and the Secretary General pushed through a resolution to deploy additional peacekeeping troops. Within a week of the U.N. decision, several African nations had reportedly offered the troops needed, but asked

that wealthy nations provide them with such things as armored personnel carriers to move about Rwanda in safety. The United States pledged 50 APC's on May 16, but the vehicles were provided only 2 months later, unpainted and without guns. The footdragging and red tape surrounding the leasing of the vehicles by the U.S. to the United Nations is, apparently, customary. What is disappointing is that there was no Pentagon, White House, or State Department senior officials were able to cut the red tape and rush the vehicles to Rwanda, so that the African forces could have been deployed to help stop genocide.

Failure to Stigmatize and Isolate the Regime: From April 6 on, it was abundantly clear that the Rwandan regime, including its self-proclaimed "president" and other officials, were not a legitimate government, seizing power as they did through mass extermination. Yet, astonishingly, the U.S. did little to stigmatize, isolate, or denounce the regime. Repeatedly pressed to make a joint statement with Rwanda's other foreign donors that there would be no future foreign aid for any government which came to power through mass killings, the U.S. declined this simple, no cost means of influencing the situation. The State Department decided to expel the regime's representatives from the Rwandan Embassy in Washington only last week, after an RPF victory was a fact. And no public statements were made during three months of genocide that the U.S. viewed the regime as responsible for genocide and would hold it accountable for it.

On a more positive note, the Clinton Administration has made several important contributions. First, it appears that the trip to Rwanda by United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso in May and the subsequent special session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights were very much encouraged and promoted by the United States. The U.S. has also supported a special U.N. commission of inquiry, which we hope will lead to the appointment of a prosecutor to take up cases of crimes against humanity and genocide. And finally, the U.S. has provided extensive relief assistance to Rwandan refugees in Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire.

Nonetheless, there are important lessons to be learned from the executive branch's belated interest in the human rights disaster itself, as described above. We at Human Rights Watch hope that the Clinton Administration is evaluating its response to the genocide in Rwanda, and preparing better means of responding to future disasters.

One that looms is Burundi. Three of the early warning signs that we saw in Rwanda, can be seen in Burundi today:—the creation of militias, the arming of those militias, and the broadcasting of ethnic hatred on the radios. It is critically important that the Clinton Administration watch the situation in Burundi closely, and take actions now to head off what could be a Rwanda-like disaster.

In particular, we call upon the Clinton Administration to take the following actions on Burundi today: First, the radios that are broadcasting anti-Tutsi hatred and incitement to genocide into Burundi from southwest Rwanda should be located and silenced. Second, a respected senior figure within the Administration should be dispatched to Burundi to deliver the message that there must be prosecutions for those Tutsi within the army and Hutu civilian leaders who were responsible for mass killings last October. And third, the U.S. and foreign donors should use their influence with the authorities by conditioning foreign assistance on such prosecutions.

A summary of human rights and U.S. policy in Burundi and Rwanda follows:

BURUNDI

On the eve of the installation of a new government in Burundi on July 12, Human Rights Watch/Africa called on the authorities to initiate prompt, impartial and effective prosecution of human rights violators. Immediate action is essential to defuse rapidly escalating tensions between majority Hutu and minority Tutsi peoples. Burundi risks widespread violence like that which has devastated neighboring Rwanda.

Rather than appointing a new government, the decision was made to extend the mandate of the current, temporary president for an additional three months. Negotiations are continuing among various political groups to name a replacement for President Cyprien Ntaryamira, killed in the same plane crash as the President of Rwanda on April 6. President Ntaryamira himself had held office only since February when he was named to replace Melchior Ndadaye, who was assassinated in a coup attempt in October.

A human rights commission named "The International Commission on Human Rights Abuses in Burundi Since October 21, 1993" was established to investigate the attempted coup and ensuing violence in the interior which resulted in the

deaths of some 50,000 civilians and the assassination of President Ndadaye. In a 200-page report issued July 5, the Commission concluded that prosecution of those responsible for these crimes is both feasible and absolutely essential.

The Commission, created at the request of the Burundi human rights league Iteka, was jointly sponsored by Human Rights Watch/Africa, the International Federation of Human Rights (Paris), SOS Torture (Geneva) and the Human Rights League of the Great Lakes (Kigali). The Commission was welcomed by both civilian and military authorities in Burundi when it was formed. Since that time neither civilian nor military authorities have made any effective move to identify or hold accountable those responsible for the assassination or the bloodshed in the countryside.

After two weeks gathering testimony in Burundi, the Commission concluded that senior officers of the Burundi army, including the current Chief of Staff Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Bikomagu, were responsible for the attempted coup d'etat. Those who instigated the coup sought to blame the action on a small group of junior officers, insisting that higher-ranking officers had become involved only later in an attempt to re-establish order.

The Commission named Lieutenant Paul Kamana as the source of the order to assassinate the President. It identified also the four presumed assassins whose names it will deliver to the appropriate authorities in Burundi. The Commission stresses that its success in identifying the presumed assassins after its brief and limited investigations only underscores the lack of action by Burundian authorities who could certainly have obtained the same information had they undertaken any serious investigation into the crime.

The Commission also ascertained that the great majority of the Burundi army had either supported the coup or done nothing to interfere with it. Even those officers who expressed disapproval at the time executed the orders of the coup leaders, including participating in the attack on the presidential palace, arresting and killing the president and other members of the government and arresting the provincial governors. These officers were aware in advance that any such attempted coup would inevitably result in violence throughout the country and therefore must share in the responsibility for the killings of civilians which followed.

President Melchior Ndadaye came to office in June 1993 in elections that were widely deemed free and fair. He had installed a government of national coalition that included substantial representation of the opposition UPRONA party, which had previously held the monopoly of power in the single-party state. About one third of the Cabinet places were held by Tutsi, including the post of Prime Minister. Ndadaye himself was a Hutu, the first to be elected as head of state in Burundi. Ndadaye replaced many governors and local administrators with members of his FRODEBU party, most of them Hutu, but left the military still in the hands of the Tutsi. Military officers, wary of reform and concerned about the loss of power, launched the coup despite the certainty that it would result in Hutu attacks against Tutsi throughout the country.

The Commission report provides a detailed reconstruction of the attempted coup, which collapsed forty-eight hours after it began in the face of unanimous international condemnation and the widespread disorder in the interior of the country. In findings related to the coup and the assassination of President Ndadaye, the Commission concluded that:

- The military high command was aware that the coup was in preparation but did nothing effective to halt it.
- The chief of staff and other senior military officers were present and did not resist when rebellious troops seized the President and took him to his death.
- No serious defense was undertaken either of the President or of the democratic system. No soldier was killed or even seriously wounded in the skirmishes that took place during the coup.

The news of the coup spread quickly throughout Burundi, in some places within an hour of the first shots fired at the presidential palace. In the days and hours that followed, people in many locations barred roads to prevent the army from moving into their communities. They were motivated largely by the fear that the army, no longer restrained by a legitimate government, would use the occasion to eliminate local Hutu and FRODEBU leaders and other members of the Hutu elite. The army had conducted such massacres in the past, most dramatically in 1972 when it had systematically executed some 100,000 Hutu, including most of the educated and politically active elite. In many communities, citizens also organized security patrols to warn of the approach of army troops. Most of these measures were ordered or at least suggested by provincial or local authorities. The Governors of Gitega and Muramvya provinces, for example, were travelling throughout their

provinces as early as 3:30 a.m., two hours after the start of the coup, ordering people to begin barring the roads.

In many places, these legitimate self-defense measures turned into deadly attacks against Tutsi civilians in the community. In several provinces, these attacks were launched by local officials who ordered or incited people to round up the Tutsi in the community. The Tutsi were then held hostage, sometimes for several hours, sometimes overnight, before being executed. Often they were detained in some public building, such as the communal or zone offices, before being killed. Among the examples cited by the Commission were the following:

—On the day of the coup, near the provincial capital of Gitega, about one hundred Tutsi students from the Kibimba school were assembled and herded into a former gasoline station at a local commercial center. That night the local people set the station on fire, killing about 60 of the students.

—In Butezi, about 30 Tutsi were rounded up on the orders of the communal administrator. They were held in the communal office until the evening. When the captors heard a radio broadcast announcing that the coup had succeeded and that all the army was supporting it, they decided to execute the hostages. After trying a variety of ways to kill them, they finally burned them alive, killing all but two.

—In Butaganzwa, about 180 Tutsi were assembled the day after the coup on the order of local officials. They were badly beaten that night and kept under guard. The next morning, all were killed by machetes, spears or knives, with the exception of two teenagers. Left for dead with their throats slit, they nonetheless survived. The sixteen-year-old who testified to the Commission bore significant scars on his neck as a result of the attempted execution.

—In addition, during the first 48 hours of the coup, several ministers broadcast appeals for resistance against the illegitimate seizure of power. Without clear instructions to avoid violence, these calls acted as incitement to violence. When the massacres of Tutsi did begin, the Government did not react effectively. Members of the government subsequently maintained they were too disorganized and shocked by the coup to act. The Commission charges that fear and disorganization are not acceptable explanations for the lack of action.

The Commission expressed serious concern that the government had delayed a proposed speech by Madame Ndadaye, the widow of the slain President, who was willing to address the nation in a call to end the killings soon after they began. In addition, the government did not deny widespread rumors that the President had been tortured before being killed and that his body had later been mutilated. The government was aware that at least the reports of mutilation were false but did not attempt to halt their dissemination; such false rumors only added to the climate of hysteria and reprisal that caused the deaths of so many civilians.

Once the killings of Tutsi had begun, the army and national police reacted with excessive and unnecessary force. In a number of places, the Commission found evidence—including the shells themselves—of the use of heavy 14.5 mm machine guns and of 20 mm cannons, fired from helicopters and armored cars. In Bukirasazi, for example, witnesses related that the soldiers arrived on several days in succession and simply fired randomly from armored vehicles for hours each day. The Commission also found that the army had often introduced the very violence that it was supposed to quell by attacking communities that had previously been calm. In a number of cases, the soldiers not only killed civilians themselves but also provoked the reprisal killings of Tutsi by Hutu of the community.

According to the Commission, the army and the police used groups of civilian irregulars to extend the reach and the effectiveness of their attacks. Most of the civilians were Tutsi, but in some northern provinces Twa, a people who form a minority of about one percent of the population, were also enlisted to guide patrols and help carry out the killings. Many of the Tutsi were recruited from displaced persons camps and cooperated with the soldiers and police to raid neighboring communities for their own profit and that of their military supporters.

The Commission expressed grave concern over the participation of secondary school students in killings and pillage. In some cases, students launched attacks on their own initiative, but often they did so under the direction of adults, both military and civilian. In some of the most dramatic examples:

—On Sunday, October 24, students from the Rusengo lycée joined with Tutsi displaced persons and town public employees to attack the bishopric of Ruyigi where scores of Hutu had taken refuge. They helped to kill seventy persons, including most of the local leadership of the FRODEBU party and the local communal administrator. The following Wednesday they returned to their school with a patrol of soldiers and policemen. Two hours later, they attacked the neighboring parish church where about one hundred Hutu had sought protec-

tion. They killed all of them. In subsequent incidents, they killed and pillaged in the surrounding communities, operating in groups of four students with one soldier or policeman in charge.

—In the days immediately after the coup, students from a nearby secondary school formed into a group of killers acting at the behest of the local official on the Musenga hill, commune of Gishubi. They attacked Tutsi on the hills Bukwavu, Munyinya, Yanza and Murangara.

—Students at the Musinzira school at Gitega were identified as the killers of fellow students as well as of a number of Hutu chosen at random as they passed by the school.

The Commission concluded that both Hutu and Tutsi used rumor and myth to incite the killing and to justify the slaughter. In addition to the rumors regarding the torture and mutilation of the President, some Hutu leaders spread stories about widespread civilian Tutsi involvement in or preparations for the attempted coup: that the Tutsi had stockpiled supplies of food and beer as though for a celebration, or that persons in the community were concealing soldiers in civilian dress or had hidden arms for an eventual attack on the Hutu. Among the Tutsi, the rumor was widespread that Hutu had prepared a plan to exterminate all the Tutsi, a plan labeled the Code of June 1, in reference to the date of President Ndadaye's election victory. Hutu were reportedly exchanging code words related to the plan, such as "at the level of the ears," meaning that machete blows should be directed near the ears in order to be most lethal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Human Rights Watch/Africa endorses the following recommendations made by the International Commission:

To the Government of Burundi

1. The government of Burundi should immediately initiate impartial and effective investigations into the assassination of the President and other state officials and into the violence that followed the coup attempt. Such investigations may be carried out either through the already-established National Commission of Inquiry or through the usual judicial channels. In either case, the government should ensure adequate resources and protection to the investigating bodies.

2. Those charged with crimes must be tried promptly and according to international due process standards.

3. Those accused who held positions of authority at the time the crimes were committed should be tried first, as should persons accused of crimes that resulted in the loss of life.

4. The army should immediately begin disciplinary proceedings against soldiers guilty of human rights abuses and other crimes. By the same token, the civilian administration should initiate similar proceedings against officials guilty of such abuses and other crimes.

5. The Commission of Inquiry should undertake a vigorous campaign to inform all citizens of their right to bring charges against anyone who has violated their rights. The government and human rights associations should also undertake programs to support citizens in filing these complaints.

6. Public sessions of the Commission of Inquiry and important trials, particularly of civilian or military officials, should be broadcast on national radio.

7. The army and the police must be clearly separate, each with its own command structure. Each must be restricted to its assigned task, either providing national defense or maintaining public order, and each should be trained, equipped and organized for its respective task. The national police force should be responsible to some minister other than the Minister of National Defense.

8. The government should make every effort to ensure that the ethnic composition of the army and the police force reflects that of the national population.

9. The government should actively keep track of rumors circulating in the country that might disturb the peace and should use the national radio to refute them and to disseminate the truth as widely as possible.

10. The government should develop a multi-faceted program to address the needs of young people who have been taught to kill.

11. The government should encourage the development of human rights organizations, particularly those aimed at secondary school students.

To the International Community

1. The international community should make available the human and financial resources needed to permit Burundi courts to judge the accused within a reasonable time period. In particular, states with judicial systems that are parallel to that in

Burundi should make available magistrates and other judicial personnel to assist Burundi magistrates, either as partners in trials or as support personnel.

2. The international community should assist in improving the distribution of information about the legal system and the rights of the people to bring legal complaints.

3. The international community should make all further financial or technical assistance to the Burundi military and police conditional upon the execution of the above recommendations concerning the army and the national police.

RWANDA

Human Rights Developments.—The death of president Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda in a suspicious plane crash on April 6, 1994 was the pretext for Hutu extremists from the late president's entourage to launch a campaign of genocide against the Tutsi, a minority who make up about fifteen percent of the population of Rwanda. The extremists also killed Hutu who had shown that they were willing to cooperate with Tutsi in forming a more democratic government. Ten weeks later, the killing continues. At least 200,000 and perhaps as many as 500,000 unarmed and unresisting civilians have been slain. The international community has failed to take any effective action to stop the slaughter.

The massacres were planned for months in advance. The Presidential Guard and other elements of the Rwandan army taught members of the political party militias, the *Interahamwe* and the *Impuzamugambi*, how to kill most efficiently. The *Interahamwe*, "Those Who Attack Together," are part of the *Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement et la Démocratie* (MRND), the party of the late president; the *Impuzamugambi*, "Those With a Single Purpose," are attached to the *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR), an extremist Hutu party in alliance with the MRND. Created in 1992, the militias received intensified military training in late 1993 and early 1994, as groups of 300 men at a time were sent for three weeks to a military camp in the northeastern region of Mutara. In their attacks on civilians, the militia are often accompanied by a small number of soldiers or national policemen, but the militia have killed far more people than have uniformed members of the armed forces.

The Rwandan authorities distributed firearms to militia members and other Habyarimana supporters as early as 1992, and gave out many more in late 1993 and early 1994. The bishop of the important Catholic diocese of Nyundo criticized this distribution of weapons in a pastoral letter at the end of December 1993. The militia who returned from training programs in early 1994 brought firearms, including grenades, back with them.

A private radio station owned by members of Habyarimana's inner circle, the *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*, last autumn began a campaign of hate-filled propaganda against the Tutsi generally and members of the opposition to the Habyarimana regime, both Tutsi and Hutu. At the end of 1993 the broadcasts became more virulent and began targeting individuals who were named as "enemies" or "traitors" who "deserved to die." Among those so labeled were Lando Ndasingwa, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who was one of the first killed once the massacres began (along with his mother, his wife and his children), and Monique Mujawamariya, a human rights activist, who narrowly escaped with her life. Throughout these weeks of slaughter, the Radio des Mille Collines has incited listeners to genocide, encouraging them to "fill the half-empty graves."

The current slaughter differs in scale but not otherwise from earlier massacres in Rwanda in October 1990, January-February 1991, March 1992 and December 1992-February 1993. The earlier killings, like those this year, were organized by officials of the Habyarimana government or of his political party, the MRND, and the closely allied CDR. Like those this year, the killings targeted Tutsi and those Hutu labeled as opponents of the Habyarimana regime. These attacks by the government on its own unarmed citizens cost about 2,000 lives and were condemned by both local and international human rights organizations.

The current campaign of killings began within an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard had set up roadblocks around the capital of Kigali and had begun liquidating key members of the moderate opposition. Among the early victims were Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and President of the Supreme Court Joseph Kavaruganda. Others were human rights activists, including Charles Shamukiga, Fidele Kanyabugoyi, Ignace Ruhatana, Patrick Gahizi, Father Chryologue Mahame, S.J., and Abbé Augustin Ntagara.

The Presidential Guard was joined by the party militias, and within a week these forces had killed an estimated 20,000 people in Kigali and its immediate environs. The international community responded by evacuating foreign nationals, the first

step in its withdrawal from the crisis. Perhaps encouraged by this retreat, the leaders of the genocide extended its scope outside the capital to the east and the southwest. Beginning on April 15, when most foreigners had departed, authorities distributed large quantities of firearms, including automatic and semi-automatic rifles and pistols, to militia and other supporters of Habyarimana.

Many people were killed in their homes, but others were slain in hospitals and churches, places usually recognized as sanctuaries. Among the worst such incidents were the following: *Kibungo*—2,800 people gathered in a church center were slaughtered in a four-hour period by the Interahamwe using grenades, machine guns, machetes and R4 rockets. Approximately forty people survived. *Cyahinda*—6,000 Tutsi who had taken refuge in a church were attacked by militia who left only about 200 to live. *Kibeho*—4,000 people killed in a church. *Mibirizi parish*—2,000 slain. *Shangi parish*—4,000 killed. *Rukara parish*—500 slaughtered in the church. *Kigali and Butare*—hundreds of patients and staff were killed in hospitals. *Butare orphanage*—twenty-one children, selected solely because they were Tutsi, were slain as well as thirteen Rwandan Red Cross volunteers who tried to protect them. *Gikongoro*—eighty-eight pupils were slaughtered at their school.

Shortly after the massacres of civilians had begun, the war between the Rwandan army and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) resumed, ending a cease-fire in effect since August 1993. Since early April, two kinds of violence—the slaughter of the defenseless by government party militias or the Presidential Guard, and the battle between the two armies—have gone on simultaneously, sometimes in the same area, as in Kigali, but often in widely separated regions. The south and west, where some of the worst massacres have taken place, are remote from the actual war zones.

Shortly after the crash and the beginning of the massacres, a group of politicians close to Habyarimana proclaimed themselves the new government. Backed by extremist military, the self-proclaimed regime also won at least tacit acceptance from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Rwanda. The “ministers” of the new government purported to represent a number of political parties and thus to continue the mandate of the previous coalition government, but in fact all emerged from the same ideological position whatever their party labels.

During the first two weeks of slaughter elsewhere in Rwanda, the *préfet* (prefect or governor) of the important southern *préfecture* of Butare succeeded in keeping his region generally calm. The prefect, Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, was a Tutsi and a member of the political opposition. His wife, Josephine, was a human rights activist. Butare, where Tutsi and Hutu had lived closely together for centuries, was generally hostile to Habyarimana and his anti-Tutsi ideology. As the site of the original campus of the National University, several research institutes, and the showplace new National Museum, it was the intellectual capital of Rwanda.

On April 19, the “President” of the rump government, Theodore Sindikubwabo, removed the prefect of Butare and replaced him with a hardline military man from the north of Rwanda. At the same time, he gave a speech on the radio calling for the killing of “accomplices” in Butare. That evening units of the Presidential Guard flew into Butare airport. The massacres began almost immediately. One eyewitness recounted that on the night of the arrival of the Guard, they dug pits in the ground and filled them with burning tires. He saw people thrown live into the pits, including his sixty-year-old mother-in-law. By noon the next day, the sound of gunfire had become continuous as Tutsi and Hutu allied with them were executed in an arboretum adjacent to the National University, in an area behind the National Museum, and on the banks of a nearby stream. The killings continued day and night for the next three days.

In late April, leaders of the militia called upon their members to finish the “cleaning up (*nettoyage*) of Tutsi and members of the Hutu opposition who had escaped death up to that point. On April 29, military and militia killed more than 300 of 5,000 hostages who had been held since April 15 at a stadium in Cyangugu in southwestern Rwanda. Several days earlier the clergy of Bukavu diocese in neighboring Zaire had alerted the world to the suffering of these hostages who had been confined for two weeks without food and with a single water tap and no sanitary facilities. On May 11, militia and military began transferring the hostages to a former refugee camp some thirteen kilometers from the town of Cyangugu, where they could torture or kill them without drawing attention. The buses transporting the hostages were often stopped en route and some persons removed to be slaughtered and left by the side of the road. The bus making the trip on Wednesday, May 11, was halted and all men between the ages of forty and eighty were removed and killed.

Militia and military continue to make nightly visits to stadiums, church compounds and other locations where people at risk have taken refuge. They remove groups of people to be executed. Anyone who is educated or has shown capacity for leadership is targeted for elimination.

On May 16, the "Minister of Defense," Augustin Bizimana, asserted that the massacres had stopped—except for "isolated killings by extremist elements." That same day foreign journalists were still witnessing groups being removed for execution from a Tutsi refugee camp at the large church center of Kabgayi in central Rwanda, some fifteen miles from where Bizimana made his statement. Also on May 16, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that the self-proclaimed Rwandan government had refused to accept the neutrality of its hospital at Kabgayi and would not guarantee its security. On that day and the two days immediately after, massacres increased in the southern prefecture of Butare. Militia manning the road blockades in that area also behaved more aggressively to passers-by. These changes resulted from the arrival of militia from the north who had been brought in because the region was "pas suffisamment nettoyé," that is, "not cleaned up enough." They were to kill the Tutsi and Hutu opposition members who had been previously protected by local officials or who had otherwise managed to escape massacre.

By mid-May, the militia had been able to create a dense network of road blocks throughout the zones controlled by the rump government. In some cases, the barriers were separated by no more than a few hundred yards, making escape virtually impossible for those targeted for elimination.

The Catholic church has been a particular focus of the killings. To date, eight-eight priests and an undetermined number of religious sisters and brothers have been killed in Rwanda. The majority have been slain by extremist militia or by the Rwandan military. In the most recent such incident, nine priests and 170 defenseless civilians who had taken refuge in their church in Kigali were slain on June 6 by Interahamwe assailants. In an unrelated incident, soldiers of the RPF killed thirteen clergy, including the Archbishop of Kigali and the bishops of Byumba and Kabgayi, in Kabgayi in central Rwanda in early June. (The RPF expressed regret, and announced that one of the soldiers responsible had been shot while trying to escape and that three others were being sought in order to be brought to trial.) The killings were apparently in response to an earlier incident when the Archbishop had permitted Interahamwe militia members to remove eleven priests and brothers, one sister, and four lay persons from church premises for certain execution.

Discipline among Rwandan army troops, lax for some time, has crumbled further in the last month, resulting in multiple abuses against civilians. In the region of Bugesera, for example, soldiers looted at will during the week of May 16, apparently in violation of orders from their commanding officer. Their attacks caused the local population, virtually all Hutu, to flee in panic towards Burundi.

Reliable accounts describe the heroism of some Rwandan authorities, both civilian and military, who have sought to prevent or halt the slaughter in their regions. In some regions, local government officials, known as burgomasters (*bourgmestres*), have done their best to protect the targeted populations and to guarantee security within their communes. Unfortunately, in some cases, they have eventually been forced to yield and permit the massacres. Military officers who have tried to maintain order or to aid the threatened to escape have later suffered reprisals for their human conduct.

The self-proclaimed government has accused the RPF of having killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, both last year and in recent weeks, but it has been unable to provide any details of time, place or circumstance where the alleged massacres have taken place. After extensive investigation among reliable sources, both Rwandan and foreign, representing clergy, staff of nongovernmental organizations, and journalists, Human Rights Watch/Africa has concluded that there is at present no credible evidence that the RPF has engaged in any widespread slaughter of civilian populations, although there are reports of less systematic abuses, including the execution of the archbishop and priests (see above.)

Refugees who fled to Tanzania at the end of April have frequently talked of RPF abuses, but the accounts are too vague to be credible. No one among the enormous number of people at Ngara camp, for example, appears to have first-hand knowledge of such alleged abuses. In the quarter of a million mostly Hutu refugees at the camp, medical authorities report that they treated only four wounds, all of them slight. This contrasts with the reports of numerous and serious wounds among the Tutsi refugees who have fled to Burundi or who have escaped to northern Rwanda. The massive flight of Hutu to Ngara drew widespread attention because it was the largest number of people ever to flee a country in such a short period of time. But these refugees fled in panic about reports that the RPF was approaching their re-

gion, not because they had been attacked or seen others attacked by the incoming troops. They had been frightened by propaganda broadcast on the radio about supposed RPF atrocities. Many refugees had taken the time, nonetheless, to gather food and even farm animals before their departure.

On May 18, a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that RPF troops had fired on Rwandans seeking to flee across the river that marks the border between Rwanda and Tanzania. He added that UNHCR representatives had gathered credible accounts from persons who had been abused or seen others abused by the RPF. The RPF immediately denied the allegations and invited UNHCR officials to inspect the zone under their control. Human Rights Watch/Africa has requested the details of these reports from the UNHCR, but at the time of writing had not yet received the information.

Church sources indicate that two Catholic priests were killed by the RPF at Nyinawimana, but information on the date and circumstances of these killings is not yet available.

In other cases, church sources report that refugees at a camp in Uganda relate that the RPF killed civilians at Rwantanga, seven kilometers from the Ugandan border, and at Nyambwesongezi, in Byumba prefecture. A witness from Rwantanga, a woman who arrived badly beaten, recounted that RPF soldiers had beaten her twelve year-old daughter to death with their rifle butts. Another witness reported that his wife and children had been killed by the RPF when the soldiers attacked people whom they had summoned to a meeting.

A newspaper account published in Uganda in late April related that RPF soldiers had tied up a person accused of being a local leader of the Interahamwe militia and had delivered him to an angry crowd who had kicked him to death. The story was accompanied by a photograph of the apparent victim. Other reliable sources have told Human Rights Watch/Africa that they have seen RPF soldiers execute civilians who appear to have been militia leaders.

Human Rights Watch/Africa has brought these reports to the attention of the RPF and has asked for investigation of the incidents and punishment for any soldiers found guilty of killings or other abuses of civilians.

Before the RPF take-over in July, approximately two million Rwandans have fled their homes in the face of the massacres and the war. Within the country, Tutsi survivors are clustered in a variety of locations, some voluntarily, others held hostage by military or militia units. In addition to those frequently mentioned at sites in Kigali, there are those at the stadium at Cyangugu and in several places in Butare. In central Rwanda, there are approximately 50,000 displaced persons, largely Tutsi at Kabgayi, mostly Hutu at nearby Gitarama. In addition there are certainly other groups who remain unknown to outside observers. More than 200,000 people have sought refuge within the zone controlled by the RPF in northern and eastern Rwanda.

When the slaughter began, there were about 200,000 Burundian refugees located in camps in southern Rwanda, who had fled violence in Burundi in October 1993. Many of them have returned to Burundi or fled to Tanzania, but as many as 80,000 may still be left in Rwanda. Over 300,000 Rwandans have fled to surrounding countries, the great majority of them to Tanzania. Approximately one quarter of a million Rwandans are grouped at Ngara, Tanzania, the largest refugee camp in the world. Approximately 8,500 Rwandans have sought safety in Zaire; between 5,500 and 10,000 in Uganda, and between 16,000 and 47,000 in Burundi.

The battle for control of Kigali between the army and the RPF made it difficult, often impossible, to deliver the supplies and services needed to keep these refugees alive. In many other cases, militia and authorities of the self-proclaimed government have hindered or prevented assistance to the displaced. In the most notorious instances of such conduct, militia and military have attacked hospitals in Kigali and Butare and killed both staff and patients. International agencies such as *Médecins sans frontières* and the ICRC have lost large numbers of local staff.

U.S./U.N. Policy: After ten weeks of slaughter and hundreds of thousands of lives lost, the international community has still made no effective response to the genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda.

Under the terms of the Arusha Accords, the United Nations was asked to provide a peacekeeping force to monitor the agreement, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). This force, which just before the crisis numbered 2,500 troops, was to monitor the cease-fire, contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, and engage in other activities associated with the establishment of a transitional government in which members of Habyarimana's government would share power with members of the internal opposition and representatives of the RPF.

Among the duties of UNAMIR was the enforcement of a prohibition against the importation of arms and ammunition into Rwanda. On the night of January 26, UNAMIR learned of the unauthorized secret landing and unloading of a planeload of arms at Kigali airport. The U.N. force intervened and placed the arms under joint U.N.-Rwandan government supervision to prevent their distribution to the Rwandan army. During February, UNAMIR also prevented the delivery of three more planeloads of arms and ammunition for the Rwandan government. The U.N. authorities therefore knew that the Rwandan government was attempting to obtain fresh supplies for its troops, presumably in preparation for further war.

With the onset of the killing after the plane crash in which President Habyarimana died, UNAMIR again failed to act decisively. Apparently both the terms of the mandate and the lack of appropriate equipment for the troops hampered an effective response. Had there been prompt and firm action by UNAMIR to suppress the first violence, the situation would certainly have developed differently.

When Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana fled for her life to a U.N. compound, UNAMIR dispatched ten soldiers, part of the Belgian contingent, to rescue her. They encountered a hostile and armed crowd and three were disabled. The others requested instructions from headquarters and, according to a press account, were told to put down their arms and attempt to negotiate with the crowd. They were slaughtered. The Belgian government then withdrew its troops, who were the best equipped of those available to the UNAMIR force. Subsequently Bangladeshi troops also left, some of them in panic before orders were given for their withdrawal.

On April 21, the Security Council met to decide the fate of the UNAMIR force. Rather than admit that genocide was taking place, as was clearly apparent by that date, and accept the responsibility of preventing it, the Security Council voted to withdraw the majority of the remaining troops and to leave behind a skeleton force of 270 soldiers. The United States, initially in favor of removing the U.N. presence completely, led this move to retain only a token UNAMIR presence.

Proponents of the reduction of UNAMIR argued the necessity of removing the troops from a threatening situation which they were ill-equipped to handle. But with the exception of the ten Belgian soldiers killed while attempting to defend the Prime Minister, surely one of the most important targets of the extremists, no additional U.N. soldier had been killed in the weeks of subsequent violence. (One was later killed in a mortar attack in Kigali). There was no evidence that U.N. troops had been targeted by either of the hostile parties after the first day of the massacres.

In the face of the mounting disaster—and particularly following widely publicized accounts of the massive outflow of refugees on April 29—the United States and other actors decided that more troops must be sent back to Rwanda with an expanded mandate. Within the Security Council, delegates from the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Spain and Argentina played the leading role in shaming other member nations into this decision. After lengthy debate on May 16, the Council authorized a force of 5,500 troops with an enlarged mandate to protect displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk (UNAMIR II). Unlike the mandate for the first U.N. force, that for UNAMIR II permits troops to use force if necessary to carry out their mission. However, last minute hesitations by the United States resulted in orders to deploy in the first instance only a small force of several hundred troops and about 150 unarmed observers. Deployment of the rest of the force depends upon progress towards a new cease-fire between the RPF and the government, the availability of resources, and further review and action by the Security Council.

Notwithstanding its promise to provide transportation and equipment to the expanded U.N. force on May 16, the United States has, to date, not yet made available some 50 armored personnel carriers which were pledged. The cause of the delay has apparently been disagreement between the U.S. and U.N. over the cost of the vehicles and the terms under which they are to be provided. Weeks—and thousands of lives—have been lost as Washington and New York continue to quarrel over modalities for providing the equipment. In the meantime, Ghana and other African countries have pledged some 5,500 soldiers to the Rwanda effort, but the forces cannot be deployed until vehicles can be made available which will permit them to move about Rwanda in safety.

General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian military commander of UNAMIR, has played a constructive role, particularly in maintaining communication with both sides of the civil war. He is currently negotiating with both parties to obtain neutrality for Kigali airport. Were the U.N. assured control of the airport, the work of UNAMIR II would be greatly facilitated. Fighting over the control of the airport has often made it impossible for relief flights to land there.

In response to urging by the United States and others, the new United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso (who took office on April 5, the day before the crisis began), undertook a mission to Rwanda and Burundi in mid-May, five weeks after the massacres had begun. In a statement on his return, he condemned the widespread violence, but did not label the systematic killing of Tutsi as genocide. At the request of Canada, an emergency meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights was convened on May 24. It was only the third time that this body has met in such a special session, the preceding meetings having been called to deal with the Bosnian crisis. The session was called for the appointment of a special rapporteur to investigate the situation in Rwanda, and endorsed the concept of accountability for those responsible for acts of genocide in Rwanda.

On June 22, the Security Council, at the request of France, authorized a unilateral intervention by France into Rwanda in an operation distinct from UNAMIR. The Resolution stressed the need for the intervention to be strictly humanitarian in character, to be conducted in an "impartial and neutral fashion," and that the French force should not constitute an "inter-position force between the two parties." The reason for the United Nations's caution is clear: France supported the Habyarimana regime for many years, even sending French troops to assist in the army's actions against the RPF, in October 1990 and again in February 1993. France continued to strongly support the Rwandan army through the events of April 1994, and has since met with representatives of the rump Rwandan government in Paris at high levels. In light of France's strong support for the Habyarimana regime and for the Rwandan army the Rwandan Patriotic Front has vowed to attack any French forces which enter Rwanda.

At the time of this writing, the RPF has taken over virtually all of Rwanda except for the "security zone" established by the French in the southwest. The RPF announced a government which includes a Hutu Prime Minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, and a Hutu President Pasteur Bizimungu.

Tragically, the destruction wrought by the rump, extremist Hutu regime, that has now fled the country, has continued in the form of regular broadcasts by the extremist radios, which incited the flight of literally millions of Hutus, who were told that the RPF would commit atrocities out of vengeance for those suffered by Tutsis. These false reports—and in some cases actual physical coercion by the militia and army—were critical factors in the massive flight of Rwandans following the RPF victory. The international community should assist the RPF government in creating conditions to encourage the refugees return, including providing massive humanitarian assistance to the displaced within Rwanda itself, and deploying U.N. human rights monitors to supplement the work of the UNAMIR to assure that the RPF does not engage in reprisals.

The new government, for its part, must make the prosecution of those engaged in planning and carrying out genocide its first priority. Only when the cycle of collective guilt and collective punishment is broken, will Rwanda be able to recover from the wounds of the past three months. The international community should offer the new government assistance in the form of judges or lawyers to assist in assuring that such prosecutions are carried out with scrupulous regard for due process. And the RPF must take pains to prosecute and punish those within its own ranks who committed violations of the laws of war, such as the shelling of civilian targets, or the execution of captured civilians or soldiers.

Senator SIMON. Thank you. Doctor Destexhe?

**STATEMENT OF DR. ALAIN DESTEXHE, SECRETARY GENERAL,
DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS INTERNATIONAL, BRUSSELS,
BELGIUM**

Dr. DESTEXHE. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I want to thank you for giving *Medicins Sans Frontieres*, *Doctors Without Borders*, the opportunity of presenting our point of view on the Rwandan crisis.

Our organization has been present in the field since the first day of the crisis; and we have lost more than 200 local Rwandan staff, who were killed during the course of the genocide.

Today, we are working in the camps in Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania, as well as in nine sites in Rwanda itself. About 250 of our

expatriate staff are currently working on the ground to assist the Rwandan people.

There is no need to stress the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda. But this is tragedy in which we believe that the United States can play a primary role, both at the humanitarian level as well as in the political level.

First of all, the humanitarian level: The needs today remain obvious and urgent for large-scale logistical support, involving airport management and transport facilities.

I spoke this morning with our team in Goma. There are now 70 expatriates from Doctors Without Borders, and there will be 100 by the end of this week. They expressed this morning three urgent specific needs:

A. At the airport of Goma, the backlog is still very serious. U.S. military forces could take control of airport traffic and plane handling. It is an immediate requirement to step up the relief efforts.

B. The relief effort require some 200 trucks on the ground, to transport water to the water tanks. Relief agencies are turning to the U.S. Government, to obtain support in the provision or the air-freight of those trucks. They are needed immediately.

C. There are bodies everywhere, all over the camps, along the roads, everywhere. They lay there for several days. This morning, there were 600 bodies in front of our Kibumba health facilities. The French military effort to dispose of dead bodies is not able to cope with the mortality. So, support from the U.S. military could help ensure that the spread of cholera through these corpses will be reduced.

It is absolutely essential that we maximize the resources and the expertise that each of our organizations can contribute. In this regard, parachute drops do not seem to us to be a priority. In addition, they require backup from the aid agency that we can ill afford at this time. It would be far more useful for the military to concentrate on large-scale logistics, an area where they have superiority over humanitarian agencies.

Our second point is concerning the future of the refugees. There is no future for the refugees in Zaire, or in the other countries to which they have fled. Their rapid return to Rwanda is the only solution for them, both from the humanitarian point of view and from the political one. So we look at the United States and the U.N., to develop the political and logistical conditions that will make their safe return possible, as soon as possible.

Three, in order to achieve this, political pressure should be put on the Rwandan Armed Forces so that the refugees are left free to decide for themselves whether or not they will return. Up until now, this is not the case. Propaganda, especially by radio, has been calling on the refugees to stay in Zaire, and inciting them to continue the fight. All such propaganda should immediately be stopped.

We must be careful, in the design of the relief effort, to avoid at all costs strengthening those who have perpetrated the genocide and are still actively involved in manipulating civilian populations and humanitarian relief.

Four, pressure must also be put on the new government and the RPF, in order to ensure the safety of the returnees. They should

also be convinced to allow the humanitarian organizations to have free access to all parts of Rwanda, and to avoid any forced displacement of the population.

Five, the humanitarian effort should not be concentrated exclusively at the frontiers of the country, but also in Kigali, the capital. By the same token, the U.N. humanitarian agencies should speed up their redeployment with Kigali as their main base.

Sixth, further, there will have to be modifications to the UNAMIR mandate, so that UNAMIR takes on the principal responsibility for guaranteeing the defense of human rights in Rwanda and for facilitating national reconciliation. To this end, human rights observers should be deployed in all of the 500 most important communes or villages of Rwanda.

Such a measure would be an important element in encouraging the refugees to return home. To realize this, the deployment of civilian personnel is very probably more important than the deployment of military personnel. The recent U.N. experience in Cambodia is proof-positive of that.

And, of course, we were happy to understand through Mr. Atwood that the RPF agreed to deployment of human rights; but we would like to see the U.N. taking the first practical step to achieve this.

Seventh and last point, we must be quite clear that the slaughter of the Tutsi by the Hutu militia corresponds directly to the U.N. convention definition of a genocide, as "acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group."

Those who are responsible for initiating and carrying out this crime must be brought to justice. It is a required and necessary step, for Rwanda to go forward in its national reconstruction. It will also send a strong signal worldwide.

So, after listening to the other speaker, I think there is not so much disagreement between us. But I really would like some action to be taken. As the previous speaker, I just would like to recall that on May 16, the U.N. allowed the deployment of a number of troops, up to 5,500 troops; and then, I think, 2 months later, this resolution is really hardly worth the paper it was written on.

So, although all the speakers agree about what should be done, we really would like to see the first practical step to be done; not only from the humanitarian side, but also from the political one.

To conclude, I would like to say that the tragedy in Rwanda has been going on for almost 4 months now. And, while we can only be glad to see the extent to which the international community has recently begun to respond—especially the United States—we deeply regret that this mobilization began so late.

There have been long weeks, during which the humanitarian organizations have felt themselves to be standing very alone.

There can be no doubts that the longer the delay in responding to crises such as Rwanda, the more complex are the problems and the more difficult to resolve.

Thank you, and I will be glad to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Destexhe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DESTEXHE

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all I want to thank you for giving Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) the opportunity of presenting its point of view on the Rwandan crisis.

Our organization has been present in the field since the first day of the crisis and we have lost more than 200 local Rwandan staff who were killed during the course of the genocide. Today, we are working in the camps for Rwandan refugees in Zaire, Burundi and in Tanzania as well as in nine (9) sites in Rwanda itself. About 250 of our expatriate staff are currently working on the ground to assist the people of Rwanda.

There is no need for me to stress the scale of the human tragedy that has now been going on for three months in Rwanda. But it is a tragedy in which we believe that the United States can play a role of primary importance both at the humanitarian level and at the political level.

1. At the humanitarian level, the needs remain obvious and urgent for largescale logistical support, involving airport management and transport facilities.

I spoke this morning with our team in Goma. They are now 70 expatriates from Doctors without Borders and they will be 100 by the end of this week. They expressed three urgent specific needs:

a. At the airport, the backlog is still very serious. US Military forces could take control of airport traffic and plane handling, an immediate requirement to step up the relief effort.

b. The relief effort requires some 200 trucks on the ground to transport water to the water tanks. Relief agencies are turning to the International governments to obtain support in the provision or the airfreight of those trucks. They are needed immediately.

c. There are bodies, all over the camps, along the roads, everywhere. They lay there for several days. This morning, there were 600 bodies in front of our Kibumba health facility. The French military effort to dispose of dead bodies is not able to cope with the mortality. Support from the US military could help ensure that the spread of cholera through these corpses will be reduced.

It is essential that we maximize the resources and the expertise that each of our organizations can contribute. In this regard, parachute drops in particular do not seem to us to be a priority. In addition, they require back-up from the aid agencies that we can ill-afford at this time. It would be far more useful for the military to concentrate on largescale logistics, an area where they have superiority over the humanitarian agencies.

2. There is no real future for the refugees in Zaire or in the other countries to which they have fled. Their rapid return to Rwanda is the only solution for them, both from the humanitarian and the political point of view. So we look to the United States and the UN to develop the political and logistical conditions that will make their safe return possible.

3. In order to achieve this, political pressure must be put on the Rwandan Armed Forces so that the refugees are left free to decide for themselves whether or not they will return. Up till now, this is not the case. Propaganda, especially by radio, has been calling on the refugees to stay in Zaire and inciting them to continue the fight. All such propaganda must immediately be stopped.

We must be careful, in the design of the relief effort, to avoid at all costs, strengthening those who have perpetrated the genocide and are still actively involved in manipulating civilian populations and humanitarian relief.

4. Pressure must also be put on the new government and the RPF in order to ensure the safety of the returning refugees. They must also be convinced to allow the humanitarian organizations to have free access to all parts of Rwanda and to avoid any forced displacement of population.

5. The humanitarian effort should not be concentrated exclusively at the frontiers of the country, but also in Kigali, the capital. By the same token, the UN humanitarian agencies must speed up their redeployment with Kigali as their base.

6. Further, there will have to be modifications to the UNAMIR mandate so that UNAMIR takes on the principal responsibility for guaranteeing the defense of human rights in Rwanda and for facilitating national reconciliation. To this end, human rights observers should be deployed in all of the 500 communes of Rwanda.

Such a measure would be an important element in encouraging the refugees to return home. To realize this, the deployment of civilian personnel is very probably more important than the deployment of military personnel. (The recent UN experience in Cambodia is proof positive of that.)

7. We must be quite clear that the slaughter of the Tutsis by the Hutu militias corresponds directly to the UN convention definition of a genocide as "acts commit-

ted with intent to destroy, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Those who are responsible for initiating and carrying out this crime must be brought to justice. It is a required and necessary step for Rwanda to go forward in its political reconstruction. It would also send a strong signal worldwide.

To conclude, I would like to say that the tragedy in Rwanda has been going on for three months and while we can only be glad to see the extent to which the international community has recently begun to respond, especially the United States, we regret that this mobilization began so late. There have been long weeks during which the humanitarian organizations have felt themselves to be standing very alone.

There can be no doubt that the longer the delay in responding to a crisis such as Rwanda, the more complex are the problems and the more difficult to resolve.

Thank you and I will be glad to answer any questions.

Senator SIMON. Thank you very much, Doctor. Mr. Drumtra?

STATEMENT OF JEFF DRUMTRA, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF ROGER WINTER, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. DRUMTRA. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am Jeff Drumtra, Africa policy analyst for the U.S. Committee for Refugees. And as I think you know, the U.S. Committee for Refugees is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization which has monitored refugee situations worldwide for 35 years.

The director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Roger Winter, had to depart for Rwanda and Zaire unexpectedly over the weekend with the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and that is why he is unable to be here today. I might add, this is the sixth time that we have had our staff people inside Rwanda since the beginning of April.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that you are holding today a potentially extraordinary hearing. It is a chance for all of us to look closely at the largest, fastest refugee emergency the world has ever seen—1.5 million Rwandans fled to Zaire in a 6-day period earlier this month; and the world has never witnessed anything like this before.

This hearing is also a chance to discuss how we should respond. How long is this emergency going to last? Is there really a solution? And I would like to address that in just a few moments.

But first and foremost, what makes this hearing extraordinary is that it really is the first official review of how the United States responded to the clearest case of genocide that the world has seen in 50 years; and I would like to spend a few minutes on that, given some of the comments of the earlier witnesses. Because, in order to understand where we are now, you have to understand what happened in Rwanda; and you have to understand that what happened in Rwanda was genocide, in the strict legal and moral sense of the word.

The Rwandan military and members of the MRND ruling party had held power in Rwanda for decades, and they were determined not to share it.

And so, beginning on April 6, they began killing all political opponents; and since they viewed all people of Tutsi heritage as political opponents, they set out to kill all Tutsi. All million or so Tutsi. And they virtually succeeded in their goal.

And most people who have traveled into Rwanda since April generally concur that at least a half million people were killed; maybe

more. Some witnesses believe the death toll may be closer to a million. We will never really know.

But as we sit here today, what we have to know, what we have to understand is that this mass murder was well-planned. It was a well-orchestrated undertaking, to exterminate an entire ethnic group. And we have to understand that this means it was genocide, pure and bold.

And U.S. policy, beginning since April, should have flowed from this core understanding. American policy should have evolved out of this core recognition that genocide was occurring before our eyes, the genocide that we, as a Nation, pledged would happen never again. It was happening again.

Instead, the State Department pointedly refused to acknowledge that this was a case of genocide. It refused to even utter the word, for the better part of 3 months; until it was too late.

And what I want to point out today is that this unwillingness by U.S. officials to comprehend genocide was a massive failure, that had policy repercussions. Because, if you acknowledge that genocide is occurring in the world, in Rwanda, then you do not pull out U.N. troops that are already on the ground in Rwanda in a position to save lives. Yet that is what the administration did in April.

The U.S. Government voted on the Security Council to pull out 2,000 U.N. troops, to cut and run instead of expand and strengthen the U.N. force so it could save lives.

And if you acknowledge that genocide is occurring, and tens of thousands of people are being slaughtered every day, as they were during April and May, then you do not insist on a 2- or 3-week study before any new U.N. troops can be inserted in the country to protect lives, to protect people who are targeted for death.

But that is what the administration policy was in May. It sat on the National Security Council, and insisted that the U.N. must not send a new peacekeeping force to Rwanda until there had been several weeks to study the situation.

This policy had the effect of granting a grace period for the massacres to continue.

And if you understand that genocide is happening, and that extremist radio broadcasts inside the country are exhorting people to violence, you do not respond with a policy that says, in effect, "We'd like to jam the radio broadcasts. We realize they are playing a major role. But there are legal technicalities that preclude us from acting." Because that was the administration position throughout the crisis; and perhaps, still is.

Any number of military people have told us that jamming radio broadcasts is not a difficult thing to do, technically. U.S. officials effectively said that legal technicalities prevented them from taking decisive action against the ultimate crime against humanity. And the list goes on.

If you understand that true genocide is occurring before your eyes, you do not wait 3 months to break diplomatic relations with the guilty government, as the administration did. The administration continued to give diplomatic recognition, which gave a murderous regime an air of legitimacy, and gave it hopes of impunity for what it was doing.

And if you understand and acknowledge that genocide is happening, then you educate the American public so they understand it too. State Department and White House officials did not do this. The American public was confused; they still are, to some extent, because their Government did not explain the one-sided nature of what was happening in Rwanda.

And so, it made it extremely difficult during April, May, and June for international relief agencies based in this country to attract contributions to pay for a well-funded humanitarian assistance effort. Because the American Government did not tell the American people the true nature of what was happening.

Obviously, Americans are responding now; and that brings us to the current situation. What do we do? In the last couple of minutes, I would like to address that.

Here is a country, Rwanda, that used to be 8 million people. The majority of the people are either dead or have fled their homes. What do we do?

The administration is finally responding to this catastrophe at a White House level; and the American military is now providing humanitarian assistance. That is encouraging.

What I would like to suggest today, as other people on this panel have suggested, is that we have to mount this operation with a solution-oriented strategy. If we give assistance in the wrong way, we risk prolonging the crisis. If we give assistance in the right way, we can help resolve it, or diminish it.

What we mean by this is that, at the same time the United States is undertaking this effort inside Zaire for Rwandan refugees, we have to know and admit to ourselves that we probably cannot sustain such a massive and difficult operation indefinitely.

Therefore, we should do whatever we can do inside Rwanda, to give humanitarian assistance and establish an international presence inside Rwanda; so that refugees might gain the confidence to return home voluntarily.

The solution for many of the refugees will ultimately be voluntary repatriation. The question is: When will that happen?

The United States and the rest of the world are mounting a tremendous effort right now, to deliver something like 600 tons of food each day to Zaire, plus hundreds of tons of food to the 350,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania. Let us not forget them. This is something that we have to do.

But we should also be aware that, as I think one of the earlier witnesses mentioned, there are farms right now inside Rwanda that have crops in the ground, waiting to be harvested since June. The crops sit there, unharvested, because the people are gone; they have fled.

It seems to me that the more normalized the situation becomes in Rwanda—in political and humanitarian terms—the more likely it is that many refugees will choose to head home, and choose to head to their crops. And when they do that, many of them might be able to begin feeding themselves. That is what is meant by a solution-oriented approach.

Let me conclude with four or five very quick recommendations, to show what this means in concrete terms: First, the United States should grant diplomatic recognition to Rwanda's new coali-

tion Government. This one act would go a long way toward beginning to normalize that political situation in Rwanda. It would also lay the groundwork for larger humanitarian operations in the country.

Official diplomatic recognition of the new government would make it easier for our own American relief agencies to operate inside Rwanda.

Second, the United States should rapidly channel more and more relief and development assistance inside Rwanda. Establish the relief headquarters there. Use the Kigali Airport, which has the capacity for this kind of airlift that is now underway. Begin to build the confidence of Rwandans that their country is coming together.

Third, as the United States sends its soldiers on the humanitarian mission into Zaire, Congress and the administration should allow some of the U.S. troops to operate in safe areas on the Rwanda side of the border. The very presence of American troops would enable some refugees to feel safe to go home.

Fourth, the United States should do whatever it takes to deploy that U.N. multinational force within days, not within months.

Fifth, make sure that the radio broadcasts still going on inside the refugee camps in Zaire are shut down permanently. The United States should also help the new coalition government of Rwanda install its own radio, so that it can begin to talk to its people.

Mr. Chairman, there are plenty of other policy steps which we could suggest, and they are mentioned in our written testimony.

Let me conclude by saying that, in our view, U.S. officials did not bathe themselves in glory by their policy response to the genocide in Rwanda in April, May, and June. Here in July, the administration is beginning—is beginning—to respond appropriately to round 2 of the crisis.

It is now a matter of responding generously, but also a matter of responding wisely; responding with the strategy that will save lives, and begin to help that entire nation put itself back together.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Drumtra follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DRUMTRA

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) to testify today about the Rwanda crisis and its effects on East Central Africa. My name is Jeff Drumtra, Africa Policy Analyst for the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Roger Winter, Director of USCR, had to depart unexpectedly for Rwanda three days ago to participate, on behalf of USCR and InterAction, in an emergency United Nations assessment mission. For that reason he is unable to be here today.

USCR is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization that has monitored refugee situations worldwide for 36 years. USCR staff have traveled to Rwanda almost annually in the past 10 years. We are currently in the process of making our seventh site visit to Rwanda in the past four months to assess the situation there.

USCR staff traveled to Rwanda during March 29 to April 3, just prior to the April 6 outbreak of violence, and evaluated the conditions for repatriation of Rwandan refugees under the Arusha peace accord. Our itinerary took us to the northern towns of Mulindi, Byumba, Murumba, Nyagasigata, Cyumba, and Kivuye. A USCR staff consultant made two additional trips inside Rwanda in April; the purpose of the third trip was to provide guidance and analysis for a CBS News reporting team.

USCR conducted its fourth site visit to Rwanda during May 13 to May 19, traveling some 300 miles throughout the eastern half of the country. USCR staff investigated conditions in the villages of Rwamagana, Kibungo, Zaza, Kanzenze, Nyamata, Rusomo, Musaza, Byumba, Mulindi, and Muhura, and found appalling

scenes of death at most locations. USCR conducted its fifth assessment mission to Rwanda during June 19 to June 22 and reached the Rwandan capital of Kigali as well as the villages of Gitarama, Mugina, Ruhango, Kanombe, Morambi, and Mulindi. A USCR consultant is in the process of returning from a sixth site visit inside the Rwanda as well as into Burundi, and we are awaiting those findings. USCR Director Roger Winter is, as mentioned, currently in Rwanda on our seventh site visit and will also be in Goma, Zaire.

Drawing on information and analysis collected during these trips inside Rwanda, USCR has provided regular public and private briefings for officials of the State Department, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, other U.S. officials, international relief organizations, the media, and the American public. USCR published a description and analysis of the massacres in the Washington Post on June 5. USCR issued an Action Alert on May 2 that contained 13 policy recommendations urging protection for Rwandan civilians, accountability for the massacres, steps to diplomatically isolate Rwanda's self-proclaimed government, and provision of urgent humanitarian assistance. USCR issued an updated Action Alert on June 27 urging 19 policy steps to alleviate the Rwanda crisis.

We deeply appreciate the invitation to participate in this hearing today.

SCOPE OF TESTIMONY

World attention is now riveted on 1.5 million or more Rwandan refugees and their desperate battle to survive cholera and malnutrition in Zaire. Certainly this latest chapter in Rwanda's humanitarian catastrophe, unfolding before our eyes on television screens, is an urgent concern of this Subcommittee and of everyone in the hearing room today. The Subcommittee has asked the U.S. Committee for Refugees to assess this unfolding refugee crisis along the Zaire-Rwanda border and offer our suggestions at this hearing.

In addition, the Subcommittee has asked USCR to address issues beyond the immediate humanitarian emergency and to provide today a broader perspective—to look backward as well as forward in our testimony. The Subcommittee has asked USCR to analyze the horrific events that have occurred on the ground in Rwanda since April, and to evaluate the overall response of U.S. policymakers to the past four months of crisis there. The Subcommittee has urged USCR to highlight the lessons learned from this crisis so that the United States' diplomatic and humanitarian relief arms might plan and respond more effectively when catastrophes occur in the future. You have asked us to suggest how to make the American "response system" work better.

SUMMARY

The straightforward title of today's hearing, "The Crisis in Rwanda," does not fully convey the enormous issues at stake. This hearing is, in our view, the first systematic review of how the United States—the world's only superpower and a country based on the principles of human rights—failed to respond appropriately to the clearest case of genocide the world has seen in 50 years.

At the core of our analysis is this: During the past four months, U.S. officials failed to comprehend—or refused to acknowledge—that genocide was occurring in Rwanda until it was too late. An aggressive response to thwart genocide should have been at the heart of U.S. policy since early April, but was not. This massive failure—or refusal—to recognize genocide and to respond appropriately is, in our view, a shameful moment in the annals of American foreign policy and produced a flawed U.S. response to the crisis that was politically ineffectual and at times counterproductive.

The sequence of U.S. policy mistakes is sobering:

- U.S. officials refused to invoke the **Genocide Convention of 1948**, which would have provided a legal framework to take action against the mass murders in Rwanda. U.S. officials compounded their egregious error by issuing dubious interpretations of the Genocide Convention that, if allowed to stand, may leave it permanently eviscerated as a component of international law.
- The U.S. government played a lead role in the UN Security Council's tragic decision in April to **withdraw most UN troops** from Rwanda rather than immediately increase UN troop strength to protect innocent Rwandan civilians who were targeted for extermination.
- U.S. officials almost single-handedly delayed a UN decision in May to **send new peacekeeping troops** into Rwanda. Those new UN troops still have not arrived, more than two months later.
- U.S. policymakers refused repeated pleas from relief workers and human rights experts to shut down the **propaganda radio broadcasts** of Rwanda's political extremists, even though the vehement broadcasts were clearly play-

ing a pivotal role in inciting and sustaining genocide and in provoking a new humanitarian emergency by directing more than 1 million ethnic Hutu Rwandans to flee into Zaire.

- U.S. officials supported a **French military intervention** that—given the Rwandan Patriotic Front's deep suspicions of French intentions—virtually ensured the RPF would push for a total military victory, resulting in huge refugee outflows into Zaire.
- The U.S. government continued to grant **diplomatic recognition** to Rwanda's self-declared "interim government" during its entire campaign of genocide. American officials belatedly withdrew diplomatic recognition only after the regime was effectively in exile, more than three months after its pogrom began. This delay by U.S. officials sent the wrong message to extremists in Rwanda and to repressive regimes elsewhere in the world, for that matter.
- The Administration's failure to acknowledge in a forthright manner that genocide—the ultimate crime against humanity—was occurring in Rwanda hindered efforts to **mobilize public support** for a well-funded humanitarian response by private relief agencies.

Despite serious errors of judgment and a disappointing lack of will in the Administration's response to the Rwanda crisis during the past four months, it is not too late for U.S. policymakers to achieve two objectives publicly declared by the State Department: "to speed delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to investigate the origins of the killings and seek accountability." Although the President should have acted sooner, we commend his announcement last Friday that up to 4,000 U.S. military personnel will be engaged in a massive effort to provide humanitarian assistance to 1.5 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The U.S. military is the only institution in the world possessing the logistical capacity to address the urgent needs of these refugees.

USCR recommends that the President should take several additional steps at this time:

1 • Grant **diplomatic recognition** to Rwanda's new coalition government as a first step in normalizing political and humanitarian conditions inside the country. U.S. officials can use this opportunity to communicate to Rwanda's new leaders the need for responsible government.

2 • Channel more relief and development **assistance into Rwanda** in order to foster better conditions for refugee repatriation and nation-building. Use Kigali, the Rwandan capital, rather than Entebbe, Uganda as the main staging site for relief operations.

3 • Insist that Zairean authorities keep their **border open** so that refugees can repatriate when they want to do so.

4 • Allow U.S. soldiers to **deploy on the Rwanda side** of the border so that refugees in Zaire, aware of the troops' presence, can more easily repatriate with a sense of safety. This would ease the overwhelming strain on relief efforts at refugee sites in Zaire.

5 • Help a **multinational UN peacekeeping force** deploy in Rwanda as soon as possible to improve security and build confidence among refugees wishing to repatriate.

6 • Ensure that the defeated regime's **extremist radio broadcasts** in refugee camps are shut down permanently. Silencing the broadcasts is crucial to change the psychology of the refugees and to begin exposing them to accurate information.

7 • Help the new government of Rwanda install a **new radio station** enabling it to speak directly to the Rwandan people.

8 • Enforce **strict disarmament** of Rwandan soldiers and militias who fled to Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania. Make clear to Zairean authorities in particular that attacks on Rwanda from Zaire's territory will not be tolerated.

9 • Empower U.S., UN, and French troops to **detai**n officials of the deposed government and other prominent leaders in the massacres.

10 • Make **documentation of Rwanda's genocide** an urgent priority. Rapidly provide full diplomatic, financial, and logistical support to these efforts. Investigation and documentation are necessary to bring perpetrators to justice in a court of law, begin the difficult process of healing Rwandan society, and demonstrate worldwide that massive human rights violations cannot be perpetrated with impunity.

11 • Impress on Burundian authorities the importance of taking action to shut down the private, **extremist radio broadcasts in Burundi** that threaten to incite additional violence there.

Mr. Chairman, the main text of this testimony elaborates on these important points and includes—per your request—a thorough analysis of the overall U.S. re-

sponse to the Rwanda crisis during the past four months and a full discussion of USCR's policy recommendations to address immediate and future needs.

This written testimony also contains an Appendix providing a chronology of events during the past four months that the Subcommittee and members of the public will find useful. A close reading of the chronology documents week after week of inaction and dissembling by the U.S. and by other governments while Rwandan government officials openly conducted their extermination campaign against an entire ethnic group and all political opponents. Our testimony also includes copies of two op-ed pieces by USCR describing and analyzing events in Rwanda as they unfolded.

THE CORE U.S. FAILURE: NO RESPONSE TO GENOCIDE

Even by its own measurements, the Administration's diplomatic strategy for dealing with the crisis in Rwanda has failed to this point.

The State Department publicly declared as early as April that it was establishing five policy objectives in Rwanda. Although one objective was "to stop the killings," the massive slaughter continued without restraint, leaving a half-million or more persons dead. Although a second State Department goal was to "bring * * * a ceasefire," no significant ceasefire occurred. Although a third declared U.S. policy goal was to "urge a resumption of negotiations," meaningful negotiations did not occur.

The fourth U.S. policy objective, "to speed delivery of humanitarian assistance," has been only a partial success. U.S. officials responded rapidly to the plight of 300,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania in early May, but the Administration has drawn criticism recently for waiting several crucial days before mounting an all-out response to the plight of 1.5 million cholera-plagued Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Some 10,000 persons have reportedly perished in the Zaire refugee camps. Furthermore, the U.S. has been slow to mount a relief effort for some 500,000 displaced persons inside Rwandan Patriotic Front-controlled areas of Rwanda during the past 16 weeks, reportedly because of political constraints imposed by the State Department on its own humanitarian relief officials.

The fifth policy goal declared months ago by the State Department was "to investigate the origins of the killings and seek accountability." There is still time to achieve this important goal. The U.S. has announced its support for some form of international tribunal to bring the masterminds of the massacres to justice. American officials will have to act aggressively to push this process forward.

Given the Administration's failure to achieve the majority of its stated goals in Rwanda, several questions arise: Why did U.S. policy fail? What was wrong with U.S. diplomatic strategy? Exactly what lessons are we supposed to learn from this nightmare? Indeed, could anything have been done to save lives inside Rwanda?

Mr. Chairman, the core failing of U.S. policymakers from the beginning was that they failed either to comprehend or acknowledge that genocide—in the strictest legal and moral sense of the term—was occurring in Rwanda. U.S. officials refused to recognize or admit that powerful individuals and organizations in Rwanda—the ruling party, its extremist militias, and the government military—were engaging in a campaign of highly organized mass murder against all ethnic Tutsi, as well as against moderate Hutu officials, which qualified as genocide under international law.

This failure of U.S. officials to label the existence of genocide had serious policy repercussions. A string of flawed policies flowed from this fundamental—and in our view, shameful—lack of will:

- Because U.S. officials refused to frame events in Rwanda in the context of genocide, the United States failed to invoke the 1948 Genocide Convention, which obliges nations to stop genocide when and where it occurs.

By refusing even to say the word "genocide" until too late, U.S. officials failed to mobilize the response needed to deter the ultimate crime against humanity. The crime of genocide that the U.S. had solemnly pledged would happen "never again" anywhere in the world was allowed to run its course in Rwanda during April, May, and June. At least 500,000 persons, mostly Tutsi, were murdered for no reason other than their ethnic identity. They were regarded by Rwanda's then-ruling regime as political opponents to be exterminated.

"Genocide" is a word that carries great legal and moral weight. The United States is a signatory to the 1948 Genocide Convention, which outlaws genocide as a crime against humanity and obliges signatories to take action to stop genocide and/or protect its targeted victims. The Convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group." Rwanda's regime and its extremist supporters were clearly engaged in systematic killings intended to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group. The UN Commission for Human

Rights issued a report on June 28 stating that "the conditions laid down by the 1948 Convention are thus met * * *. The term 'genocide' should henceforth be used as regards the [killing of] Tutsi" in Rwanda.

U.S. officials dodged legal responsibility by refusing to acknowledge that genocide was in fact occurring. News reports in early June indicated that the Administration forbade its officials from uttering the word "genocide" in order to avoid legal obligation to respond to the killings. Not until mid-June—after most of the massacres had taken place—did Secretary of State Warren Christopher grudgingly label events in Rwanda as "genocide," although he added that he wondered "if there is any particular magic in calling it genocide."

The State Department compounded the ill effects of this half-hearted policy by declaring in June that the Genocide Convention merely "enables" the world to respond but does not require a response. If this flawed interpretation of the law, forwarded by U.S. officials to justify their inaction, is allowed to stand, it may irreparably damage—if not eviscerate—the Genocide Convention's stature as a powerful prohibition against the calculated extermination of entire ethnic groups.

• The United States played a lead role in the UN Security Council's tragic decision in April to withdraw 2,000 UN troops from Rwanda, rather than strengthen UN troop presence in order to protect innocent Rwandan civilians targeted for extermination.

Confronted with massive massacres that began on April 6 and continued night and day without interruption, U.S. and UN officials could have offered the victims protection and reduced the scale of slaughter by strengthening the contingent of 2,500 UN peacekeepers already in Rwanda. Instead, the United States led the UN decision on April 21 to withdraw all but several hundred UN troops, leaving Rwanda's Tutsi population and moderate Hutu leaders to almost certain death. The shocking pullout of UN troops had the effect of giving a green light to the regime's campaign of genocide and gave the attackers every reason to believe they could proceed with impunity.

With the exception of 10 Belgian soldiers killed in the first hours of violence, indications suggest that UN troops were not usually targeted for attack during the three months of unrestrained genocide. Bear in mind that most of the killings were perpetrated by civilian youth militias who were intimidated when confronted by armed force. In fact, the 450 UN troops that remained in Kigali after April effectively protected up to 20,000 civilians from certain death at various sites around Kigali—a ratio of 40 civilians saved per each UN soldier on the ground. At just one location, Hotel Milles Collines, a mere 10 to 12 UN soldiers protected some 600 Tutsi who were under siege for two months—a "save" ratio of at least 50 civilians per soldier. These examples of lifesaving work by a mere 450 UN soldiers suggest that if the U.S. and UN had taken prompt action to double the UN contingent to 5,000 troops—rather than withdrawing 2,000 soldiers—a quarter-million lives might well have been saved. The world could have made a huge dent in the Rwandan regime's campaign of genocide.

• U.S. officials slowed efforts to insert new UN peacekeeping troops into Rwanda, allowing the massacres to run their course. Administration officials exhibited no sense of urgency and hindered the UN's efforts to act with dispatch.

Some members of the UN Security Council quickly realized that the April 21 decision to withdraw 2,000 troops was a tragic mistake and attempted in May to authorize the deployment of a larger UN force of up to 5,500 troops to protect trapped civilians. The United States delayed the authorization and deployment process for weeks, insisting on further study. The delay effectively granted a grace period for additional massacres inside Rwanda. Although numerous countries have offered to send a combined 4,000 peacekeeping troops, the troops have not arrived in Rwanda and require financial and logistical assistance from the U.S. and other powers before they can deploy.

The U.S. military is currently demonstrating in Zaire that it has the logistical ability to deploy massive numbers of troops quickly, and could have done so in April to key locations inside Rwanda where lives could have been saved. Although Rwanda as a country does not hold strategic value for the United States, the United States does have a strategic, legal, and moral interest in deterring genocide. The United States' failure to respond stemmed from a lack of will, not a lack of capability. The nearly 70,000 UN peacekeeping soldiers currently deployed at UN peacekeeping operations worldwide include about 800 American troops—a mere 1 percent of the UN's total force.

• By failing to acknowledge that events in Rwanda constituted genocide to be thwarted at all costs, U.S. officials refused to shut down or "jam" extremist radio broadcasts that played a pivotal role in inciting and sustain-

ing the genocide. State Department officials cited legal technicalities for their inaction. The broadcasts were allowed to emanate from the regime and its supporters throughout the crisis, exhorting the population to massacre Tutsi and, in July, ordering more than 1 million Hutu to flee to Zaire, provoking the current humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions.

State Department officials on several occasions expressed to USCR that they were studying the possibility of jamming Radio Milles Collines and the government radio station in Rwanda—they were aware of the insidious propaganda power of the broadcasts—but they ultimately said that various legal and technical difficulties precluded taking action.

In USCR's view, taking action to stop genocide—the ultimate crime against humanity—should override such legal inhibitions. Moreover, numerous military personnel and radio technicians have indicated to USCR that jamming radio stations—especially those with weak signals—is not technically difficult. U.S. officials on one occasion said they were prevented from jamming the broadcasts because they were unable to locate the frequency. USCR responded by informing the State Department that the broadcasts were airing on 94.1 FM. The Administration took no action.

Administration officials indicated last week that either the United States or France would finally take action to silence the regime's clandestine radio station broadcasting into the refugee camps in Zaire. USCR urges that the broadcast be shut down permanently.

• **By spending weeks trying to initiate negotiations linking an end to the massacres with a ceasefire, U.S. officials exhibited a misunderstanding of what was driving the massacres and what might end them.**

The massacres began on April 6, several days before the civil war resumed. The massacres were committed throughout Rwanda, in hundreds of locations far from the threat of war, distant from the front lines. The civil war did not drive the massacres, which were motivated by a determination to eliminate all potential political opposition. There was absolutely no reason to believe a ceasefire in the civil war would curb the slaughter going on separately. In fact, by linking the two issues in negotiations, U.S. officials inadvertently gave the regime a convenient "excuse" to continue the massacres in the absence of a ceasefire. This misguided U.S. strategy was particularly hollow given the absence of any other meaningful U.S. effort to stop the massacres.

• **By refusing to break diplomatic relations with Rwanda's murderous government until July 15—three long months after its campaign of genocide began—the Administration lent Rwanda's extremists an air of legitimacy, gave them hopes of impunity, and hampered humanitarian relief inside the country.**

The United States should have rapidly broken relations as a concrete signal to all Rwandans that their government had lost legitimacy and that its frenzied slaughter of an ethnic group was transforming their country into a pariah state in the eyes of the world community. Administration officials belatedly withdrew diplomatic recognition only after the Rwandan regime was effectively in exile. This delay sent the wrong message to extremists in Rwanda and to repressive regimes elsewhere in the world.

Diplomatic recognition of Rwanda's self-proclaimed government throughout April, May, and June also made relief efforts in RPF-controlled territory politically difficult for many private and governmental relief agencies despite great humanitarian needs there. The U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a federal agency staffed with excellent relief experts, was reportedly barred by Administration policy from conducting an official needs assessment in RPF-territory until the past two weeks, despite the fact that some 500,000 internally displaced persons and some 1.5 million other civilians were reportedly located there. Many private relief groups routinely hesitate to operate without the permission of a host country's recognized government, in order to avoid appearances of political favoritism. State Department officials should have made clear long ago that Rwanda's government had forfeited its legitimacy.

• **By supporting French military intervention instead of rapid deployment of multinational UN troops, the Administration inadvertently ensured that the RPF—given its deep suspicions of French intentions—would push for a complete military victory, resulting in huge refugee flows into Zaire.**

The RPF indicated in June that it might halt its military offensive under certain circumstances, including the arrest and detention of Rwanda's rump government and other massacre leaders. There is no way to know if the RPF would in fact have halted its attack. What is certain is that the entry of French troops into Rwanda in late June raised understandable suspicions worldwide, given France's history of military and political support for Rwanda's hardline government. The RPF predict-

ably decided—correctly or not—that French troops intended to bolster a crippled government and that the only way to ensure complete defeat of the government was to capture its traditional stronghold in northwest Rwanda. The ensuing military offensive, combined with the regime's radio broadcasts instructing people to flee, produced an unprecedented flow of more than 1 million new refugees in less than a week's time.

• **By failing to acknowledge in a forthright manner that genocide—the ultimate crime against humanity—was occurring in Rwanda, the Administration did not properly educate the American public about what was happening. This hindered efforts to mobilize public support for a well-funded humanitarian response by private relief agencies.**

Average Americans' unfortunate stereotypes about tribal African wars masked the reality of what was happening in Rwanda and immobilized the public's response. Public financial contributions to Rwandan relief efforts were meager through June, according to InterAction, the umbrella agency for American relief organizations. The Administration did not communicate the stark, one-sided nature of the killings, or that events in Rwanda represented one of history's greatest crimes. The Administration did not elevate this crisis to priority status, and thus neither did the public.

CURRENT EMERGENCY: A SOLUTION-ORIENTED STRATEGY

The current Rwandan refugee crisis in Zaire is unprecedented. It is the largest, fastest refugee flight in history. During July 13 to July 19, an estimated 1.5 million Rwandan refugees entered Zaire. One official of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called it "the exodus of a nation." Although many of the refugees—all of them ethnic Hutu—legitimately feared for their safety as the front line of the civil war approached, it appears that what would have been a large population of refugees was whipped into a staggeringly huge refugee exodus by the vehement radio broadcasts of Rwanda's retreating rump government, which directed all civilians to flee with their government officials.

UN and nongovernmental relief agencies, working on their own, could not possibly have prepared for this deluge even under the best conditions. Stretched beyond capacity by nearly 500,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania and Burundi and by emergencies in other parts of the world, relief officials were in no position to cope with 1.5 million additional refugees in a difficult location in Zaire. Relief agencies pleaded for high-level assistance from the United States and other major nations. After an outbreak of cholera killed several thousand refugees and with intense media coverage of their unspeakable misery, President Clinton announced on July 22 that the U.S. military would launch a humanitarian operation into Zaire. A White House team is now reportedly coordinating the relief effort. The U.S. military is the only institution in the world that possesses the logistical capability to undertake such a massive relief operation rapidly, and USCR commends the President's decision to mount an all-out effort. Saving the lives of refugees in Zaire must be a priority.

The ultimate solution for the predicament of most of the refugees, however, will be voluntary repatriation to Rwanda when the situation there allows. **Adequate assistance to such a huge dependent population in Zaire cannot be sustained for an extended period.** The U.S. government should act now to pursue a solution-oriented strategy by taking steps that will quickly lay the groundwork for voluntary refugee repatriation to Rwanda. At a time when the international community is struggling to feed refugees in Zaire by shipping 600 tons of food each day, some areas of Rwanda have crops in the ground awaiting harvest when people return. A wise strategy would provide services in home areas of Rwanda, particularly where food is already available.

Despite the Administration's serious failings throughout the Rwanda crisis, it has an opportunity to play a constructive role in coming days and weeks.

• **First, the U.S. government should grant official diplomatic recognition to the new coalition government of Rwanda announced last week. Diplomatic recognition is a critical first step in normalizing political and humanitarian conditions in the country.**

Expedient recognition of Rwanda's new government would help Rwanda begin its long healing process. It would also facilitate international relief efforts inside the country that may ultimately give many Rwandan refugees confidence to return home voluntarily. American relief agencies will be able to cooperate with the new government more easily if the U.S. normalizes diplomatic relations.

Rwanda's coalition government reportedly includes at least 12 Hutu and 6 Tutsi among the 19 cabinet positions announced so far. Information about the ethnicity of one cabinet official is currently unavailable. The RPF holds 9 of the 19 announced

seats in the new government. Three political parties other than the RPF hold 10 of the 19 cabinet positions.

• **Second, channel more relief and development assistance into Rwanda in order to foster better conditions for refugee repatriation and nation-building. Provide technical assistance to the new government.**

The nearly 2 million Rwandan refugees in the region, as well as the estimated 2 million internally displaced persons inside Rwanda, will be more inclined to return home when they see relief operations and an international presence in their country. The new Rwandan government lacks experience in relief administration and has no civil affairs capacity. It requires rapid training.

UN agencies should relocate their operational headquarters for this crisis from Nairobi to Kigali, and Kigali airport should be the focus of the U.S. effort to build up humanitarian relief in the region. The airport is in decent condition and could be improved within 24 hours with the right equipment. Truck transport costs from Kigali to Goma, Zaire are cheaper than from Entebbe, Uganda to Goma. Convoys traveling between Kigali and Goma could deliver badly needed supplies to Rwandan communities along the route. USCR staff currently on the ground in the region state that this recommendation has wide support among relief professionals there.

• **Third, insist that Zairean authorities keep their border open so that refugees can repatriate when they want to do so.**

Zairean soldiers have blocked some groups of refugees from repatriating in recent days. Although the border was open again on Monday, the Administration and the UN should closely monitor against future border closings and should register strong protests when they occur.

• **Fourth, the Administration should allow U.S. soldiers to deploy at some sites on the Rwanda side of the border as well as in Zaire. Deployment of troops into safe areas in northwest Rwanda will enable refugees in Zaire to repatriate with a greater sense of safety.**

Although the deployment of U.S. troops in the refugee camps in Zaire is commendable, immediately positioning some U.S. soldiers in northwestern Rwanda could facilitate refugees' voluntary return home. The region is quiet—it is no longer a war zone. Carefully positioning troops on the Rwandan side of the border would contribute to a more lasting solution to the current humanitarian crisis.

• **Fifth, deploy an expanded multinational UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda within weeks in order to improve security and build confidence among refugees wishing to repatriate.**

French troops will begin departing in a few days and should not be asked to remain beyond their August 22 target date for complete withdrawal. The prolonged presence of French troops would send the wrong signals to Rwandan society. In order to speed the deployment of UN troops, the French should leave their equipment behind for use by an expanded UN force.

• **Sixth, ensure that the defeated regime's radio broadcasts are shut down permanently in Rwanda and in refugee camps in Zaire.**

The same regime that orchestrated the murder of a half-million Tutsi also helped direct the massive population flight two weeks ago which has left some 10,000 Hutu refugees dead of cholera and an additional 2,000 to 3,000 dying each day. Its vehement radio broadcasts, which continued to air in the Zaire refugee camps last week, have heightened Rwandan Hutus' fear of the RPF. Although the RPF has been guilty of some atrocities, by all independent accounts it has not exhibited a policy of retribution against most Hutus. Silencing the radio broadcasts is crucial to change the psychology of the refugees and begin exposing them to accurate information.

• **Seventh, help the new government of Rwanda install its own radio station so that it can speak directly to the Rwandan people.**

Rwandans should be given an opportunity to hear what their new government wants to tell them. Installation of a new radio station will require financial assistance as well as legal assistance to conform with international broadcasting regulations.

• **Eighth, enforce strict disarmament of Rwandan soldiers and militias who fled to Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. Make clear to Zairean authorities that attacks on Rwanda from Zaire's territory will not be tolerated.**

Reports have surfaced that the deposed regime's soldiers and militias are attempting to re-arm to launch a guerrilla campaign against the new government of Rwanda. U.S. and French troops should ensure that complete disarmament has occurred. Zairean troops are known for their corruption and cannot be trusted to enforce the disarmament.

• **Ninth, mandate U.S., UN, and French troops to detain officials of the deposed government and other prominent leaders in the massacres.**

Reasonable cause exists for the arrest of scores of massacre leaders while full investigation and documentation of the genocide continues. The arrest of individuals widely known to be guilty would improve security in border regions and would signal to Rwandans that the time has come to follow new, hopefully more moderate, leaders.

• **Tenth, place an urgent priority on documentation of Rwanda's genocide. This is needed to bring guilty individuals to justice and to send a warning that such acts are punished by the world community.**

The Administration has indicated support for a special tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda. U.S. officials should push this process by providing immediate diplomatic, financial, and logistical support to human rights investigators.

• **Impress on Burundian authorities the importance of taking action to shut down the private, extremist radio broadcasts in Burundi that threaten to incite additional violence there.**

Burundi is struggling through its own political transition and is attempting to recover from politically instigated violence that killed some 50,000 persons in late 1993. Events in Rwanda have heightened tensions in Burundi, and recent private radio broadcasts transmitting a message of hate could sow the seeds of more bloodshed.

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Mr. Chairman, you have expressed a keen interest in focusing this hearing on how to make the U.S. political and humanitarian relief systems respond more effectively to catastrophes such as Rwanda. It is a valuable line of inquiry, and we commend you for raising the issue in this way.

The core lesson of Rwanda, in our view, is that our response system did not fail us, but rather we as a nation failed our response system. The U.S. political response to the Rwanda crisis failed because U.S. officials lacked the will to respond. Several weeks ago a White House spokesman implied that a better "socioeconomic and political early warning system" might have improved U.S. policy before and during the Rwanda crisis. In fact, early warning of a calamity in Rwanda existed. No one quite foresaw its massive scale, but Rwanda's peace process and human rights standards were clearly in dangerous trouble long before the massacres occurred. In fact, politically instigated ethnic violence in neighboring Burundi six months earlier, in October 1993, gave ample warning that the densely populated region of East Central Africa had reached a new explosive stage, and that ruling parties and military leaders accustomed to unquestioned power were determined to resist democratic reforms and coalition governments.

It is also clear that the U.S. has the capacity to respond rapidly and massively to emergencies when it chooses to do so. The current U.S. humanitarian military mission to Zaire is the latest proof of that, and stands in stark contrast to the American government's tortuously slow response to UN peacekeepers logistical needs throughout the crisis.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to suggest four ways to improve the U.S. response system based on the Rwanda example.

First, make better use of existing international laws which can provide a framework—a rallying point—for urgent action in crisis situations. We are a nation of laws, and the American public is more likely to respond positively to issues framed in that context. U.S. officials refused to use the Genocide Convention in this crisis and may have damaged the Convention in the process. Congress, the Administration, and all international signatories to the Convention as well as to other international human rights instruments must be held to the letter and the spirit of the covenants they have signed. They must live up to what these covenants empower or oblige the international community to do when confronted with an emergency requiring action. Secretary of State Christopher appeared to denigrate the importance of the Genocide Convention in June when he questioned whether the word genocide has "any particular magic." The "magic" comes from people of courage taking action on the treaties they have signed.

Secondly, the United States can respond more effectively to political crises by preventing them in the first place. In particular, U.S. officials should participate more aggressively in ensuring that political leaders and opposition groups adhere to the peace processes and political reforms they signed—such as the Arusha accords in Rwanda. If the Arusha accords had been implemented on schedule, the Rwandan army chain of command would have been changed and many soldiers would have been demobilized by April. The United States and the international community tolerated delays in Arusha that opened the possibility for the orchestrated violence that ultimately occurred.

Thirdly, the U.S. humanitarian response system works best when the talented relief professionals of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are able to do their vital humanitarian work without political constraints from the State Department. Political constraints against working in RPF-controlled territory hampered OFDA activities in much of Rwanda until recently. The agency's mission is purely humanitarian, and it should be allowed to operate that way.

Fourthly, the U.S. humanitarian response system requires adequate funding to respond most effectively. The displacement of some 4 million Rwandans inside and outside their country and the need to provide assistance to them in difficult locations has overwhelmed the capacity of governmental and nongovernmental relief agencies. Relief budgets are virtually exhausted. A supplemental appropriation will be necessary this year, and should receive the support of this Subcommittee and all members of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our testimony. On behalf of USCR, thank you for inviting us to share our views and analysis with you today.

Appendix.—Brief Chronology of Rwanda Crisis

April 1994 to Present

April 5

UN Security Council Resolution 909 extends mandate of UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until July 29, 1994. The resolution authorizes UNAMIR to monitor the execution of the Arusha peace accord between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Some 2,500 UNAMIR troops from 23 countries are present.

April 6

Plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyrimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira crashes on approach to Kigali airport. Rwandan Defense Ministry states plane shot down by "unidentified elements."

April 7

UPI reports "fierce fighting" in and around Kigali.

Ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, attempting to protect Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, are tortured and executed by Rwandan soldiers of the Presidential Guard. The Prime Minister is also murdered.

UN spokesman reports that many of those killed are leaders of four political parties opposed to Habyrimana's MRND.

UPI quotes President Clinton as saying "I am * * * horrified that elements of the Rwandan security forces have sought out and murdered Rwandan officials * * *."

Washington Post quotes recent radio broadcast warning Tutsis in Rwanda: "You cockroaches must know you are made of flesh! We won't let you kill! We will kill you!"

April 8

UP reports that Presidential Guard "was rampaging through the city [Kigali] detaining and executing anyone suspected of being a member of the Tutsi minority."

Washington Post cites "persistent reports, from witnesses and diplomats in Kigali, that government ministers were being rounded up by soldiers and some had been executed."

UN Security Council President reports that an "interim government" has formed in Rwanda.

UPI quotes President Clinton as saying, "We're doing everything we possibly can to be on top of the situation there."

April 9

French paratroopers arrive in Kigali to oversee evacuation of French nationals. Two companies of U.S. marines are dispatched to Bujumbura, Burundi to prepare for the evacuation of some 250 Americans in Rwanda.

UN Under Secretary General for peacekeeping expresses concern for safety of UNAMIR forces, saying, "There are worrying signs as of Saturday, because the troops of the RPF are moving toward Kigali."

April 10

Belgian paratroopers arrive in Kigali to oversee evacuation of Belgian nationals. Most U.S. citizens evacuated by road convoy to Burundi.

U.S. Embassy in Kigali closes.

April 12

UPI estimates at least 10,000 people have been killed in the past six days.

Belgium informs the UN that it intends to withdraw its 400-strong UNAMIR contingent.

April 13

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlines options on the future of UNAMIR to the Security Council. Council decides not to withdraw UNAMIR completely, but reaches no final decision.

AP reports more than 100,000 persons have fled Kigali, and 20,000 have been killed.

April 14

AP reports on the arrival of convoy of Belgian troops to evacuate 18 foreigners: "As the convoy arrived, 500 ethnic Tutsi refugees camped in one of the compound's buildings rushed out with their hands up, pleading for help. But they were all left behind * * *. The [compound] had been besieged since Tuesday night by Hutu gangs armed with clubs, machetes, and rifles."

U.S. State Department Spokesman Michael McCurry says the Clinton Administration condemns "the slaughter of innocent civilians."

UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) created in Nairobi.

April 15

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) says at least 20,000 Rwandans have fled to neighboring countries.

April 16

After discussion, UN Security Council again defers decision on fate of UNAMIR.

April 17

At least 12,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, have gathered at sites guarded by UNAMIR, including the national stadium, the King Faisal Hospital, and the Meridien Hotel.

April 18

AP reports "massacres have spread throughout Rwanda." International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports at least 400,000 Rwandans have been driven from their homes and "tens and tens of thousands" are dead. "The situation is catastrophic, not just in Kigali, but in the rest of Rwanda," says an ICRC spokesman.

April 19

Christian Science Monitor quotes Canadian UNAMIR commander General Romeo Dallaire as saying the killers are "like demons in human form," and notes radio broadcasts continue to incite killing of Tutsis.

Human Rights Watch says the death toll has risen to 100,000.

April 20

OXFAM releases statement saying the UN force "is not strong enough to protect civilians and does not have a clear mandate to do so." OXFAM appeals to the UN Security Council to "increase the size of the UN force."

AP reports 428 Belgian, 213 Bangladeshi, 144 Ghanaian, and 50 other UNAMIR soldiers have evacuated from Rwanda over the past two days.

UNHCR reports more than 50,000 people have fled Rwanda.

April 21

Security Council Resolution 912 reduces UNAMIR's authorized strength to 270 troops and changes mandate to act as intermediary between forces and assist in aid delivery, but does not authorize UNAMIR to stop killings of civilians.

AP reports two million people have fled their homes.

U.S. State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs attributes assassinations and "large-scale massacre[s]" to Presidential Guard.

April 22

National Security Advisor Lake calls on leaders of Rwandan military "to do everything in their power to end the violence immediately."

Some 1,000 UNAMIR troops prepare to leave Rwanda following adoption of Security Council Resolution 912.

UNHCR reports more than 100,000 people have fled Rwanda.

April 25

AP quotes UN spokesman in Kigali as saying, "Radio RTLM [Radio-Television des Milles Collines] is calling on militias to step up the killing of civilians."

April 27

UNHCR reports more than 130,000 people have fled Rwanda.

April 28

U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson declares "state of disaster."

April 29

UNHCR reports some 250,000 Rwandans have fled to Tanzania over the past 24 hours, the largest and fastest exodus ever witnessed by the agency.

Boutros-Ghali tells Security Council that death toll may have reached 200,000. Boutros-Ghali cites "strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians," and calls for an increase in UN presence that "would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which member states have so far proved reluctant to contemplate."

April 30

UN Security Council condemns massacres, but refuses to back Boutros-Ghali's call to increase UN presence.

President Clinton calls on the Rwandan army and the RPF "to agree to an immediate cease-fire and return to negotiations aimed at a lasting peace in their country."

May 1

UNHCR official reports "hundreds of bodies a day" floating down the Kagera River, which empties into Lake Victoria. Many of the bodies have their hands tied behind their backs.

May 2

New York Times reports Boutros-Ghali is requesting African heads of state to contribute troops to an all-African peacekeeping force for Rwanda

May 3

Boutros-Ghali repeats call for African troops that would be financed and equipped by the West, saying a foreign military presence is necessary to "defuse the conflict, to contain the genocide." Fewer than 500 UN troops remain in Rwanda.

May 4

OXFAM reports that death toll may be 500,000.

Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, speaking at House Africa Subcommittee hearing, says U.S. has declared "our intention to provide our fair share of support—logistical, financial, and other—to such a [UN/OAU peacekeeping] mission, should it be mounted."

May 5

In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck says, "[T]he parties must begin serious and meaningful direct talks."

May 6

Two-person USAID/BHR/OFDA team begins assessments of refugee sites in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania

May 10

UN staff circulate recommendation that calls for an international force of 5,500 peacekeeping troops.

In South Africa, Vice President Al Gore says the United States has advanced "several new ideas" on Rwanda, which he says are not "earthshaking," but declines to provide specifics, saying, "the discussion is unfortunately at a delicate stage."

May 11

Boutros-Ghali reports Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania have offered to provide troops, and says a force is necessary to "stop the genocide taking place."

New York Times reports the United States opposes a UN Security Council resolution to send 5,500 UN troops to Rwanda, preferring the possibility of establishing a "protection zone" along parts of Rwanda's border. The United States advocates "far smaller numbers [of UN troops] restricted to helping refugees in border areas," Reuter reports.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights José Ayala Lasso arrives in Kigali after meeting RPF commander Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame in Byumba, Rwanda.

May 12

Reuter reports that aid workers say mass killings are still being conducted in areas of the south controlled by the "interim government."

In a letter to OFDA, RPF asks the U.S. government "to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced people in the areas under its control."

May 13

UN reports at least 88 students were massacred yesterday in the town of Gikongoro, held by the "interim government."

Reuter reports that the word "genocide" has been dropped from a draft Security Council resolution, and has been replaced with the phrase "systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law."

Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes calls on the United States to "play a much more active role" in Rwanda.

May 16

The New York Times reports the United States "forced the United Nations today to put off plans to send 5,500 troops to Rwanda" in favor of a less ambitious plan that would initially insert only 850 UN troops, with up to 5,500 authorized for later.

Time magazine quotes U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson as saying, "We have got to hope that these people will understand that they are brothers."

May 17

UN Security Council Resolution 918 authorizes UNAMIR with troop strength of up to 5,500. Initially, only an additional 500 Ghanaians and 175 military observers will be inserted, pending Council approval of further study on future deployments requested of Boutros-Ghali. The resolution expands UNAMIR's mandate to include the security and protection of civilians. AP reports the Clinton Administration "reluctantly supported the resolution under pressure from other Security Council members anxious to act."

UNHCR reports that, for the first time, it has received accusations of RPF involvement in torture and massacres.

May 18

RPF denies accusations by UNHCR officials in Tanzania that it has engaged in torture and massacres.

May 19

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings says the United States must provide logistical and material support in the deployment of African troops, saying the United States "is the one country with the resources and capability" to do so.

May 22

RPF captures Kigali airport.

May 25

In New York, Boutros-Ghali declares that he, the UN, and the international community as a whole have failed in Rwanda. "It is genocide which has been committed in Rwanda and more than 200,000 people have been killed [but] the international community is still discussing what ought to be done," he says.

UN Human Rights Commission adopts resolution condemning massacres and saying it believes "genocidal acts may have occurred." Resolution also call on Boutros-Ghali to appoint a Special Rapporteur to investigate and document human rights violations in Rwanda.

According to the *New York Times*, the United States has indicated that it may lend 50 armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR.

Reuter reports Ethiopia and Senegal, joining Ghana, have agreed in writing to send some 800 troops each.

OFDA dispatches Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART) to region.

May 27

AP reports tens of thousands of Rwandans, including soldiers of the Rwandan army, fleeing south from Kigali.

May 31

A Senegalese UNAMIR officer is killed in an RPF mortar attack, the second UNAMIR fatality attributed to RPF forces.

June 1

UNAMIR commander Dallaire appeals to the United States to send armored personnel carriers and other military equipment to help evacuate trapped civilians. Reuter reports Dallaire briefed an envoy from President Clinton in Nairobi on UNAMIR's needs and was told his request "would be taken to the highest authority."

June 2

Reuter reports aid groups caution that "a horde of Biblical proportions is swarming south to flee advancing rebels," and that if those fleeing enter Zaire or Burundi "aid workers will be barely prepared to feed or shelter them."

AP reports the United States will send 50 armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR.

June 6

UNAMIR commander Dallaire reports that large numbers of Rwandans are expected to flee the country in the near future, and says that two million is a "reasonable [planning] figure."

AP reports that African countries have so far volunteered 3,500 of the 4,000 infantry troops the UN wants to send to Rwanda, but that engineering and communications staff are in short supply.

June 8

UN Security Council Resolution 925 endorses Boutros-Ghali's proposals for deploying the remainder of UNAMIR's authorized troops, and extends UNAMIR mandate until December 9, 1994.

Government of Uganda reports that bodies are no longer entering Lake Victoria from the Kagera River, and that fewer bodies are washing up on the river's shores.

RPF soldiers kill 13 Catholic clerics. Later, RPF official acknowledges that "misguided" RPF soldiers are responsible. It is the first confirmed massacre by RPF forces.

June 9

OXFAM official states, "During the past months of slaughter, the United States has been the key player in halting action on Rwanda, creating a series of excuses and inventing problems that do not exist."

June 10

The New York Times reports that the Clinton Administration has instructed its spokespersons not to use the word "genocide" in describing the killings in Rwanda, but rather, to say "acts of genocide may have occurred." *The Times* reports the Administration is concerned that if it acknowledges that genocide is occurring, it would be expected to take action to prevent it. U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson

says, "As a responsible government, you don't just go around hollering 'genocide.' You say that acts of genocide may have occurred and they need to be investigated," according to the *Times* report.

UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye begins visit to Rwanda.

June 11

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, responding to criticism over the Administration's refusal to label the Rwanda massacres as "genocide," states, "If there is any particular magic in calling it genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that."

June 13

Uruguayan UNAMIR officer is killed in an RPF rocket-propelled grenade attack, the third UNAMIR fatality attributed to RPF forces.

June 14

Approximately 60 Tutsi boys are abducted from the Sainte Famille church complex and murdered by Hutu militias.

In Tunisia, the RPF and Rwandan army reportedly agree to a cease-fire. The agreement seems to have no effect on events in Rwanda.

June 15

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe indicates that France and its African allies are prepared to intervene militarily in Rwanda if massacres continue.

June 16

RPF spokesman James Rwengo, citing past French support for the Rwandan government, says the French "should not participate in any force, even a United Nations one, much less carry out any action on their own."

All members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee sign letter to President Clinton urging a greater U.S. response to the genocide in Rwanda.

June 17

Washington Post reports that Administration officials now state that the 1948 Genocide Convention merely "enables" governments that detect genocide to act to stop it, but does not require them to do so.

Washington Post reports Administration officials reject criticism that the delivery of armored vehicles to UNAMIR has taken too long, saying that the elapsed time from request to delivery will be one month, less than normal in such transactions.

July 19

Italian Defense Minister Cesare Previti says Italy will not take part in any French-led intervention in Rwanda.

June 20

Following the evacuation of hundreds of mostly Tutsi people from the surrounded Sainte Famille compound in Kigali, UNAMIR spokesman Major Jean-Guy Plante states, "We can only do what we can do. There are people in desperate situations all over Kigali, but we can only rescue people when both sides let us, and we have only so many trucks." AP reports nearly 2,000 people were left behind.

Boutros-Ghali urges Security Council to accept France's offer of intervention and says French troops should stay in Rwanda for three months, until UNAMIR reinforcements arrive. Boutros-Ghali says some 4,600 troops have been offered by nine countries.

State Department spokesman Mike McCurry tells reporters the United States "is supportive of their [French] efforts to muster international support for an early deployment of a UN force that would help put an end to the atrocities in Rwanda."

June 21

More than twenty French aid organizations speak out against the French plan to intervene militarily in Rwanda.

Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes says, "Someone must take the initiative to save what is left to save. France took the initiative and I don't know any other candidates."

June 22

The UN Security Council, in a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions, approves Resolution 929 authorizing French military intervention in Rwanda. The resolution authorizes French troops to use "all necessary means" to achieve the humanitarian objectives identified in Resolution 925, namely, contributing to the security and protection of civilians and providing security and support for the distribution of relief supplies. The French intervention is authorized for up to two months.

Given RPF opposition to the French intervention, some 42 French-speaking UN military observers from Togo, Congo, and Senegal are evacuated from Rwanda as a precautionary move.

OFDA reports that, to date, 10,700 bodies have been retrieved from Lake Victoria and buried.

June 23

The first of 47 U.S. armored personnel carriers leased to the UN arrive in Entebbe, Uganda from Germany.

First French troops cross into Rwanda on assessment missions from Zaire. Reuter reports that Radio RTLM says the French are coming to fight on the side of the interim government and are bringing in new weapons.

June 24

AP reports that relief groups allege that arms are moving through Goma, Zaire into "interim government"-held border areas of Rwanda.

June 27

To date, more than 1,300 French troops have arrived in Goma and Bukavu, Zaire. A total of 2,500 are expected.

June 28

UN Special Rapporteur issues report on Rwanda. Report characterizes massacres as "genocide."

Reuter reports that UNESCO has offered \$20,000 to help set up a humanitarian radio station in Rwanda that would counter the broadcasts of Hutu extremists.

UNAMIR spokesman reports that only five U.S. M-113 armored personnel carriers have arrived in Entebbe, Uganda.

July 1

Security Council Resolution 935 requests establishment of Commission of Experts to analyze evidence of grave violations of humanitarian law and possible acts of genocide in Rwanda.

OFDA DART field office to respond to crisis is established in Bujumbura, Burundi.

New York Times, reporting on French troops providing protection to a small group of Tutsi survivors in the southwest, quotes one French noncommissioned officer as saying, "This is not what we were led to believe. We were told that Tutsi were killing Hutu, and now this." Another French soldier tells the *Times*, "If we leave, they [the Tutsis] will be dead by tonight"

Washington Post reports that French soldiers had believed Hutu statements that Tutsis in the southwest were well-armed rebels. "We were manipulated," one French officer told the *Post*. "[W]e have not a single wounded Hutu here, just massacred Tutsis," he said.

July 4

RPF forces take control of Kigali.

July 5

French military authorities report that more than 2,300 French soldiers and marines and 300 Senegalese soldiers are in Zaire or western Rwanda and that France is considering setting up a "safe zone" in the southwest.

RPF says that it intends to appoint Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu and member of moderate MDR party, to head a new broad-based government.

July 6

Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman says that Belgium is "completely ready to work with this [new] government."

July 7

Faustin Twagiramungu tells Reuters Television, "I appeal to the big powers, especially the United States, to assume completely their responsibilities and send soldiers to Rwanda and not say that Africans should do it alone."

June 8

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that Rwanda needs more than one million tons of food aid this year to avert large-scale famine.

July 12

UNHCR reports as many as 500,000 Rwandan Hutus are moving toward the northwestern town of Gisenyi on the border with Zaire, fleeing an RPF advance.

Speaking in a personal capacity, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, UN Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, states, "It seems to me quite difficult to admit that in this century you can have a massacre of up to half a million people with everyone watching. I think it's a very, very sad event."

July 13

Ugandan officials report that 16,000 Rwandan refugees who had fled to Uganda in 1959 had returned to Rwanda following the fall of Kigali to RPF forces.

July 14

UNHCR reports that more than 100,000 Rwandan refugees have arrived in Goma, Zaire. UN Rwanda Emergency Office spokesman says 800,000 more are expected within two days. Officials report there are 1,500 tons of food in Goma, enough to feed 150,000 people for one month.

Reuter quotes Rwandan soldier as saying, "The Inkontanyi [rebels] are taking positions around Gisenyi and we believe they will start shelling it as soon as the civilians have emptied the town."

Reuter reports mobile radio station still operating from somewhere near Gisenyi on border with Zaire.

French Foreign Ministry spokesman says that remnants of the fleeing Rwandan "interim government" would not be welcome in the French zone in southwestern Rwanda.

Prime Minister-designate Faustin Twagiramungu returns to Kigali from exile in Belgium.

July 15

Reuter reports that extremist radio broadcasts are encouraging Rwandan Hutus to flee into Zaire, and that truckloads of Rwandan soldiers are also entering Zaire. UN officials estimate refugees are entering Zaire at a rate of 12,000 per hour.

Thirteen weeks after large-scale massacres began in Rwanda, President Clinton orders the closure of the Rwandan embassy in Washington, DC. In a statement, President Clinton says, "The United States cannot allow representatives of a regime that supports genocidal massacres to remain on our soil."

French officials say that French forces in Rwanda will detain members of the "interim government" if they are found in the French zone.

July 16

Tutsi refugees in Zaire who had fled the massacres in Rwanda report that grenades are thrown over the barbed wire surrounding their compound. The refugees believe Hutu extremists carried out the attack.

July 17

Journalists report that two mortar shells fall on the Zairean side of the border near Goma, killing several people. Scores of refugees are trampled to death as they flee from Gisenyi to Goma.

July 18

The International Committee of the Red Cross reports that up to 100,000 Rwandans have left the French zone and entered Zaire in the past 24 hours. Reuter reports that an additional 50,000 Rwandans have fled to Burundi, bringing the total there to 140,000. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood arrives in Goma, Zaire and says the United States is pledging an additional \$31 million in aid.

UNHCR reports a surge of refugee arrivals in Zaire following radio broadcasts that state "[the RPF] are going to come kill you." Reportedly, refugees are moving toward Uvira, Zaire.

July 19

Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu and formerly the RPF representative in Brussels, is sworn in as President of Rwanda.

Rwanda's Ambassador to the UN decides not to participate in the Security Council.

French forces distribute leaflets urging people to stay in Rwanda and promising food supplies.

UNHCR reports that radio broadcasts are continuing. A spokesman for the French aid organization AICF says the radio "has prompted general hysteria among people who believe only in their leaders, who have made devils of the Rwanda Patriotic Front. People are scared out of their wits."

USAID Administrator Atwood says, "The Rwandan military is everywhere [in Goma, Zaire] * * *. They are planning to invade the country."

July 20

Rwandan soldiers and civilians loot 200 tons of food and medicine from a Swedish aid station in the town of Cyangugu near the border with Zaire.

The first suspected case of cholera is reported in refugee camps near Goma.

July 22

United States announces that it will employ its military to step up the provision of humanitarian and logistical aid to the relief effort. The United States will upgrade the airport in Goma, Zaire, manage an "airhead" in Entebbe, Uganda that will become the focal point of the relief effort, and provide food, medical, and other relief aid.

[The two op-ed pieces by USCR referred to may be found in committee files.]

Senator SIMON. I thank you. One of the points that I think all three of you made is that the humanitarian effort has to take place in the interior of the country. We do not want to create a magnet outside of Rwanda, that pulls people away. It ought to be the other way around.

You mentioned, Doctor Destexhe, taking control of the airport, in terms of air traffic controllers and that sort of thing. Right now, one of the amazing things is, Zaire is demanding payment from us for every airplane that lands. It is an incredible situation. I will pass that along.

Doctor, you mentioned—I think it was your second point—that something should not be a priority; but I did not catch what you said should not be a priority.

Dr. DESTEXHE. Yes, there are two things: Airdrops should not be a priority. And then, we think that every organization, literally, every relief agency has its own expertise. So we do not need the military people, for example, to treat the patients from cholera. We think these kinds of things would be better done by the relief agencies.

But where the military is a real asset, adds a real added value to the relief effort, it is in the logistics. And you are right to mention the case of the airport in Goma. Today the airport of Goma is not yet running effectively. I mean, there is still a need for U.S. management of this airport.

If you will allow me to briefly comment on your first point, I think what we should absolutely avoid in Rwanda is what happened in Cambodia 15 years ago; when the Khmer Rouge were al-

lowed to shelter in Thailand, and became a very strong force acting against the Cambodians in Thailand.

The political situation is very different. But we should avoid that the relief efforts will strengthen the former government in Zaire or Burundi or Tanzania.

Senator SIMON. Let me ask all three of you a question, because you have heard me list the nations that have volunteered to do some things: Your organization, Doctor Destexhe was critical in Somalia, that some of the troops under U.N. command were not well disciplined. They were abusing the public that, ostensibly, they were there to help.

How do we deal with this particular problem? Any one of the three of you?

Ms. DESFORGES. We have talked about making human rights a part of the mandate of peacekeeping operations; and I think that would be something that this administration could play a leading role in, trying to encourage the U.N. to incorporate that element. And if, in fact, there is a component of human rights monitors involved in every peacekeeping operation, then presumably that kind of abuse will be much more limited.

Senator SIMON. And having the human rights monitors there should help in this, Doctor Destexhe?

Dr. DESTEXHE. Yes, it should really help. But they should be on the ground, in the villages. I mean, those human rights monitors should really be on the ground disseminated throughout the country.

There is a big difference between Somalia and Rwanda. We should say that, with the exception in some regions, of the Belgians and the French for historical reasons, the expatriates are not targeted as such in Rwanda, which is very different from Somalia; and so there is plenty of possibility for expatriates to work inside Rwanda.

And I am a bit afraid that there is that precedent of Somalia, which really makes people afraid to step into Rwanda. But this should not be the case. Expatriates can work easily inside Rwanda today.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Drumtra?

Mr. DRUMTRA. Well—your question about what can be done to better train troops for humanitarian operations?

Senator SIMON. Well, the U.N. says here, we have 10 nations who have volunteered troops. Some of them, from what I hear, have done a very good job. Tunisia. I hear Tunisian troops have been very good.

One country in this list, I have heard the troops are just not that disciplined. And the physicians, Doctors Without Borders, issued a report which I read, by the way; I want you to know someone reads those reports once in a while.

You issued a report that was critical of this part of the U.N. operation; that there was violation of the population of Somalia, by U.N. troops.

How can we avoid that?

Now, you have a different situation there because, in Somalia, for all practical purposes, there was no government. Here in Rwanda, you do have a government.

I do not know if you have had any experience along this line, or have any suggestions.

Mr. DRUMTRA. Well, a couple of suggestions. I think you had referred to it earlier in the hearing: The idea of a standing U.N. force.

This is an idea that the administration, I think, was very keen on when it first came into office a couple of years ago, and now has backed away from it. A standing U.N. force of several thousand troops.

Part of the idea of a standing force is that it is there, undergoing training on a continual basis, for the types of humanitarian emergencies that it is supposed to address.

Second, the U.S. military in the last year has undergone some model training exercises, I believe, down in Louisiana and elsewhere, that American NGO's have participated in, to give American troops a better understanding of the complexities of working in the chaos of a humanitarian emergency.

I would suggest that these types of training exercises need to be undertaken more frequently in this country, for our own troops; and tried elsewhere, with some of the better troops from other nations that participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Dr. DESTEXHE. I can give you the example of the British Government. I mean, every soldier from Britain, going on a peacekeeping mission, will get a 3-month training, specifically on the peacekeeping mission; with a course on international law and the Geneva Conventions. This was the case in Somalia.

We realize that most of the soldiers in Somalia never heard about the Geneva Convention, which had been ratified by all of the member states of the U.N. So it is strange that no one in the army understands that.

But the British Army wrote a manual, which is a British Army manual on peacekeeping, which provides very good information for every soldier going on peacekeeping. So I think this kind of experience could be expanded to other countries, and should be recommended by the U.N.

Senator SIMON. Senator Jeffords?

Senator JEFFORDS. This has been very helpful, your testimony. I just have one question: Do you know anything about this new government that is there? And can you give me any confidence that it is some group that we should rely upon?

Ms. DESFORGES. There are some promising signs in the composition of the new government. Chairman Simon has alluded to the ethnic background of the President and the Prime Minister, that both of those are Hutu; and in fact, a substantial number of other Ministers are also Hutu. Many of the key Ministries are, in fact, in the hands of Hutu.

I am less encouraged by the apparent decision of this government to extend the transition period from 22 months to 5 years. I find that a very troublesome development.

I understand, of course, that the country is severely disorganized. But this is a country where people are extremely flexible; and just as they departed, within a very short time, I think that when conditions are reestablished, they will return within a relatively short time.

And I think the kind of elaborate mechanisms that were described by general here—meaning tape recordings of people in the villages, to persuade them to return home—and so on and so forth; I think that is not necessary. I think word of mouth will do the job very quickly; and within 24 to 48 hours, people know who has gone home, what has happened to them there. And on that basis, they then make the decision if they intend to return home.

So I think that it is not going to be necessary to foresee a 5-year period of transition, before formal elections can be held. And I find it troublesome that at least some members of the government believe that this period needs to be extended so long.

I think that we need to pay careful attention to the continued reports of summary executions which have not, the reports have not ceased. And it is extremely difficult to verify this information; and many of our requests for investigation by the RPF have not been satisfactorily dealt with until this time.

I think it is necessary to see the establishment of a functioning judicial system. It is also necessary to pay attention to the land policy of this new government.

There have been approximately 20,000 Tutsi refugees who have returned to Rwanda from the north, I believe. And we need to pay careful attention to where they are settled; and whether or not the people who have fled their lands more recently, namely the Hutu who have fled, whether they have the opportunity to return to their holdings.

These are major questions; not just in terms of justice, but also in terms of political stability. And I think we need to regard these from both points of view.

Senator SIMON. If my colleague would yield, you heard Mr. Drumtra recommend that we recognize the government. The French have recognized the government. If Bill Clinton says to you, "Should we recognize the government?" What is your answer?

Ms. DESFORGES. I would say this is a question which Mr. Moose should certainly address this coming weekend. But I would say that he should bargain hard; and that he needs to get some assurances on these points that I have mentioned, before he recommends recognition.

Senator SIMON. All right. Thank you.

Mr. DRUMTRA. Mr. Jeffords, if I may add, if you do not mind. The information we have received indicates that, of the 19 ministerial positions that have been announced in the new government, 12 are filled by ethnic Hutu, 6 by ethnic Tutsi, and 1 is unclear at this point.

It appears that, in terms of party breakdown, 10 of the 19 positions are filled by political parties other than the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Front; 9 positions are filled by the RPF. We are in the process of trying to get other details along those lines.

I would add that this idea of recognition, this is the time. This is the time when the United States does have maximum leverage. It is entirely appropriate for Secretary Moose to use this opportunity to put the new government on notice about what is expected and what the standards are; and that should be part of the recognition package.

Dr. DESTEXHE. Very briefly, I think in the very, very short term we can see if this new government is really committed to three things: first of all, human rights; second, free access to humanitarian organizations; and third, its attitude toward the refugees, and this could be seen in the very, very short term.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. We thank you very, very much. We thank you for your testimony, but more than that for what you are doing on the scene there.

Our hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIONEL A. ROSENBLATT, PRESIDENT, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee: Your hearing represents an important opportunity to further speed up the U.S. and international response to what has so quickly become the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world. I had hoped to testify today before this committee; we are submitting this testimony in lieu of that.

How Rwanda became the worst humanitarian disaster in the world is a story to be dissected after the refugee death rates begin to come down. Suffice it to say that there is plenty of blame to go around for failing to get involved earlier. For months the U.S. and the international community let genocide play out in Rwanda. As in Bosnia, early action would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars.

Now, only the logistical capacities of the U.S. and other militaries can effectively save the almost 2 million refugees who have fled. After a somewhat hesitant White House start, the U.S. military is now getting into high gear led by Joint Chiefs Chairman Shalikashvili with the same gusto as when he commanded the rescue effort for the Kurds in 1991.

Some Americans may ask why the U.S. is doing most of the rescue job. The answer is that in our military we possess most of the world's capacity to deliver equipment and trained personnel over long distances. The President should be working on the NATO countries to commit their military machines to join in the operation. As several in the Congress have remarked, it is good to see the NATO militaries engaged in useful activity, now that the cold war is over. Countries not playing a direct role should help pay the freight.

In the days ahead, Rwandans—refugees and internally displaced—will continue to die in large numbers and we should concentrate on making every hour count in saving refugee lives. But we must also look ahead to the next challenges:

- We must speed up the delivery of water equipment which is essential to fighting the cholera epidemic which has now claimed over 14,000 lives. Pumps, tanker trucks, water bladders and simple chlorination are needed immediately. If the Goma airport is too congested, alternate airfields should be used.
- Beyond Goma, there are refugee flows in to Bukavu and further south. The UN and U.S. forces should swiftly take preventive action to head off cholera there before it starts.
- The UN and U.S. forces should dynamically encourage voluntary repatriation of the refugees. Even as refugees are being stabilized along the Zaire border, every effort should be made to facilitate their early return. *The center of gravity of U.S. and UN assistance should quickly move from Goma, Zaire and Entebbe, Uganda, to Kigali and other points in Rwanda.* Supplies moving unobstructed to villages where refugees will return will be an important symbol that conditions are ripe for repatriation. Incentives for the refugees to return—guarantees of land, farming implements and other basic support—would get them home so they can harvest their crops before they rot. Repatriation food kits and UN monitors to allay refugee security concerns should be put in place. Now that radio broadcasts telling refugees to leave have ceased, there should be broadcasts to encourage the refugees to return home. Return should take place before the rainy season begins in just over a month.
- The U.S. should supply transport, equipment and logistics support to ensure early deployment of an expanded UNAMIR force inside Rwanda, which would help stabilize the situation and guarantee protection for returning refugees.
- UN troops in Rwanda should insure that the defeated Rwandan soldiers in Zaire are not permitted to return with retrieved weapons or re-group, and that those responsible for genocide are apprehended.

- An international judicial process to bring to justice those responsible for the mass murders of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda must be pursued, which will allow those innocent to feel that they can safely return to Rwanda.
- To coordinate these tasks which involve a number of U.S. agencies, President Clinton should name a senior official in charge with full mandated authority over all U.S. components.
- Similarly, the UN should put in place an effective over-all commander of international stature to coordinate the logistical and other relief efforts by the U.S. and other countries in this life-saving work.

Three years ago, the American military intervened to save the Kurds. Now, working urgently together, the U.S. and European governments under a UN umbrella can mobilize their military logistical capacity to save hundreds of thousands of lives.

With U.S. leadership, thousands of lives are being saved. To turn away would have diminished us in the eyes of the world and in our own estimation. The challenge of the future is to build an international system to head off such humanitarian emergencies before they get out of control.

MEMORANDUM OF GERALD GAHIMA, RWANDESE PARTIOTIC FRONT SPECIAL ENVOY TO
THE U.N. AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The government of Rwanda wishes to express its gratitude to the people of United States of America for the generosity and compassion with which they have responded to alleviate the suffering of the victims of violence in Rwanda.

The government of Rwanda is equally grateful to the United States Congress for the concern and support it has extend to the people of Rwanda during the tragic period of the past four months.

The government and people of Rwanda further commend the government of the United States of America for its long standing commitment to the restoration of peace in Rwanda and the leading role it has taken in responding to the current humanitarian crisis.

The government of Rwanda welcomes the decision to deploy American forces on the humanitarian mission inside Rwanda, gives its strong assurances about the security situation in the country and the safety of U.S. personnel and calls upon the American public to support the bold and noble goals of the mission.

The Rwandese government appreciates that the responsibility for resolving the crisis in Rwanda lies primarily with the Rwandese people themselves. It is an inescapable fact, however, that owing to the magnitude of the crisis, the Rwandese people cannot by themselves effectively deal with the crisis at hand without the support of the international community. The government of Rwanda believes that the international community generally and the United States Government in particular can and should contribute to the resolution of the crisis and calls upon the United States Government:

(a) To support the new government in Rwanda, as it offers our country's last and only hope of avoiding disintegration.

(b) To continue with the program of providing humanitarian assistance to the needy both inside and outside Rwanda.

(c) To use the organs of the U.N. to take urgent steps to apprehend the perpetrators of genocide now sheltering in the French protection zone as well as Tanzania, Zaire, France and other countries.

(d) To promote the setting up of international war crimes tribunals to bring the perpetrators of the atrocities to justice.

(e) To find practical ways of silencing Radio Milles Collines whose broadcasts have incited massacres and unwarranted displacement of millions of Rwandese with catastrophic consequences.

(f) To facilitate the expeditious deployment of UNAMIR, so that it can fulfill its humanitarian mandate of providing protection and assistance to those who may need it, including returning refugees.

(g) To move the U.N. Security Council to devise an effective plan for disarming and demobilizing, without delay, the members of the militia and renegade soldiers of the former government who are regrouping in Zaire as their presence on the common border with Zaire will lead, sooner or later, to a resumption of hostilities which will compromise the prospects for the immediate repatriation of the civilian population, consume resources that ought to be used for reconstruction and threaten the peace and stability of the region.

(h) To provide the resources and equipment, especially radio transmitters, newsprint and printing equipment, necessary for use in a campaign to promote national unity and reconciliation.

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